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In cryptographic schemes that use keys, security of the scheme as a whole depends on the
security of the key. Our area of interest is in applications where the keys used to encrypt
files need to be changed, particularly when those files are stored by third parties. Proxy
Re-Encryption (PRE), originally introduced by Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss in 1998, allows
a proxy to transform ciphertexts encrypted under one public key into an encryption of the
same message under a new public key without learning the message. This is achieved by
sending the proxy an update token created using the current secret key and new public key.
The original motivation cited for PRE was email forwarding, as a means of Alice
sharing her encrypted emails with Bob. Access revocation, the other obvious application of
PRE, was not considered, meaning many PRE schemes are unsuitable as a mechanism for
mitigating key compromise. In this thesis, we take a fresh look at PRE, particularly its
suitability in enforcing cryptographic access control and as a key rotation mechanism to
enforce key life cycles.
In our first contribution, we consider a malicious proxy that seeks to perform unautho-
rised re-encryptions. We propose a number of security definitions concerning an adversary’s
ability to perform a re-encryption not initiated by the client. One of these definitions
is authenticated re-encryption, which allows the identity of the party who initiated the
re-encryption to be verified, which is useful for verifying that access has been granted
legitimately.
Our second contribution is to define post-compromise security for PRE. PRE schemes
meeting this definition can be used for access revocation and key expiry. We create the
strongest definition to date, whereby compromise of the old secret key, old ciphertext
and update token cannot distinguish re-encrypted ciphertexts. We provide an efficient
post-compromise secure PRE scheme using lattice-based cryptography.
Finally, we investigate PRE security with adaptive key corruptions. Most work on
PRE considers selective key corruptions, where key compromise happens before adversaries
learn any challenges. Adaptive security, on the other hand, allows adversaries to corrupt
keys at any point, as long as they do not corrupt any key that can be used to directly
decrypt challenge ciphertexts. Existing work shows how adaptive security can be reached
from selective security, but usually relies to some extent on needing to guess which keys
will be corrupted in advance. This approach leads to a large security loss as the guess
must be correct. We achieve tighter bounds by taking a different approach which extends
observations already made in the literature to prove adaptive security at a much smaller
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In this Chapter
This chapter introduces the context of this thesis and our motivation for studying Proxy Re-
Encryption (PRE). We begin by discussing how use of cloud services has become increasingly
popular, and how cryptography can be used as a mechanism for ensuring that clients still
have control over their data when using cloud services. We then discuss how security
is defined in cryptography, motivating our work on creating stronger, application-driven
notions of security for PRE.
I: 1 Introduction to the Cloud
In the past, companies would have acquired and maintained their own infrastructure and
software which would be physically located in sites they controlled. However, modern
times have seen a huge increase in using cloud services, where infrastructure and other
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services are maintained externally by a third party. For example, cloud storage has become
increasingly popular in recent years, evolving from acting as a source of backup data to
becoming the default storage for many applications and systems. An extension of this is
the rise of popular media streaming platforms such as Netflix and Spotify, allowing clients
to subscribe to on-demand access for media files as opposed to storing them locally. This
has increased the number for devices with limited in-built storage as long as they have an
Internet connection.
Using cloud services allows clients to reduce their infrastructure and maintenance costs
and only pay for the services they use. Whilst use of the term ‘the cloud’ was popularised by
Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) in 2006, concepts of time-sharing and outsourcing
computation have been around since the 1960s [Wil18]. In this thesis, we take “the cloud” to
mean a server controlled by a third party, which a client is using for outsourcing purposes.
There are various types of cloud service, the most common of which are Software-as-a-
Service (SaaS)1, Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) [NK16].
Forecasts predict that cloud usage will only continue to grow; the 2016 Harvey Nash /
KPMG CIO Survey [NK16] found that the number of Chief Information Officers (CIOs)
planning significant investment in cloud services for the following three years went up for all
services – from 31% to 49% for SaaS, 25% to 39% for PaaS, and 20% to 37% for IaaS. There
has also been a huge increase in individuals’ use of cloud services. In particular, the use of
online streaming services has led to a decline in sales of DVDs [YCPC18], with streaming
and downloading services taking over physical sales in early 2017 [Swe17]. There is also
increasing prevalence of cloud storage being the default over local storage, as can be seen in
multiple smartphones, including Google Pixel phones, offering “unlimited storage” for photos
because they automatically store photos in the cloud [Sav16]. This has clear advantages for
end users including not needing to worry about storage limitations of their smartphone,
and in being able to access remotely stored files when they get a new smartphone.
Whilst using the cloud has a number of practical advantages, it also comes with risks,
some of which are poorly understood. One result of cloud backups by default in smartphones
is that often, everyday users are unaware that data created on their phones is backed up
in the cloud, as was the case with the 2014 iCloud data hack [Coo17]. One important
1which includes Storage-as-a-Service
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factor that an organisation should take into account when using the cloud is that if an
organisation chooses to outsource data storage and processing, this does not necessarily shift
their responsibility for ensuring the data is adequately protected, meaning they still have
liability for data breaches. For example, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
in the EU [GDP16] indicates how customer personal data should be managed, and failure
to comply can result in fines of up to 10 million euros or up to 2% of an organisation’s
global turnover, whichever is higher.
The most obvious concern with using the cloud for storage is the need to make sure
that the stored data does not get lost, as satirised in Figure I.1. Solutions clarifying the
Figure I.1: Outsourcing storage means trusting that the cloud will
not lose the data.
way client data is handled include creating legislation over how data is handled, Cloud
Service Providers (CSPs) publicising their data policies and terms and conditions of using
the service, and making customers aware of data breaches. We will now explore these ideas
further and point out some shortcomings with respect to how well they mitigate the risks
associated with using cloud services.
Limitations of relying on policy. Whilst CSPs set out terms and conditions which
state how client data will be used, this may not provide full confidence. An infamous
example justifying this is Dropbox’s terms and conditions not accurately conveying how
client data is handled, as pointed out by security researcher Christopher Soghoian [Leo11].
On 12thApril 2011, the Dropbox help site stated that “Dropbox employees aren’t able to
access user files... they only have access to file metadata... All files stored on Dropbox
servers are encrypted (AES-256) and are inaccessible without your account password.” This
led customers to believe their files were encrypted in such a way that Dropbox did not
have the means to decrypt them. However, Soghoian pointed out that this assertion was
15
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contradicted by another claim by Dropbox – that if a client attempts to upload a file which
has previously been uploaded, then this would be detected and the second upload cancelled
to save space. On 23rdApril 2011, after Soghoian pointed out this discrepancy, Dropbox’s
policy changed to say that “Dropbox employees are prohibited from viewing the content
of files you store in your Dropbox account, and are only permitted to view file metadata...
we have a small number of employees who must be able to access user data for the reasons
stated in our privacy policy” [emphasis added]. This policy wording change indicates that
Dropbox always had the capability to access client data, despite what the policy originally
said. This is a far cry from the privacy expectations that Dropbox appeared to convey at
the start of 2011.
A further problem with relying on legal mechanisms alone is that policies are usually
written by the CSP and not by clients, particularly when those clients are small businesses
and individual users. Clients only have the choice to either agree or disagree with all terms
and conditions, as opposed to having fine-grained control over what they deem acceptable.
This is true both when clients initially agree, and when a CSP’s data-handling policies
change. Consenting to changes in a policy has the further issue that clients must also factor
in the cost of transitioning to another service or starting a private infrastructure if they
disagree with the changes. This may impact their decision to agree to new terms and end
up with them agreeing to terms they would object to given a fresh choice. It is therefore
unwise for a client to rely on CSP policies alone to ensure appropriate controls over their
data.
Awareness of data breaches. Organisations have not always been transparent in their
handling of customer data, and do not always disclose when there has been a data breach
in good time, if at all. In 2012, Dropbox reported that user email addresses had been stolen
but failed to mention until 2016 that passwords had also been stolen [BBC16]. In 2016,
Uber suffered a data breach after which they paid money to the hackers to delete the stolen
data and attempted to hide the incident from regulators [BBC18]. This demonstrates how
the existence of regulation does not go far enough to control how data is handled. It is
also worth noting that when organisations elect to pay hackers to delete stolen data, it is
impossible to know whether the hackers actually did delete the data. Even if legislation is
upheld by the provider, in order to disclose a breach they must first be aware of it. This
16
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lack of transparency in failure to disclose breaches creates a problem where clients are
unable to respond to data breaches and mitigate damage. In summary, whilst regulation
can act as an incentive for appropriate data controls, additional measures are necessary to
implement control of clients’ data.
The most pressing concern is that the cloud has the potential capability to perform
malicious actions. Aiming for security in this setting covers scenarios where the cloud is
hacked by malicious parties, when the cloud itself deliberately performs malicious actions,
or where incompetence leads to malicious consequences. It would be preferable to control
precisely what a malicious cloud service provider can do with data that has been uploaded
by a client. More specifically, when the client also outsources some additional processing
over that data we would like a mechanism that controls what actions the server is and is
not capable of performing. In the ideal world, we would like to ensure that, as much as
possible, the client maintains control over their data when using cloud services.
I: 2 Cryptography and the Cloud
Earlier, we noted how legal mechanisms may not be enough to ensure clients have adequate
control over data outsourced to the cloud2. We now discuss how cryptography can offer
clients more control over their data, including how it provides a formal means of both
defining and proving security.
Cryptography addresses a number of aspects of information security including the
provision of confidentiality, authentication and integrity. For example:
• Encryption keeps messages confidential from parties who do not know the secret key
necessary to decrypt.
• Cryptographic authentication mechanisms provide a means of users verifying where or
who some piece of data originated from.
• Data integrity enables us to ensure that data has not been altered.
If a client wants to ensure the confidentiality of externally stored files, one solution is to
encrypt them prior to storage. This means that neither the cloud nor any other malicious
parties attempting to hack into the cloud should be able to read the contents of the files.
2From this point on, we will be agnostic as to which Cloud Service Provider (CSP) is being used and
will therefore use the term ‘cloud’.
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Since keys are almost always much shorter than files, it is reasonable to assume that a
client who lacks the capacity to store files locally will at least be able to store cryptographic
keys, so this solution is appropriate for the majority of cases where storage is outsourced.
Whilst this simple solution is adequate for the basic storage scenario, the cloud is
increasingly being used for more than just storage. To this end, there are a number of
cryptographic primitives specifically designed for the scenario where functionality is also
outsourced to the cloud. These primitives aim to provide some level of security in this
setting. For example:
• Searchable encryption [ABC+05,BBO07, SPS14,CJJ+14] allows clients to retrieve
files associated with certain keywords, without the plaintext files or keywords being
leaked to the cloud. It also seeks to verify that the cloud has retrieved all relevant
files as opposed to only retrieving some subset of them.
• Verifiable computation, formalised in [ABG+97,GGP10], checks that a third party
has performed a computation correctly, without the client needing to perform the
whole computation locally.
• Order-preserving encryption [AKSX04, BCLO09, BCO11, TYM14] permits range
queries over encrypted data, designed for encrypted databases.
However, as the priority in creating some of these primitives was functionality as
opposed to security, the security guarantees offered can sometimes be lacking or poorly
understood. For example, published material on order-preserving encryption first appeared
in 2004 by Agrawal et al [AKSX04], and was proven secure in a comparatively weak model
where the adversary has no prior information about the plaintext and can neither encrypt
nor decrypt values of their choosing. These assumptions are unrealistic in many real-world
scenarios, and make security barely comparable to that of standard encryption. There
have been subsequent attempts to create stronger security definitions for order-preserving
encryption [BCO11], but it is arguable that such definitions must either sacrifice how well
they preserve the order, or the how well they model realistic attacks. Whilst it can be
argued that encryption with additional functionality involves an inevitable trade-off with
security, it is useful to know precisely what kind of security such schemes have.
Our scenario of interest is when a client has encrypted their files prior to storing them
in the cloud, and the client later wishes to change the key which the file is encrypted under.
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This could be for a number of reasons such as satisfying compliance directives or to enforce
access control policies. For the former, NIST recommends regular key rotation [BBB+12],
as does the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard [PCI18] and the Open Web
Application Security Project (OWASP) [OWA18]. For the latter, an organisation can
choose which of its employees can access specific files by having those files encrypted under
those keys. Should access need to be granted or revoked from someone, the files need
to be re-encrypted to a new key accordingly (we shall elaborate on this in Chapter IV).
One trivial solution has the client download, decrypt, encrypt using the new key, then
re-upload the file. However, this can be very expensive, particularly for modern applications
involving large databases, or if the client has limited processing capability (as is the case
with smartphones), or where bandwidth is expensive. A preferable solution would involve
utilising the cloud’s often advanced computational capacity, as opposed to placing the entire
computational burden on the client.
Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE), introduced in [BBS98], aims to solve this problem. It
allows a ciphertext encrypted using one key to be transformed into an encryption under
another key without revealing either the plaintext or the decryption keys to the proxy.
This is achieved by the client computing an update token which it sends to the cloud or
‘proxy’, enabling it to perform the transformation on the client’s behalf. In other words,
PRE allows clients who store encrypted files in the cloud to outsource re-encryption to new
keys to the cloud without compromising either the secret keys or the underlying data.
I: 3 A Brief Introduction to Computational Security
One of the main advantages that cryptographic solutions offer over the alternative solutions
discussed in Section I: 1 is that the security of cryptographic schemes is defined formally
and in such a way that it can be proven. In this section, we discuss how security in
cryptography is defined. We explain what formal security is, why it is necessary, and some
basic techniques for proving security.
Historically, cryptography was mainly used by privileged entities such as governments
and militaries. Its development was kept secret, and was generally considered more as a
craft requiring creativity than a scientific discipline requiring scrutiny, peer review and
formal proofs. As a result, history is littered with examples of poor cryptography some
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of which had a significant impact. For example, Mary, Queen of Scots was executed for
participating in the Babington plot after her letters were intercepted and successfully
decrypted. The code used was a type of substitution cipher, and therefore prone to simple
statistical analysis [Sin00]. Another example is the breaking of the Enigma machine cipher
used by the Nazis in the Second World War, which is thought to have shortened the war by
two years [Kee10]. Whilst the developers believed their cipher to be unbreakable, it had
features that enabled successful cryptanalysis, such as letters never mapping to themselves
when encrypted [Jon13].
As a result of these failings, one of the important developments in modern cryptography
is formal security. Formal security provides a means of specifying what ‘security’ means
for a cryptographic primitive, and provides a mechanism for proving that a particular
construction meets that definition. As written by Jonathan Katz and Yehuda Lindell in
‘Introduction to Modern Cryptography’ [KL14]:
“...formal definitions of security are an essential first step in the design of any
cryptographic primitive or protocol”.
Definitions are a powerful tool for helping us understand precisely what attacks a crypto-
graphic primitive protects against, and what attacks it does not. Definitions in cryptography
model precise attacks and scenarios, with the overall aim of modelling real-world attacks.
They take a high-level idea such as message confidentiality, and translate it into terms
that give precision as to what a cryptographic scheme protects against from which a
mathematical proof of security can be created. In Phillip Rogaway’s paper ‘On the Role of
Definitions in and Beyond Cryptography’ [Rog04], he argues that it is definitions that tell
us what a cryptographic primitive achieves, rather than specific algorithms or software. A
comprehensive overview of the importance and usefulness of definitions in cryptography
can be found in [Rog04].
Computational security is a formal approach to security which was first published by
Goldwasser and Micali in 1984 [GM84] when they defined message privacy – the basic
notion which encryption schemes are expected to meet. In this framework, security is
defined in terms of a challenger running a game (or experiment) against an adversary. This
adversary is assumed to be a Probabilistic Polynomial-Time (PPT) algorithm that the
challenger calls on during the game which tries to correctly answer the challenge issued by
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the challenger. If a PPT adversary exists that can win the game significantly more often
than would be expected by randomly guessing the correct answer, then the scheme is not
considered secure. If there are no PPT adversaries that can win the game with a better
strategy than guessing, then the scheme is considered secure.
The experiment run by the challenger describes precisely what information the adversary
has access to and what their goal is. In computational security, cryptographic schemes are
proven secure using an assumption which states that a particular problem is hard. We use
a reduction to demonstrate how breaking the security of the scheme can be used to break
the underlying assumption. We provide a more detailed discussion on how computational
security works in Section II: 3 after we have presented the necessary preliminaries in
Chapter II.
I: 4 Discussion on Security Definitions
Definitions not only allow us to assess the security of a particular scheme, but they can
be compared to each other to determine which is stronger. For example, security against
random-plaintext attacks (where two random messages are encrypted) is weaker than
security against chosen-plaintext attacks (when the adversary gets to choose two specific
messages). Therefore, if a scheme is not secure against random-plaintext attacks, then it is
not secure against chosen-plaintext attacks.
Definitions can also be used to form basic observations that teach us the minimum re-
quirements a scheme needs for the definition to be met. For example, for a public-key encryp-
tion scheme to be Indistinguishable against Chosen Plaintext Attacks (IND-CPA-secure),
the encryption algorithm must introduce some randomness to the ciphertext to prevent
encryptions of the same message always being the same. We shall elaborate on this in Sec-
tion II: 3.2. Therefore, when constructing a scheme that is IND-CPA-secure, cryptographers
know that some random sampling in the encryption algorithm is necessary.
I: 4.1 Creating a definition
There are several aspects to consider in the process of creating a formal security definition:
1. The high-level (informal) idea.
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For example, “An eavesdropper should not be able to read encrypted messages”. It is
good practice to give an informal definition together with the formal one, to give the
reader an intuition of what the definition means.
2. Defining what the attacker’s goal is.
Giving a precise idea of what constitutes a ‘win’ in the game. For an encryption
scheme, does the attacker need to recover the full message, or do they just need to
determine which of two messages has been encrypted? In practice definitions are often
stronger than may seem necessary or realistic. This is partly because historically,
people have been mistaken as to what an attacker can realistically do3, and partly
because if a scheme can be proven to meet a stronger definition then this is clearly
preferable from a theoretical standpoint.
3. Defining the advantage.
In the computational model, it is technically possible for an adversary to output a
random guess and win the game. We are therefore more concerned with the advantage
of winning the game over guessing. How the advantage is defined depends on the
game. For example, if the adversary needs to choose between one of two options as in
an indistinguishability game, then a random guess will be correct with probability
1
2 . The adversary’s advantage of winning an indistinguishability game is therefore
defined as
[∣∣(probability of winning)− 12 ∣∣]. In other games where the adversary must
output a specific value, such as creating a forged signature, the advantage is closer
to the probability of winning the game at all as opposed to having to adjust for the
possibility of a random guess being successful.
4. What can the attacker do?
We must define what information is available to the adversary, including whether the
challenge is in response to any input from the adversary or generated independently.
For example, for plaintext indistinguishability, does the attacker know which two mes-
sages could have been encrypted? For an encryption scheme that is IND-CPA-secure,
3During the Pacific War, American intelligence intercepted Japanese communications which indicated
that “AF” was under threat. Whilst they suspected that “AF” referred to Midway, they could not confirm
this through cryptanalysis alone and the higher-ups wanted confirmation before agreeing to take action, as
they believed Midway to be an unlikely target. Intelligence proceeded to send an encrypted message to
Midway, asking them to send a plaintext message saying that their supplies were low. This message was
intercepted by the Japanese who then sent an encrypted message indicating that supplies were low at “AF”
– thus American intelligence was able to deduce that “AF” did indeed refer to Midway [Wea00]
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the attacker gets to decide those messages.
A particular point of interest is whether to write the theoretically strongest possible
definition, or to settle for a definition appropriate for a specific scenario. For example,
the challenger in an IND-CCA-secure game gives the attacker a decryption oracle which
enables them to decrypt any ciphertext apart from the challenge ciphertext. Whilst this is
clearly stronger than IND-CPA-secure security, it requires extra cryptographic measures to
be in place which may be more than is necessary for the basic encryption scenario where
the eavesdropper has no means of decrypting any ciphertexts.
I: 4.2 What makes a new definition useful?
We now discuss our beliefs on what needs to be considered when creating a useful security
definition in cryptography. The art of devising relevant definitions in cryptography requires
the following aspects to be considered:
The definition should model an actual threat. Motivations for a new definition are
highly important. A new definition is unlikely to be taken seriously unless there is a clear
application for a construction that meets it, and this threat is not covered by existing
definitions.
There should be a construction that meets the definition. Whilst definitions can provide
a gold standard for a cryptographic primitive to meet, not being able to provide a scheme
that meets it limits the usefulness of the definition – it is easy to create a notion of security
which is very strong in theory, but impossible to meet in reality. Providing a tangible
construction connects theory and practice4. It is also useful to indicate how such a scheme
might be created by demonstrating results around the definition that convey necessary
elements or properties that any construction meeting the definition must have, such as
the need for certain algorithms to be probabilistic. This helps other cryptographers to
create constructions that meet the definition. In other words, definitions should facilitate
composability – where we can take a modular approach both to the design of constructions
and the proof that these constructions meet the given definition [Rog04].
The definition should be as simple as possible. Definitions which are overly complicated
or appear substantially different from similar definitions will be harder to understand and
4Note however that just because a construction exists, does not mean this construction will be efficient
enough to be considered practical for real-life implementation.
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are therefore less likely to be picked up by the cryptographic community and contribute to
further advancements. Complex definitions may also result in complicated proofs, which
are more likely to contain (potentially unnoticed) errors. Creating a definition which has a
similar structure to related definitions is helpful both in making the two easier to compare,
and in making it possible for proof techniques used for the related definition to be useful
in proofs for the new one. Whilst it is often inevitable that stronger definitions are more
complicated than weaker ones (for example, if the adversary is given additional oracles), it
is important to keep the complexity to a minimum.
Many of the contributions in this thesis involve creating new security definitions. These
are the principles we used for these contributions. In each case, we describe a construction
that provably meets the definition. Many of our new definitions builds on existing ones,
and for those that differ we seek to be as intuitive as possible.
I: 5 Motivation for studying PRE
In this thesis, we investigate the extent to which cryptography can enable clients outsourcing
to a third party such as the cloud to retain control over their data, focusing on the
cryptographic primitive of PRE. Recall that PRE is a cryptographic primitive that allows
a ciphertext encrypted using one key to be transformed to an encryption under a new key
without revealing either the plaintext or the decryption keys to the proxy.
Whilst out primary motivation is investigating how cryptography in the cloud can
enable clients to have greater control over their data, our motivations for exploring PRE
in particular are twofold. Firstly, security in most cryptographic schemes often comes
down to how well the keys are managed. Therefore, the ability to change keys without
losing security, and the opportunities presented by this, are worth further exploration.
Secondly, unlike some other cryptographic schemes, the problem of changing keys already
has a trivial solution – namely the client downloading, locally decrypting and encrypting
using the new key, and then re-uploading the file. In comparison, other cryptographic
primitives such as multi-party computation (where two or more parties wish to compute
a function over their combined inputs without revealing the inputs to any other party)
have no trivial solution outside cryptography. PRE schemes that are useful in practice
therefore should have some advantage over the trivial solution. For example, the email
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forwarding application is justified by pointing out that re-encryption does not require Alice
to be online once the server has the update token. Other practical benefits that a PRE
scheme should have in order to be practically useful include it being cheaper for clients,
either computationally or in terms of the bandwidth used. This caveat means that building
a PRE scheme using some of the more intensive cryptographic tools (e.g. obfuscation)
limits its usability, and so constructing a scheme that is useful in practice presents an
interesting challenge. We shall elaborate on this when we look at existing PRE schemes in
Section III: 4.
The original motivation given for PRE in [BBS98] was email forwarding – if Alice is
going on holiday and wants to forward her emails to her secretary, Bob, without giving him
her secret key, then she can have her email server re-encrypt all her emails to Bob’s public
key by generating an update token for the server to use during this time. In Section I: 2, we
discussed other situations where it is beneficial to change the key that a ciphertext has been
encrypted under, namely key rotation, and enforcing cryptographic access control. An initial
exploration reveals that PRE in practice is not always appropriate for these applications,
both in terms of how security is defined, and in constructions. We do not go into more
detail here, as further explanation requires some preliminary understanding of PRE. We
therefore revisit our overall motivations in Section III: 5, and describe the contributions of
each chapter in their respective introductions.
I: 6 Overview of Contributions & Roadmap
In this thesis, we investigate how well PRE is suited to key expiry and access revocation.
We do this by examining both existing security definitions and constructions, and proposing
new alternatives. We also seek to model adversaries that are stronger than in existing
models. We examine the existing security definitions for PRE and note where they are
lacking with respect to applications where keys become compromised. We then fill this
gap by giving new security definitions, and present constructions that provably meet those
definitions.
In Chapter II we describe general preliminaries for mathematics and cryptography,
before describing preliminaries specific to PRE in Chapter III. We then move on to our
main contributions. In Chapter IV we explore definitions that prevent the proxy from
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performing unauthorised re-encryptions. In Chapter V we define Post-Compromise Security
for PRE, as a means of identifying when a scheme is appropriate for key rotation and access
revocation. In Chapter VI we look at strengthening our definitions to the adaptive key
corruption model, and how to prove security in this model. Finally, we offer concluding
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In this Chapter
We introduce notation and preliminaries for general cryptography, and define some standard
cryptographic schemes. We then discuss formal security in more detail, giving explicit
security games and formally defining the concepts used to define something as secure in
the computational model, before stating the standard assumptions used in computational
proofs. Finally, we present some constructions of cryptographic primitives which are built
on later in this thesis in the construction of PRE schemes.
II: 1 Maths and Notation
Here we discuss general notation, but note that more specific notation is defined in the
relevant sections.
We denote by Zn the set of integers modulo n, and by Z∗n the set {1, 2, . . . , n− 1}. For
a set X , sampling an element x uniformly at random from X is denoted x $← X . We say
a distribution D is (B, δ)-bounded if Pr
[
|x| > B : x $← D
]
≤ δ. We use x $← D to denote
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that the element x is sampled according to distribution D.
We sometimes abuse this notation by writing y $← Alg(x) to explicitly convey that the
algorithm Alg is probabilistic and therefore generates some randomness in creating output
y. We write y ← Alg(x) when Alg is deterministic, and y ($)← Alg(x) for the general case
where the function could either be probabilistic or deterministic, depending on the specific
scheme.
II: 2 Basic cryptography definitions
Definitions in cryptography use a security parameter, λ ∈ N which is usually represented in
unary as 1λ. The security parameter measures how ‘hard’ it is to break the security of the
cryptosystem, and influences parameter choices in cryptographic algorithms.
There are two main types of encryption – symmetric and public-key (also called
asymmetric). We begin by defining both, as we shall discuss both symmetric and public-key
PRE schemes.
Definition II.1. A Symmetric Encryption (SE) scheme consists of the following algorithms:
• Setup(1λ)
($)→ params: Outputs a set of public parameters params, including the
message spaceM and ciphertext space C.
Note that params is input to every subsequent algorithm, but we omit it for compactness
of notation. We often omit the Setup algorithm from security games for the same
reason.
• KeyGen(1λ) $→ k: A probabilistic algorithm that returns a symmetric key, k.
• Enc(k,m) $→ c: Encrypts a message, m, using a key, k, producing a ciphertext, c. In
this thesis we assume that Enc is probabilistic.
• Dec(k, c)→ m′ ∪⊥: A deterministic algorithm that takes a ciphertext c and produces
either an element of the message space m′ or an error symbol ⊥.
A symmetric encryption scheme is correct if for all m ∈M and all k $← KeyGen(1λ):
Dec(k,Enc(k,m))→ m.
In a symmetric encryption system, the same key is used for both encryption and
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decryption, meaning both the sender and receiver of the message must already share a
secret key k. In contrast, a public-key encryption system uses one key for encryption, and
another for decryption. Since the encryption key cannot be used to decrypt, it does not
need to be kept secret and can be publicly broadcast and hence is referred to as the public
key.
Definition II.2. A Public-Key Encryption (PKE) scheme consists of the following algo-
rithms:
• Setup(1λ)
($)→ params: Outputs a set of public parameters params, including the mes-
sage spaceM and ciphertext space C.
As before, params is input to every subsequent algorithm, but we omit it for compact-
ness of notation. We often omit the Setup algorithm for the same reason.
• KeyGen(1λ) $→ (pk, sk): A probabilistic algorithm that generates a public-private key
pair.
• Enc(pk,m) $→ c: An algorithm that encrypts a message m using a public key pk,
producing a ciphertext c. In this thesis we assume that Enc is probabilistic.
• Dec(sk, c) → m′ ∪ ⊥: A deterministic algorithm that decrypts a ciphertext c using
secret key sk to produce either an element of the message space m′ or an error symbol
⊥.
A PKE scheme is correct if for all m ∈M and all (pk, sk) $← KeyGen(1λ):
Dec(sk,Enc(pk,m))→ m.
Public-key cryptosystems enable two parties to communicate securely even if they have
had no previous interaction with which to share a key. This separation between keys is
useful for scenarios where the sender and receiver do not have a mutual trust relationship,
as is the case when sharing a symmetric key as this gives the power to decrypt as well as
encrypt messages. We shall see this when we explore security notions for PRE.
Another useful cryptographic primitive which we discuss in this thesis is digital signature
schemes. These allow one party to sign a message, and another to verify the signature.
This is also a public-key primitive, as the signing key must be kept secret so that only the
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relevant party can create signatures, but the verification key is public so that anyone with
the verification key can verify the signature.
Definition II.3. A digital signature scheme consists of the following algorithms:
• Setup(1λ)
($)→ params: Outputs a set of public parameters params.
• KeyGen(1λ) $→ (svk, ssk): A probabilistic algorithm that generates a signature signing
key ssk and a signature verification key svk.
• Sign(ssk,m) $→ σ: Signs a message m using a signing key ssk, producing a signature
σ. We assume that Sign is probabilistic.
• Verify(svk, σ,m)→ {0, 1}: A deterministic algorithm that verifies a signature σ over
a message m, returning a bit.
A digital scheme is correct if for all m ∈M and all (svk, ssk) $← KeyGen(1λ):
Verify(svk, Sign(ssk,m),m)→ 1.
Whilst encryption is designed for message confidentiality, signatures are designed for
authentication. Consequently, what it means for these primitives to be ‘secure’ is different.
We shall discuss the security of encryption schemes and digital signature schemes explicitly
in Section II: 3.2.
The last primitive that we use in this thesis is a (cryptographic) hash function. For
brevity, we explicitly define a secure cryptographic hash function as opposed to defining
security separately.
Definition II.4. A secure cryptographic hash function (with output length l) is a deter-
ministic function h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l that takes an arbitrary-length input x and outputs a
string h(x) = y of length l such that:
• Given y, no PPT adversary can find x (preimage resistance).
• Given x, y, no PPT adversary can find an x′ 6= x such that h(x′) = y (second preimage
resistance).
• No PPT adversary can find any x, x′ such that h(x) = h(x′) (collision resistance).
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II: 3 Formal security
Recall that computational security is defined according to a challenger running an experiment
(also called a game) against an adversary, A, assumed to be a Probabilistic Polynomial-
Time (PPT) algorithm. The size of A is given according to a security parameter, λ,
usually represented in unary as 1λ. The adversary can either be single-stage or multi-
stage (A = (A0, . . . ,An)) and in the latter case is assumed to pass on a state to future
stages conveying its current knowledge. The adversary is assumed to know the encryption
algorithm being used, in keeping with Kerckhoffs’ principle [Ker83], and other details such
as the public parameters used by the cryptographic scheme being assessed.
The challenger may give some additional information to the adversary by providing
oracles, where the adversary can choose inputs and receive the corresponding outputs.
These functions may rely on secrets only known to the challenger, and thereby give the
adversary a means of learning information computed by honest parties during normal
activity of the cryptosystem, and potentially infer information about the underlying secrets.
Sometimes, oracles carry restrictions on what the adversary can learn, generally to prevent
the adversary from gaining a trivial win. For example, the challenge oracle in a chosen-
plaintext indistinguishability game checks that the input messages are the same size
(|m0|
?
= |m1|), as a huge size discrepancy will result in different sized ciphertexts, making
it simple for the adversary to know which message was encrypted. Some oracles can be
queried only once, and we convey this using a state called maintained by the challenger.
We use the notation AOf to mean that adversary A can access oracle Of .
Adversarial advantage is a crucial concept in defining computational security. Informally,
we define the advantage that an adversary has in winning the game to be the probability
that the adversary wins, minus the probability that a random guess would win the game.
The way in which advantage is determined depends on the game. In this thesis, we define
advantage implicitly in our security definitions. Cryptographic schemes are considered
secure if no adversary has a significant advantage in winning the game. We use the following
to define whether an advantage is significant.
Definition II.5. A function f is negligible if for every polynomial p() there exists an N
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We denote negligible functions as negl(λ).
If all adversaries can only win the security game with negligible advantage, then the
cryptosystem meets the definition associated with that game. The concept of overwhelming
probability compliments negligible probability. Informally, it means that the probability of
losing is negligible.
Definition II.6. Given a security parameter λ, we say that the probability p of success is
negligible if there exists a negligible function negl(λ) such that p ≤ negl(λ). We say the
probability of success is overwhelming if p ≥ 1− negl(λ).
II: 3.1 Mathematical assumptions
In computational security, a proof leverages a well-known mathematical assumption taken
from number theory. Whilst unproven, these assumptions are well-studied and generally
considered reliable by the cryptographic community. Proofs of security usually give a
reduction which demonstrates that an adversary who can break the security of a construction
would also be able to break the mathematical assumption.
The main assumptions used in the constructions described in this thesis are Diffie-
Hellman and ring-Learning With Errors, which we now introduce.
II: 3.1.1 Diffie-Hellman
Diffie-Hellman assumptions underpin the security of ElGamal-based PRE schemes, which
make up the majority of the literature, including the original PRE scheme [BBS98] and
many subsequent schemes such as [LV08b,ABH09,CWYD10].
The Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem. Let p be a prime and let g be a
generator of the group Zp. Given a tuple (g, ga, gb, gc) where a, b
$← Z∗p, determine whether
c
$← Z∗p or c = ab. The DDH assumption states that there is no PPT algorithm that can
solve the DDH problem.
The Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem. Let p be a prime and let g be
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a generator of the group Zp. Given a tuple (g, ga, gb) where a, b
$← Z∗p, compute gab. The
CDH assumption states that there is no PPT algorithm that can solve the CDH problem.
Lemma II.1. If there exists a PPT adversary A that can solve the CDH problem, then
there exists another PPT adversary B that can solve the DDH problem. In other words the
hardness of the DDH problem implies that the CDH problem is also hard:
DDH assumption =⇒ CDH assumption.
Proof. We show that if the CDH assumption is false, then one can solve the DDH problem.
Given (g, ga, gb, gc), B can call A(g, ga, gb)→ gab and compare this to gc.
II: 3.1.2 RLWE
We now present notation and preliminaries relevant for lattice-based cryptography, which is
built on the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem (or ring-LWE (RLWE) problem). We let
q ∈ Z denote some modulus and n denote a ring dimension. We represent the set of integers
modulo q as Zq = {b−q/2c, . . . , 0, . . . , bq/2c}. In lattice-based cryptography, computations
are performed over power-of-two cyclotomic rings of the form Rq = Zq[x]/〈xn + 1〉 where
n is a power of two. We denote the discrete Gaussian distribution over Zq as χσ. The
distribution χσ has its support restricted to Zq and a probability mass function proportional
to that of a Gaussian distribution with variance σ2. We sometimes write χe where we use
a subscript e to denote an “error” distribution, but the underlying variance is still denoted
by σ.
We can sample a polynomial s $← χe by sampling each of the coefficients of s according
to the distribution χe. We denote the uniform distribution over Rq as Uq, and use the
shorthand (a, b) $← Uq × Uq to mean that a
$← Uq, b
$← Uq. The RLWEn,q,χe(s) distribution
outputs values of the form (a, b = as+ e) ∈ Rq ×Rq where a
$← Uq, e
$← χe.
The (normal form) ring-LWE (RLWE) problem. Let s $← χe. Distinguish whether
a given oracle outputs samples from RLWEn,q,χe(s) or uniform elements in Rq ×Rq.
The RLWEn,q,χe assumption states that no PPT algorithm can solve the RLWEn,q,χe
problem with a non-negligible advantage1. In this thesis we focus on the RLWE problem
1Note that the RLWE assumption is built from other assumptions in lattice-based cryptography,
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as opposed to other standard problems in lattice-based cryptography as it is the under-
lying assumption used in the most relevant existing work and produces more practical
constructions.
II: 3.2 Security in Public-Key Encryption
We now present the basic confidentiality game for PKE schemes. Informally, it states that
an adversary cannot determine the underlying plaintext given a ciphertext, even when the
adversary chooses the two messages that could be encrypted.












($)← A1(1λ, state, c∗b)
return (b′ = b)
A PKE scheme PKE is said to be ε-Indistinguishable against Chosen Plaintext Attacks









If ε is negligible as determined by the security parameter λ then we say PKE is Indistin-
guishable against Chosen Plaintext Attacks (IND-CPA-secure).
Here the advantage ε is the additional probability of a win over a random guess (which
happens with probability 12). This is standard for indistinguishability games as stated
in Section I: 4. The definition we give here is the single-challenge game, as opposed to
the multi-challenge game where the adversary has access to a left-or-right oracle which
it can call multiple times on pairs of messages to obtain an encryption of either m0 or
namely the LWE problem and Shortest Integer Solution (SIS) problem. If we take σ ≥ ω(logn) and
σ/q = 1/poly(n), then RLWEn,q,χe problem has been shown to be at least as hard as solving standard
worst-case lattice problems over ideal lattices up to polynomial approximation factors using quantum
algorithms. See [LPR10] for full details.
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m1, as determined by b. Observe that because this is a public-key scheme, the adversary
has the ability to encrypt both m0 and m1 locally. This implies that encryption schemes
which meet this definition cannot have a deterministic encryption function – otherwise, the
adversary could locally encrypt m0 and m1 and compare the resulting ciphertexts with the
challenge ciphertext c∗b to win the game. In this thesis we generally assume that encryption
schemes are at least IND-CPA-secure, hence we assume Enc is probabilistic.
The assumption of algorithms being probabilistic or deterministic can influence how
security games are written, and in particular what information is assumed to lead to a trivial
win if given to the adversary. This idea of specific algorithms needing to be probabilistic is
one we will revisit in this thesis.
We now present another, stronger, definition for message confidentiality.














($)← AODec1 (1λ, state, c∗b)
return (b′ = b)
ODec(c)→ m
if c = c∗b : return ⊥
m← Dec(sk, c)
return m
A PKE scheme PKE is said to be ε-Indistinguishable against Chosen Ciphertext Attacks









If ε is negligible as determined by the security parameter λ then we say PKE is Indistin-
guishable against Chosen Plaintext Attacks (IND-CPA-secure).
In IND-CCAPKEA (1λ), A1 has access to a decryption oracle ODec, which carries the
restriction that it cannot be queried on the challenge ciphertext c∗b . By definition of a
correct PKE scheme, being able to decrypt the challenge ciphertext will enable the adversary
to win the game. Therefore, for CCA games to have any meaning over CPA games, we need
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to make this restriction. These types of restrictions are more common for powerful oracles
such as decryption. We note that CCA security is strictly stronger than CPA security, as
the adversary has access to more information.
We now move on from message confidentiality to give a different security definition for
encryption schemes. Key privacy (also known as key anonymity) was first introduced by
Bellare et al [BBDP01] for public-key encryption. Informally it means that a ciphertext does
not reveal which key was used to encrypt the message. In other words, given a ciphertext,
the receiver of the ciphertext remains anonymous.





(pk0, sk0), (pk1, sk1)
$← KeyGen(1λ)
(m, state)




($)← A1(1λ, state, c∗b)
return (b′ = b)
A Public-Key Encryption (PKE) scheme PKE is said to be ε-key private (or ε-key









If ε is negligible as determined by the security parameter λ then we say PKE is key private.
As in IND-CPAPKEA (1λ), the adversary has the ability to locally encrypt the message
as it is given both public keys, so key privacy also requires the encryption function to be
probabilistic.
Note that for IND-CPAPKEA (1λ), IND-CCA
PKE
A (1
λ) and KeyPrivPKEA (1λ), equivalent for-
mulations for symmetric schemes can be achieved by giving the adversaries access to
an encryption oracle OEnc(m), where the adversary inputs a message m, and receives a
ciphertext c $← Enc(k,m) (for KeyPrivPKEA (1λ), the oracle also takes an index i ∈ {0, 1} as
input so the adversary can specify which key it would like the message to be encrypted
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under). The encryption oracle is necessary as, without knowledge of the symmetric key,
the adversary cannot learn any ciphertexts under keys generated by the challenger, aside
from the challenge ciphertext.
II: 3.3 Security of digital signature schemes
The security of digital signature schemes is based on the inability of an attacker to create a
valid signature on a message. In the following security game, the adversary has access to a
signing oracle OSign which will sign any message the adversary gives it. This necessitates
the winning condition that the adversary cannot submit a signature on a message that
it previously sent to the signing oracle. The challenger therefore maintains a list, Q, of
messages sent to OSign for this purpose.
















Q ← Q∪ {m}
return σ
A digital signature scheme Π is said to be ε-existentially unforgeable under an adaptive







If ε is negligible as determined by the security parameter λ then we say Π is existentially
unforgeable under an adaptive chosen-message attack.
II: 4 Some cryptographic schemes
In this section, we present examples of established cryptographic schemes. We focus on
those which form the underlying bases of the PRE schemes discussed in this thesis.
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II: 4.1 The ElGamal encryption scheme
We describe the ElGamal encryption scheme in Figure II.1.
Setup(1λ)→ (p, g)
Select a prime p
Select g, a generator of Zp




















m′ = s−1 · c1
return m′
Figure II.1: The ElGamal encryption scheme [ElG86]. All
operations are performed modulo p.
We can demonstrate correctness as decryption derives s = (gy)x = gyx, meaning that
for a ciphertext c = (c0, c1) = (gy, (gx)y ·m):
m′ = s−1 · (gx)y ·m
= g−yx · gyx ·m
= m.
Security can be proven via the DDH assumption. Informally, for a DDH challenge ga, ab, gc,
one can set the public key as ga and challenge ciphertext as c∗b = (g
b, gc ·mb). Then if there
is a PPT adversary that is able to determine b, then this implies that c = ab. See [ElG86]
for full details.
II: 4.2 The BV encryption scheme
We now describe a PKE scheme based on lattices. Whilst the construction we present in
Figure II.2 is based on [BV11], the version we present is the one presented in [PRSV17],
which is defined over rings and comes from the work of Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev
[LPR10,LPR13] and Micciancio [Mic10].
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The security parameter is interpreted as a “root Hermite factor”, δ, as defined in
[LP11, GN08]. The ciphertext space is determined by the ring Rq := Zq[x]/〈xn + 1〉,
where q is the ciphertext modulus and n is the ring dimension. Errors are sampled from a
Be-bounded discrete Gaussian error distribution χe with distribution parameter σe. Each
coefficient in the polynomials is represented in the range {−b q2c, . . . , b
q
2c}. The message
space is defined asM := {0, 1, ..., p− 1}n.
Setup(1λ)→ (q, n, p, σe)
Select ciphertext modulus q ∈ N
Select ring dimension n ∈ N
Select discrete Gaussian error distribution χe
Select plaintext modulus p ≥ 2








b := a · s+ pe







c0 := b · v + pe0 +m
c1 := a · v + pe1
return c = (c0, c1)
Dec(sk, c)→ m′
(c0, c1)← c
m′ := c0 − sk · c1 mod p
return m′
Figure II.2: The BV encryption scheme defined over
rings [BV11,PRSV17]. For more detail on parameter selection,
see [PRSV17].
We can demonstrate correctness, since given a ciphertext c = (c0, c1) = (b · v + pe0 +
m, a · v + pe1):
c0 − s · c1 = b · v + pe0 +m− s(a · v + pe1)
= (a · s+ pe) · v + pe0 +m− s(a · v + pe1)
= m+ p(e · v + e0 − s · e1)
= m mod p.
Security follows from the RLWE assumption. Informally, the RLWE public keys can be
replaced with uniform values in Rq, which in turn means that ciphertexts can be replaced
with uniform values in Rq. See [BV11] for full details.
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II: 4.3 The ElGamal digital signature scheme
We present the ElGamal signature scheme in Figure II.3.
Setup(1λ)→ (p, g, h)
Select a prime p
Select g, a generator of Zp
Select h, a hash function













s = (h(m)− ssk · r)k−1 mod p− 1
σ = (r, s)
return σ
Verify(svk, σ,m)→ {0, 1}
(σ0, σ1)← σ




Figure II.3: The ElGamal signature scheme [ElG86]. All
operations are performed modulo p unless stated otherwise.
We can demonstrate correctness, since given a signature σ = (r, s) = (gk, (h(m)− x · r)k−1):
gh(m) = (gx)r · (gk)(h(m)−xr)k−1
= gxr · gh(m)−xr
= gh(m).
Proving unforgeability is similar to proving that ElGamal encryption is IND-CPA-secure,
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In this Chapter
Here we introduce the language and setting of PRE before defining it formally. We present
the existing definitions of security for PRE schemes, as well as outlining some existing
constructions based on the encryption schemes described in Section II: 4. In light of
this information, we describe our thesis motivations and contributions in more detail. In
particular, we use existing work to highlight how existing PRE schemes are unsuitable for
some obvious applications as discussed in Section I: 5, setting the scene for the contributions
presented in this thesis.
III: 1 Introduction to Proxy Re-Encryption
So far we have defined some basic cryptographic primitives, given some standard definitions
of security for these primitives and described some well-known constructions which we build
on in this thesis. We have also given an idea of how standard assumptions can be used
III: 1 Introduction to Proxy Re-Encryption
to prove that specific schemes meet given definitions, demonstrating how computational
security can be proven, and how it allows definitions to be compared as discussed in
Section I: 4.
In this section, we introduce PRE more formally, focusing on public-key PRE. Infor-
mally, PRE allows a ciphertext encrypted under one key pki to be transformed into an
encryption of the same message that can be correctly decrypted using a different secret key
skj , without needing to reveal either the secret keys or the message to the party performing
the re-encryption. This is done via the client generating an update token using the current
secret key, ski, and new public key, pkj , which is sent to the proxy, who uses it to perform
the re-encryption.
III: 1.1 Terminology
We now introduce terminology for PRE that will be used in this thesis.
• Proxy. The party who performs the re-encryption operation. The proxy is never
directly given either the message m nor any secret keys.
• Ciphertext under pki. A ciphertext c originally created by encrypting a message, m,
that currently decrypts to m using ski, possibly having been re-encrypted a number
of times.
• New key / target key. The key pkj used to produce an update token ∆i,j .
• Old key / source key. The key pki where ski was used to produce an update token
∆i,j .
• Underlying message. The message m← Dec(ski, c) where c is an encryption under
pki.
• Fresh ciphertext. A ciphertext created using the encryption algorithm Enc.
• Re-encrypted ciphertext. A ciphertext created by the re-encryption algorithm ReEnc.
• Level. The number of times a ciphertext has been or appears to have been re-encrypted.
• Re-encryption initiator. The party who computes the update token ∆i,j This party
must be in possession of ski.
Use of these terms can be seen visually in Figure III.1.
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Figure III.1: The normal PRE operation. skA is the source secret
key, pkB is the target public key. cA is a fresh ciphertext, cB is a
re-encrypted ciphertext, both of which have m as the underlying
message. Note that it is not necessary for the encryptor and
re-encryption initiator to be the same party, as long as both know
skA.
III: 2 PRE definitions
The first PRE scheme [BBS98] was defined assuming that both the current secret key ski
and the target secret key skj are known to the party generating the update token needed
for the proxy to perform the re-encryption. Subsequent work where update tokens require
both secret keys to be known have considered this a symmetric form of PRE, which we
now define.
Definition III.1. A symmetric PRE scheme consists of the following algorithms:
• Setup(1λ)
($)→ params: Outputs a set of public parameters params, including the
message space,M, ciphertext space, C, and token space, T .
Note that params is input to every subsequent algorithm, but we omit it for compactness
of notation. We often omit the Setup algorithm for the same reason.
• KeyGen(1λ) $→ k: A probabilistic algorithm that generates a symmetric key, k.
• Enc(k,m) $→ c: A probabilistic algorithm that encrypts a message m using a key k,
producing a ciphertext, c.
• Dec(k, c)→ m′ ∪⊥: A deterministic algorithm that decrypts a ciphertext c to produce
either an element of the message space, m′, or an error symbol, ⊥.
• ReKeyGen(ki, kj)
($)→ ∆i,j: An algorithm that is either probabilistic or deterministic
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that takes two keys ki and kj and outputs an update token ∆i,j.
• ReEnc(∆i,j , c)
($)→ c′: An algorithm that is either probabilistic or deterministic that
takes a ciphertext, c, and update token, ∆i,j, and outputs a re-encrypted ciphertext, c′.
A symmetric PRE scheme is correct if for all m ∈M, k $← KeyGen(1λ):
Dec(k,Enc(k,m))→ m
and if for all c ∈ C such that Dec(ki, c)→ m′:
Dec(kj ,ReEnc(∆i,j , c))→ m′
where ki, kj ,
$← KeyGen(1λ) and ∆i,j
($)← ReKeyGen(ki, kj).
We remark that definitions in the literature often have an additional condition for
ReKeyGen to return ⊥ if i = j. We note that we can generalise updatable encryp-
tion [BLMR13, LT18] and key rotation [EPRS17] as types of symmetric PRE where
re-encryptions are sequential, always updating from ki to ki+1. Updatable encryption
also has an explicit goal of updating all components of a ciphertext upon re-encryption
as opposed to, for example, just the ciphertext header. A full definition of updatable
encryption schemes is given in Appendix A. We sometimes use the term ‘re-encryption
primitive’ as a general term to describe cryptographic primitives that re-encrypt ciphertexts
from one key to another.
More recent work on PRE is in the public-key setting, including the contributions
presented in this thesis. Recall that in PKE, anyone with the public key can encrypt the
ciphertext but only someone with the private key can decrypt it. For public-key PRE
schemes, this rationale is retained as the current secret key is needed to create an update
token, but only the public key of the target key pair is needed.
Definition III.2. A (public-key) Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) scheme consists of the
following algorithms:
• Setup(1λ)
($)→ params: Outputs a set of public parameters params, including the
message space,M, ciphertext space, C, and token space, T .
Note that params is input to every subsequent algorithm, but we omit it for compactness
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of notation. We often omit the Setup algorithm from security games for the same
reason.
• KeyGen(1λ) $→ (pk, sk): A probabilistic algorithm that generates a public-private key
pair.
• Enc(pk,m) $→ c: A probabilistic algorithm that encrypts a message, m, using a public
key, pk, producing a ciphertext, c.
• Dec(sk, c)→ m′∪⊥: A deterministic algorithm that decrypts a ciphertext c to produce
either an element of the message space, m′, or an error symbol, ⊥.
• ReKeyGen(ski, pkj)
($)→ ∆i,j: An algorithm that is either probabilistic or deterministic
that takes a secret key, ski, and public key, pkj, and outputs an update token, ∆i,j.
• ReEnc(∆i,j , c)
($)→ c′: An algorithm that is either probabilistic or deterministic that
takes a ciphertext, c, and update token, ∆i,j, and outputs a re-encrypted ciphertext, c′.
A PRE scheme is correct if for all m ∈M, (pk, sk) $← KeyGen(1λ):
Dec(sk,Enc(pk,m))→ m
and if for all c ∈ C such that Dec(ski, c)→ m′:
Dec(skj ,ReEnc(∆i,j , c))→ m′
where (pki, ski), (pkj , skj)
$← KeyGen(1λ) and ∆i,j
($)← ReKeyGen(ski, pkj).
PRE schemes sometimes have a correctness bound, L – the number of times a ciphertext
can be re-encrypted and still decrypt correctly. We shall see this in more detail in Chapters V
and VI which utilise PRE schemes based on lattices.
Definition III.3. For a PRE scheme PRE = (PRE .Setup,PRE .KeyGen,PRE .Enc,PRE .Dec,
PRE .ReKeyGen,PRE .ReEnc), we define the underlying encryption scheme as the encryp-
tion scheme given by (PRE .Setup,PRE .KeyGen,PRE .Enc,PRE .Dec). This applies to both
symmetric and public-key PRE schemes.
Note that, in this thesis, we assume that PRE schemes are public-key unless explicitly
stated otherwise.
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III: 2.1 Additional PRE properties
There are some important properties that distinguish PRE schemes which are not considered
security definitions but sometimes affect how security is defined. We now define these before
we present any security definitions for PRE. Note that the following definitions apply to
both symmetric and public-key PRE
Definition III.4. A PRE scheme is bidirectional if an update token ∆i,j can be used to
re-encrypt ciphertexts under pkj (kj) to pki (ki).
If the scheme is not bidirectional, we say it is unidirectional.
This description of directionality is taken from existing work [AFGH05,CH07,LCLS09,
EPRS17]. Note that bidirectional schemes must be symmetric as, by definition, the secret
key is required to re-encrypt ciphertexts under that key to another key. However, not all
symmetric schemes are bidirectional, as any public-key unidirectional PRE scheme can
be easily converted into a symmetric one. Directionality is important in that it affects
applications of the PRE scheme, and in some cases is used to restrict the actions of the
adversary during security games, meaning that it plays an important part in which security
models should be applied to a particular PRE scheme.
Definition III.5. A PRE scheme PRE is single-hop if a fresh ciphertext can be re-
encrypted at most once. PRE is multi-hop if it permits multiple re-encryptions.
Whether a scheme is single or multi-hop affects the syntax of the definitions. In
the literature, single-hop PRE schemes are often defined differently, so that ciphertexts
are levelled and have different forms – fresh encryptions are level 0 whilst re-encrypted
ciphertexts are level 1. Typically ReEnc in single-hop schemes changes the format of the
ciphertext, and there are two decryption algorithms Dec0,Dec1, one for each level. We shall
see this when we give examples of existing schemes in Section III: 4.1. In some definitions of
a PRE scheme [AFGH05,FKKP19], levelling is considered explicitly by having encryption
take an additional input, `, at which to produce the ciphertext. As we focus on multi-hop
PRE schemes in this thesis, we assume PRE schemes are multi-hop unless explicitly stated
otherwise.
Definition III.6. A PRE scheme has transparency if ciphertexts have the same format
regardless of how many times they have been re-encrypted.
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Transparency is so-named because the involvement of the proxy is essentially hidden.
We note that number of hops, directionality and transparency are separate aspects that
do not necessarily affect one another.
III: 3 Basic PRE security
Now that we have defined PRE schemes formally and described some notable properties,
we can move on to formally defining the security of PRE schemes. We begin by explaining
a necessary winning condition in all experiments for PRE security.
III: 3.1 Trivial wins and Re-encryption Graphs
Recall that in IND-CCAPKEA (1λ) (Definition II.8) we had a winning condition that the
adversary cannot use the decryption oracle ODec on the challenge ciphertext c∗b , and that
this is enforced in ODec.
Security in PRE usually also requires a winning condition to prevent a trivial win.
Most security games in PRE consider corrupted keys. To model the functionality of PRE,
security games usually give the adversary access to oracles OReKeyGen and OReEnc that create
update tokens and re-encrypt ciphertexts respectively. This means that even though the
challenge ciphertext is created under one key, it can be re-encrypted to other keys. This
leads to the necessary winning condition that the adversary cannot have corrupted a secret
key under which a challenge exists. In other words, the key the challenge was originally
created under cannot be corrupted, and neither can any key that the challenge ciphertext
could (or already has) been re-encrypted to. We refer to this as the trivial win condition.
This is a necessary condition, as by the definition of a correct PRE scheme, the
adversary will be able to decrypt the challenge ciphertexts under corrupted keys. As such,
any meaningful security definition will hinge on the assumption that such corruptions have
not happened. Clearly, the trivial win condition is minimal in that there is no weaker
condition that can avoid such trivial wins.
A good visualisation technique for demonstrating which queries are permitted by the
experiment is the use of re-encryption graphs. These are generally defined as follows:
• a vertex vi is added for each keypair (pki, ski) (or symmetric key ki in the symmetric
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case) generated by the challenger,
• an edge ei,j is added if the adversary learns an update token ∆i,j .
The precise definition of the graph will be given in the experiments, as most experiments also
add an edge when certain re-encryptions are made. In general, we work with unidirectional
schemes meaning that edges are unidirectional, which we denote as
→
e i,j . We generally
refer to this graph as a Directed Re-encryption Graph (DRG). In some formulations of
PRE security definitions, the re-encryption graph is used in to enforce the trivial win
condition. An example of how the trivial win condition is represented using a DRG is given

















Figure III.2: An example DRG. If a challenge is called under pk6 (v6)
then pk6 is considered a challenge key. Other keys that are reachable
from the initial challenge key (v5,v7) are therefore also considered
challenge keys. Queries that create edges from challenge keys to
corrupted (square) ones (v1,v2,v8) will result in a trivial win. The
dashed lines on the graph on the right demonstrate queries the adversary
can and cannot make, assuming that queries resulting the graph on the
left have already been made.
Re-encryption graphs can reflect applications. For example, key rotation, where keys
are updated sequentially from pki to pki+1 will result in a chain (depicted in Figure III.3),
whereas some hierarchical access control policies will result in a tree (depicted in Figure III.4).
Recall that there exist other re-encryption primitives that focus specifically on key rotation
as an application [LT18,EPRS17]. This can be considered as restricting oracle queries in
such a way that only chains are considered. Some other work, including [PRSV17,FKKP19],
only considers re-encryption graphs that are acyclic. Typically, works where re-encryption
graphs are restricted contain security proofs that apply only to acyclic graphs and cannot
necessarily be extended to the general case. We explore this in detail in Chapter VI. As we
do not rely on these techniques, in this thesis we do not assume that re-encryption graphs
are acyclic.
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As a final note, our security games differ from common formulations, where the adversary
does not explicitly pass any update tokens to the oracle and instead uses the appropriate
indexes, and then the oracle generates the token. One of the goals of this work is to create
definitions that are applicable for all re-encryption schemes, and thus we allow for the
possibility that ReKeyGen is a probabilistic algorithm, meaning that ReKeyGen(ski, pkj)
has more than one possible output. We therefore allow the adversary to call OReEnc by
either giving an explicit token, or just indices for the appropriate keys (setting ∆i,j = ⊥).
This has the caveat that the token must have been honestly generated, and the challenger
maintains a list Thonest for this purpose. If the token is not honestly generated, then the
oracle generates an honest update token and uses this instead. This caveat does not make
our definitions weaker than others in the literature, as the common formulation is for OReEnc
to only take inputs (i, j) which the challenger uses to look up an honestly-generated update
token. We also note that our syntax is still applicable for PRE schemes where ReKeyGen is
deterministic, as in this case OReKeyGen(i, j) will always return the same value.
III: 3.2 Chosen Plaintext Attacks
We begin by giving some definitions for message confidentiality for PRE schemes. Similarly
to PKE, the basic definition of security for PRE is indistinguishability against chosen
plaintext attacks. The intuition behind this definition is that, in addition to encryption
masking the message, the re-encryption process should not reveal anything about the
underlying message. This means confidentiality remains intact despite the proxy performing
re-encryptions. As mentioned in Section III: 3.1, we need to model the functionality of
re-encryption and therefore provide the adversary with more oracles than IND-CPAPKEA (1λ)
(for PKE schemes), specifically OReKeyGen and OReEnc.
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Definition III.7. Consider the following security game:
PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ)
Kcorrupt, Thonest = ∅


























if (ski 6∈ Kcorrupt) ∧ (skj ∈ Kcorrupt) :
return ⊥






OCPAReEnc(i, j, [∆i,j ], c)
($)→ c′
if (ski 6∈ Kcorrupt) ∧ (skj ∈ Kcorrupt) :
return ⊥
if (skj 6∈ Kcorrupt) ∧ (ski ∈ Kcorrupt) :
return ⊥








if (called = true) ∨ (|m0| 6= |m1|) :
return ⊥







where boxed conditions apply only to bidirectional PRE schemes, and values in squared
brackets [] are optional arguments.
A Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) scheme, PRE , is said to be (selectively) ε-Indistinguishable










If ε is negligible as determined by the security parameter λ then we say PRE is Indistinguishable
against Chosen Plaintext Attacks (PRE-IND-CPA-secure).
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Here the trivial win condition is enforced by having OReKeyGen and OReEnc return ⊥ if
queried on (i, j) where skj is a corrupted key and ski is not. Here we have assumed that
PRE is unidirectional. Note that in the literature this definition is referred to as being
IND-CPA-secure, but we opt for PRE-IND-CPA-secure to make the distinction between
security for PRE and PKE schemes. Clearly, the underlying encryption scheme must be
IND-CPA-secure in order for the PRE scheme to be PRE-IND-CPA-secure.
Graphic representations of the queries permitted by the PRE-IND-CPA game are given
in Figure III.5 and Figure III.6. Observe that key compromise for bidirectional schemes
corresponds to proving that confidentiality is maintained when the set of corrupted keys













Figure III.5: For bidirectional PRE
schemes, PRE-IND-CPA forbids all













Figure III.6: For unidirectional PRE
schemes, PRE-IND-CPA forbids
queries from uncorrupted to
corrupted keys but allows the
reverse.
III: 3.3 Honest Re-Encryption Attacks
A development in PRE security introduced in 2017 was the notion of security against
honest re-encryption attacks [Coh17]. Recall that the PRE-IND-CPA experiment
PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ) forbids all re-encryption queries from uncorrupted to corrupted
keys. Honest re-encryption attacks are more powerful in that they permit re-encryptions
from uncorrupted to corrupted keys for non-challenge ciphertexts, as long as these cipher-
texts were honestly (oracle) generated. For this reason, the adversary also receives an
encryption oracle OEnc, and the challenger maintains a list Chonest of honest ciphertexts and
a list Cchal of challenge ciphertexts.
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Definition III.8. Consider the following security game ( shaded parts highlight the differ-
ences from PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ)):
IND-HRAPREA (1λ)
Kcorrupt, Thonest, Chonest, Cchal = ∅
































if (ski 6∈ Kcorrupt) ∧ (skj ∈ Kcorrupt) :
return ⊥














(i, c) ∈ Cchal
)












($)← ReEnc(∆i,j , c)
Chonest.add{(j, c′)}
Chonest.add{(j, c′)}





if (ski ∈ Kcorrupt) : return ⊥










where boxed conditions apply to bidirectional schemes, and values in squared brackets []
are optional arguments.
A Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) scheme, PRE, is said to be (selectively) ε-
Indistinguishable against Honest Re-Encryption Attacks (ε-IND-HRA-secure) if for all
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If ε is negligible as determined by the security parameter λ then we say PRE is
Indistinguishable against Honest Re-Encryption Attacks (IND-HRA-secure).












Figure III.7: Grey lines indicate re-encryptions of non-challenge
ciphertexts that the adversary, A, is permitted to make in
IND-HRAPREA (1λ).
The definitions considered so far are in the selective key corruption model. In this
setting, the adversary is in two stages (A = (A0,A1)) where A0 corrupts keys, and A1
learns the challenge, update tokens and re-encryptions. Adaptive key corruption allows
the adversary to corrupt keys even after the challenge has been learned, resulting in a
single-stage adversary. Adaptive key corruption will be defined and explored explicitly in
Chapter VI.
III: 4 Existing PRE Schemes
We now give some intuition behind constructions for PRE schemes, first by giving the
original PRE scheme, then by describing a common mechanism for deploying PRE in
practice.
III: 4.1 The BBS PRE scheme [BBS98]
We first note that while we have given a definition for public-key PRE in Definition III.2,
the original scheme given in [BBS98] was formulated slightly differently as it is defined in
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the public-key setting but ReKeyGen takes both secret keys ski, skj as input. The [BBS98]
PRE scheme, BBS, is described in Figure III.8.
Setup(1λ)
p = 2q + 1 where p and q are primes
g a generator of Z∗p




$← Zp ∗ must be coprime to p− 1







c0 = m · gk mod p
c1 = (pk)
k mod p










i ) · skj mod p
return ∆i,j




return c′ = (c0, c
′
1)
Figure III.8: The original PRE scheme, BBS [BBS98].
Let ski = a, skj = b. Then ciphertexts are of the form c = (m · gk, gak), and tokens
are of the form ∆i,j = b/a. We therefore see that re-encrypted ciphertexts are of the form
c′ = (m · gk, (gak)b/a = gbk), which is the same form as an encryption under pkj , meaning
BBS has transparency. This means correctness follows from correctness of the underlying
encryption scheme:




= m · gk · (gak·
1
a )−1 mod p
= m · gk · g−k mod p
= m.
Many PRE schemes are based on this original one. Unlike BBS however, they are
defined as symmetric PRE schemes, despite relying on public-key-type primitives. In fact,
most symmetric PRE schemes rely on public-key-type primitives. It is therefore important
to note that, unlike regular encryption, it is not necessarily accurate to say that symmetric
PRE schemes are more efficient than public-key ones. In fact, recent work [AMP19]
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suggests it is unavoidable for PRE to depend on public-key-like primitives. To some extent
this is intuitive, as re-encryption relies on the underlying encryption scheme having some
key-homomorphic properties which do not usually exist in symmetric encryption. The
preference in choosing a symmetric PRE scheme over a public-key one is therefore more
likely to depend on whether the re-encryption initiator in the application will know the
target secret key.
III: 4.2 The Key Encapsulation Approach
A common approach to PRE is the key encapsulation approach, where the ciphertext header
contains the (usually symmetric) data encryption key, k, encrypted using a key encryption
key (which we assume to be public key), pk, from a PRE scheme. Typically, such schemes
perform re-encryption by replacing pk — so the ciphertext header now contains the same
k encrypted with the new key encryption key pk′ and the body of the ciphertext remains
unchanged. The effect of a re-encryption in the key encapsulation approach can be visualised










Figure III.9: A key change in the key encapsulation approach.
[a]PREpk represents a PRE ciphertext that produces a when
decrypted using the appropriate sk, and [m]SEk is a symmetric
encryption of the message m using k.
The appeal of this approach is that it has the benefits of hybrid encryption. The
key encapsulation approach is used widely, for example in Amazon’s Key Management
Service [Ama17]. Whilst these schemes are simple and easy to implement, they do not
completely re-randomise a ciphertext during re-encryption. This creates the concern that
key scraping attacks are possible, where any entity that learns k will be able to decrypt the
ciphertext regardless of how many times it has been re-encrypted. Therefore, this approach
is not suitable for key rotation, or where a malicious revoked user wants to retain access
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KEM.KeyGen(1λ) : (pk, sk) $← PRE .KeyGen(1λ)
KEM.Enc(pk,m) :k $← SE .KeyGen(1λ),
cPRE
$← PRE .Enc(pk, k),
cSE
$← SE .Enc(k,m).
c := (cPRE , cSE)
KEM.Dec(sk, c) : (cPRE , cSE)← c
k′ ← PRE .Dec(sk, cPRE),
m′ ← SE .Dec(k′, cSE)
KEM.ReKeyGen(ski, pkj) : ∆i,j
($)← PRE .ReKeyGen(ski, pkj)
KEM.ReEnc(∆i,j , c) : (cPRE , cSE)← c,
c′PRE
($)← PRE .ReEnc(∆i,j , cPRE),
c′ ← (c′PRE , cSE)
Figure III.10: A full description of the key encapsulation approach
to PRE.
to the message. We note that a similar concern also applies to BBS, as the part of the
ciphertext that contains the message does not change upon re-encryption.
III: 4.3 Other noteworthy PRE schemes
We now discuss some other existing PRE schemes which build on those described thus far,
and give an overview of the properties met by existing constructions. Our goal here is to
indicate how PRE schemes can be constructed so that they will have certain properties,
as opposed to reviewing all related work. We instead discuss related work in detail in the
most appropriate chapter for each topic. For now, we focus on a few prominent examples.
Unidirectionality has historically been a challenging property to attain. One approach
to achieving unidirectionality is to use bilinear maps to create a single-hop scheme. For
example, in [AFGH05] Ateniese at al. present a scheme based on ElGamal encryption,
and achieve unidirectionality using a bilinear pairing e : G1 × G1 → G2. We give an
overview here but refer to [AFGH05] for full details. The scheme has public parameters
G1,G2, e, g, Z = e(g, g) where g is a generator for G1 and Z is a generator for G2. For key
pairs (pki, ski) = (ga, a), (pkj , skj) = (gb, b):
• ciphertexts have the form c = (pkk,m · Zk) = (gak,m · Zk)
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• re-encrypted ciphertexts have the form c′ = (e(c0,∆i,j), c1) = (e(gak, gb/a),m · Zk) =
(Zbk,m · Zk).
Decryption of fresh ciphertexts is the same as for BBS. Re-encrypted ciphertexts cannot be
decrypted in the same way as fresh ciphertexts (at level 0), as components of the ciphertexts
are now in G2 as opposed to G1. This means a second decryption function is necessary (as
discussed in Section III: 2.1).
Ateniese at al. take advantage of this and also define a second encryption function that
outputs ciphertexts of the same format of re-encrypted (level 1) ciphertexts by computing
c = (e(gak, g),m · Zk) = (Zak,m · Zk). These ciphertexts cannot be re-encrypted, and thus
gives the encryptor a means of ensuring that PRE cannot be used to the underlying message
m with further parties. A similar approach is taken in other unidirectional, single-hop PRE
schemes [LV08b,ABH09].
Another approach to creating a PRE scheme that is both unidirectional and single-hop
is using obfuscation [HRsV07, CCV12]. The downside of this approach is that known
methods of achieving obfuscation are computationally intensive. Whilst schemes that rely
on computationally intensive methods are theoretically sound, they incur a heavy overhead
in terms of the computation needed to perform a re-encryption (from both the client and
the proxy). This means the naive approach of downloading, re-encrypting locally and
re-uploading may be preferable and, therefore, PRE schemes that rely on these measures
are hard to justify over the trivial solution.
In 2007, Green and Ateniese created a unidirectional, multi-hop PRE scheme [GA07].
However, their construction works by appending new elements to the ciphertext upon
re-encryption, meaning that decryption takes longer the more times a ciphertext has been
re-encrypted. It also means that, similarly to the key encapsulation approach discussed in
Section III: 4.2, the scheme is unsuitable for key rotation and access revocation as the part
of the ciphertext containing the message does not change.
This justifies the desire for PRE schemes with transparency. Whilst it is hard to achieve
this for schemes whose security relies on Diffie-Hellman, advancements in lattice-based
cryptography have enabled the first constructions of multi-hop, unidirectional PRE schemes
with transparency. The first generic description of a PRE scheme based on lattices was
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presented in Gentry’s work [Gen09] which uses Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE).
Since then, a number of concrete lattice-based PRE schemes have been proposed including
[Kir14,NAL15,FL16,PRSV17]. We describe an explicit construction of a lattice-based PRE
scheme in Chapter V.
In Table III.1 we give a summary of notable existing work. Note that this is a simplified
overview of the contributions given by existing work that highlights the factors most notable
for this thesis, and should not be taken as a complete guide to the contributions of each
paper. The PRE schemes that we directly build on and compare in the body of our work
are described in the appropriate chapters.
In Table III.1, key corruption adaptivity describes whether keys are generated as being
corrupted (fixed), keys can be corrupted but only before challenges are issued (selective),
or keys can be corrupted at any point (adaptive). Graph adaptivity refers to whether
the pattern of re-encryption queries the adversary can make is predetermined. These are
discussed fully in Chapter VI.
We also acknowledge work on defining security against Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (CCA)
in PRE. This was first introduced in [CH07] for bidirectional, single-hop schemes. A
definition of IND-CCA security for unidirectional schemes is given in [LV08b]. However
since the focus of this chapter is to create definitions with particular applications in mind,
for simplicity we restrict security to IND-CPA and IND-HRA-security. We do not consider
this a significant weakening of security in comparison with existing practical schemes, as
recent schemes which are both unidirectional and multi-hop such as [PRSV17,FKKP19]
also do not consider IND-CCA security.
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III: 5 Thesis motivations revisited
III: 5 Thesis motivations revisited
Recall that the original motivation given in [BBS98] was for email forwarding, where Alice
wants to share her emails with Bob. Another obvious application of PRE is to enforce access
control. For example, [ABH09] gives an overview of using PRE as a means of access control
for distributed file systems. In this application, keys are associated with access rights and
files are encrypted under keys according to an access control policy and the classification of
the file. In practice, access control is a dynamic process where access rights change over
time, such as when an employee gains higher security clearance, or when an employee leaves
the company. For the latter, we can consider any keys in the former employee’s possession
to be corrupted, and it is good practice to re-encrypt any files under the corrupted key to
fresh keys. In this way, former employees do not retain access to files. Access revocation
can be considered similarly to key rotation.
Many PRE schemes in the literature, including [BBS98, ID03,AFGH05,LV08b], do not
(fully) re-randomise a ciphertext upon re-encryption. In particular, often the component
containing the message does not change. In fact, [AFGH05] calls this original access
and postulates that there are applications of PRE where Alice still wants to be able to
decrypt ciphertexts even after she has had them re-encrypted to Bob’s key. Recall from the
key encapsulation example that this means such schemes are unsuitable for applications
involving access revocation or key expiry.
In this thesis, we re-examine PRE with regards to its suitability as a mechanism
for enforcing cryptographic access control. We therefore are particularly interested in
investigating unidirectionality and key corruption to create PRE schemes suitable for
revocation as well as sharing. We also note that, as a third party, the proxy is untrusted.
Most of the focus on the literature considers the proxy an adversary in the sense that message
confidentiality should be maintained even when the proxy performs the re-encryption. Recall
that searchable encryption, verifiable computation and order-preserving encryption all
consider adversaries who are interested in more than just breaking confidentiality. Security
beyond confidentiality is rarely considered in PRE. A particular concern presented by
access control is that no unauthorised re-encryptions should be performed. This necessitates
considering a more active malicious proxy who may try to create update tokens not provided
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by clients, to share files without authorisation. Whilst unidirectionality covers the idea
that tokens from pki to pkj cannot re-encrypt ciphertexts under pkj to pki, we investigate
malicious re-encryptions in a more general setting, separate to confidentiality. This involves
investigating not only the corruption of keys but also the corruption of update tokens in
greater detail.
Note that public-key PRE schemes can trivially be made into symmetric ones. We
therefore focus on building public-key schemes, as these will cover a wider number of
applications. In particular, as symmetric schemes require both secret keys to be known
in order to create an update token, the re-encryption initiator must know both secret
keys, which is not necessarily the case, depending on the application. Suppose that an
employee wishes to share a confidential file with their employer. Because the employer
is more senior, we can assume that they have access to more sensitive files, and so their
secret key is not known to all their employees. Where access control is defined by such
hierarchical structures, public-key schemes may be preferable. Recall that, as existing
symmetric PRE schemes rely on public-key type primitives, symmetric PRE does not have
the same efficiency benefits of regular symmetric encryption. Symmetric PRE also does
not have the key management benefits of public-key cryptography. We therefore aim to
create PRE solutions in the public-key setting.
We also note that access control as a main motivation necessitates that appropriate
PRE schemes must be multi-hop, as access permissions may change more than once. There
are other practical considerations to bear in mind. As PRE solves a problem that can be
solved naively by re-encrypting locally, efficiency be considered in the construction of a PRE
scheme. This means that some means of achieving strong security guarantees will render
the resulting scheme too inefficient for realistic usage. For example, one could instantiate
PRE using garbled circuits, where the update token is a garbled circuit that first decrypts
under the old key and then encrypts under the new key. As garbled circuits are meant to
mask any interim values calculated during evaluation, this will be secure. However, the act
of creating the circuit without knowing the input ciphertext (otherwise re-encryption could
be performed locally) is highly inefficient, especially in comparison to other approaches to
PRE.
A summary of our motivations is as follows:
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• To investigate modelling malicious actions that could be carried out by the proxy
other than breaking confidentiality.
• To investigate key compromise more fully, especially the compromise of update tokens.
• To provide public-key constructions that are practical in the sense that:
– They are both unidirectional and multi-hop.
This means they can be used for key rotation and dynamic access control.
– Ciphertexts do not expand upon re-encryption.
This limit the resources needed to store and decrypt re-encrypted ciphertexts,
making it a more attractive alternative to downloading and re-encrypting locally.
– They have transparency.
This means the resulting schemes can be used in applications where the act of
re-encryption should be hidden.
– As much as possible, they do not rely on heavy parameter choices or heavy
computations to achieve security.
We investigate beyond what is theoretically possible into constructions that
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In this Chapter
Recall from Section III: 5 that one application of PRE is as a mechanism for enforcing
cryptographic access control over remotely stored files, where files are encrypted under
specific keys according to an access control policy and keys are shared with users in
accordance with their access rights. Re-encryption can signify a change in user access rights,
particularly revocation or key expiry. In this chapter, we investigate security definitions for
PRE with a particular focus on enforcing access control as an application. Our particular
focus is on definitions that imply the proxy cannot perform a re-encryption unless that
re-encryption was initiated by the client.
The contributions of this chapter were published at Latincrypt 2017 [Lee17a]. A full version
of the published work is published on the Cryptology ePrint Archive [Lee17b].
IV: 1 Introduction
IV: 1 Introduction
PRE schemes have clear applications to cryptographic access control by allowing outsourced
data to be selectively shared to users via re-encryption to appropriate keys. For instance, if
data is given a classification level and keys are shared with users according to an access
control policy, then re-encryption can be used to enforce changes to the policy [AFGH05,
PRSV17]. It is important to ensure that only parties with the current secret key can
re-encrypt ciphertexts as, in this application, other ‘unauthorised’ re-encryptions signify
files being shared without authorisation of the data owner(s). In other words, having a
mechanism for ensuring that re-encryptions are authorised is desirable.
Most existing work on re-encryption is limited to the honest-but-curious model, where
the adversary participates in the protocol honestly but tries to break message confidentiality.
By extension, this means much existing work focuses only on the confidentiality of messages
in re-encryption schemes, and not authorised re-encryption. An existing work of note
which inspires our work is that of Everspaugh et al. on ‘Key Rotation for Authenticated
Encryption’ [EPRS17]. This goes beyond the honest-but-curious setting and extends
symmetric authenticated encryption to the re-encryption setting (‘key rotation’ in their
language) and introduces the concept of ciphertext dependence, where ReKeyGen takes an
additional input from the ciphertext to be re-encrypted, and ReEnc can only correctly
re-encrypt that ciphertext. We apply similar concepts to PRE and extend their work to
creating stronger definitions that imply that re-encryptions not initiated by a party with
the current secret key are not possible, subject to realistic assumptions. This models a
malicious cloud service provider aiming to subvert the re-encryption process to leak sensitive
data.
We break unauthorised re-encryptions down into two main security notions: the inability
to re-encrypt a ciphertext to a key it has not been encrypted under before, and a stronger
notion of unidirectionality which considers reversal attacks where adversaries may try to
reverse a re-encryption by retaining information about prior ciphertexts and update tokens.
We also consider an adaptation of Data Origin Authentication (DOA) (where the encryptor
of a message can be verified), that allows parties to formally verify identity of the last party
to re-encrypt a ciphertext. This is useful not only in preventing unauthorised re-encryptions,
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but in auditing changes to access control policy.
IV: 1.1 Contributions
The summary of contributions presented in this chapter is as follows.
Token robustness. We build on ciphertext dependence to define token robustness – a property
that implies it is impossible for an adversary without an appropriate secret key to re-encrypt
a ciphertext to a key it has not been encrypted under before. Our model assumes the
adversary sees a number of legitimate update tokens, modelling a malicious proxy who
honestly performs re-encryptions requested by the client, then attempts to perform a new
re-encryption. We give a separating example which shows that token robustness is stronger
than ciphertext dependence.
Formalised unidirectionality. The ability to re-encrypt back to the old key can grant access
back to an unauthorised user or re-encrypt to an expired key. To model an adversary who
attempts to re-encrypt a ciphertext to a key it has previously been encrypted under, we
revisit the existing notion of unidirectionality. Recall that in a unidirectional PRE scheme,
a re-encryption token can only be used to transform a ciphertext under pki to pkj and not
from pkj to pki, otherwise the scheme is bidirectional. This existing, informal notion of
unidirectionality does not consider reversal attacks where a server may retain some limited
information about an old ciphertext and update token to reverse the re-encryption. This
consideration is particularly important for ciphertext dependent and token robust schemes
where update tokens can only re-encrypt specific ciphertexts, meaning that reversing that
re-encryption should depend on that specific update token, as opposed to one generic,
ciphertext-independent update token ∆i,j permitting the re-encryption of any ciphertext
under pkj to pki.
Clearly, all re-encryption operations are trivially reversible if the adversary stores the
entirety of a previous ciphertext. Whilst existing notions of unidirectionality implicitly
consider the adversary who retains the update token, it is more realistic to assume that a
server willing to retain the update token would be willing to retain any state of at least
the same size. We therefore formally define reversal attacks with respect to the size of the
state the server must retain in order to reverse a re-encryption. This allows us to define
maximal irreversibility and best-achievable unidirectionality for token robust schemes. Using
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our stronger and more realistic model, we see that there exist schemes which claim to be
unidirectional but are bidirectional in our more realistic model, and vice versa.
Ciphertext Origin Authentication. Finally, we revisit the notion of DOA for PRE. DOA
is a cryptographic utility where the identity of the encryptor can be inferred from the
ciphertext, thereby providing the recipient a means of verifying who sent the message.
Typically, DOA assumes that the same party who created the message also encrypted
it, hence tying the data creator’s identity to the message underlying the ciphertext is
sufficient, and this is the approach generally taken in constructions. In PRE, however,
the re-encryption functionality means that the party who initialised re-encryption is not
necessarily the same party that created the message. We thus introduce the notion of
Ciphertext Origin Authentication (COA) to determine which party encrypted the message
(or initiated the most recent re-encryption) and show how to fulfil this requirement in
practice. We also discuss mandatory COA where the identity of the re-encryptor must be
verified in order for the message to be recoverable.
Overall, our security model covers a wider range of attacks than prior definitions. We
show that best-achievable unidirectionality can be met by introducing a simple adaptation
of BBS, and discuss extensions to COA both for our construction and for ReCrypt [EPRS17].
In keeping with the motivations discussed in Section III: 5, we focus on constructions that
fully re-randomise a ciphertext so as to avoid similar problems to the key encapsulation
approach.
Chapter structure. In Section IV: 2 we formally discuss existing work. We define token
robustness in Section IV: 3. In Section IV: 4 we give a formal definition for the existing
intuition of unidirectionality, and presentmaximal irreversibility – the first security definition
that considers reversal attacks. In Section IV: 5 we use maximal irreversibility together with
token robustness to create a stronger definition for best-achievable unidirectionality, and
present a scheme which meets this definition. Finally, in Section IV: 6 we define Ciphertext
Origin Authentication as a means of providing authenticated PRE and discuss how to
achieve this, presenting explicit extensions to our scheme and to ReCrypt.
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IV: 2 Related work
In this section, we discuss existing definitions of directionality in re-encryption primitives
(Section IV: 2.1), give a detailed discussion on ciphertext-dependence (Section IV: 2.2),
and discuss some related work that implies all ciphertext components change during re-
encryption (Section IV: 2.3). Finally, we discuss the existing concept of DOA and how it
can be achieved (Section IV: 2.4). Note that much existing work is written in the context
of symmetric PRE schemes, but uses underlying mathematics associated with public-key
schemes. We therefore note that whilst some of the work we cite was written for a slightly
different model, they still create expectations in what a definition for public-key PRE
should achieve, and provide guidelines in how to create an appropriate definition.
IV: 2.1 Directionality
Directionality is usually given as an informal definition. The manner in which unidirection-
ality is described is not consistent in the literature. For example, in [EPRS17] a scheme is
described as being unidirectional if there is no algorithm Invert() which, given ∆i,j , can
output ∆j,i, whereas unidirectionality in [LT18] is described as there being no algorithm that
can find skj given ski and ∆i,j . These definitions are both given for symmetric re-encryption
schemes such as updatable encryption (see Appendix A). It is not immediately clear whether
these two definitions are equivalent, or whether they are well-suited to public-key PRE
schemes.
One attempt to formalise the definition of directionality in public-key PRE is given
by Ivan and Dodis in [ID03], but the authors do not view directionality as a security
definition, rather a classification of PRE schemes. They therefore give one definition for
unidirectional PRE schemes and another for bidirectional PRE schemes, as opposed to
defining directionality separately from PRE. Furthermore, the definition of unidirectionality
in [ID03] assumes that a unidirectional scheme is single-hop, which is not necessarily the
case. A more recent work which informally describes unidirectionality is based on the idea
that no PPT algorithm can output a token that can re-encrypt to the old key [EPRS17],
whereas other works such as [PRSV17] are based on the idea that no PPT algorithm can
output an equivalent encryption of the old ciphertext, which is to say, any encryption of
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the message under the old key.
Recall that before lattice-based PRE schemes, creating unidirectional PRE schemes
was difficult, and single-hop schemes emerged as a means of achieving unidirectionality
[LV08b,SC09,CWYD10]. These schemes achieve unidirectionality by having two distinct
levels of ciphertext which have different formats — level 0 for ciphertexts which can be
re-encrypted, and level 1 for ciphertexts which cannot be re-encrypted. It is this format
change which prevents a ciphertext from being re-encrypted more than once. However, this
approach does not convey how easy it is for a malicious server to reverse the re-encryption
process. It also does not allow for multiple re-encryptions, meaning it is unsuitable for access
revocation and key rotation. As we discussed in Section III: 4, in many multi-hop schemes
the size of the ciphertext grows linearly with each re-encryption, meaning the schemes do
not have transparency and thus we have similar problems in defining what is meant by
unidirectionality. The related problem of multi-hop unidirectional proxy re-signatures is
addressed in [LV08a], however their construction works by providing the message along
with the signature and thus this technique cannot be easily adapted to re-encryption.
Existing PRE schemes which are both unidirectional and multi-hop such as [PRSV17]
do not address ciphertext-dependence. Current methods for achieving this cannot easily
be applied to their scheme. Key scraping attacks (see Section III: 4.2) in the context
of subscriber revocation are discussed in [MS17], where they consider an adversary who
receives portions of a ciphertext as long as the total size is sufficiently less than the total
size of the ciphertext. Whilst their definition of revocation does not explicitly model an
adversary seeking to reverse a re-encryption, their rationale of limiting the amount of
information the adversary can access with respect to old states is in keeping with ours – that
it may be more realistic to assume that the old keys can be retained than old ciphertexts
due to storage constraints.
There does not appear to be existing work on either symmetric or public-key PRE that
explicitly models a malicious server seeking to perform unauthorised re-encryptions.
IV: 2.2 Ciphertext-Dependence
To our knowledge, the only existing work that addresses limiting re-encryptions that the
proxy can perform is [EPRS17]. The particular contribution of interest is ciphertext-
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dependence, where update tokens can only be used to re-encrypt specific ciphertexts:
Definition IV.1. Let ReKeyGen in a PRE scheme be redefined to take additional infor-
mation c̃ about ciphertext c as input: ReKeyGen(ski, pkj , c̃) → ∆ci,j. The PRE scheme is
ciphertext-dependent if for all c1
$← Enc(pki,m1) and c2
$← Enc(pki,m2) such that c1 6= c2,
and all re-encryption tokens ∆c1i,j,





i,j , c2)) = m2
]
≤ negl(λ) (IV.1)
for some negligible function negl(λ)1.
If ReKeyGen(ski, pkj) does not take c̃ as input and update tokens can re-encrypt a ciphertext
under the source key, then the scheme is ciphertext-independent
In existing work [EPRS17] and in our scheme, c̃ denotes the header of the ciphertext.
For simplicity we will assume this is the case for ciphertext-dependent schemes in the
remainder of this chapter. We note that not all applications require ciphertext-dependence.
For example in key expiry, all ciphertexts under the old key need to be re-encrypted, and
this is used as motivation in creating a ciphertext-independent updatable encryption scheme
in [LT18]. To reflect this, most of the security games in this chapter have variants for both
ciphertext-dependent and ciphertext-independent PRE schemes.
To give an idea of how ciphertext-dependent schemes can be constructed, we describe
ReCrypt, the construction given in [EPRS17]. Before we do this, we must first define Pseudo-
Random Functions (PRFs) and Key-Homomorphic Pseudo-Random Functions (KH-PRFs).
Definition IV.2. A Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) is a function F : X → Y that is
indistinguishable from a function that outputs genuine random values in Y.
Definition IV.3. A Key-Homomorphic Pseudo-Random Function (KH-PRF) is a PRF
F : K ×X → Y such that
F(k1, x) + F(k2, x) = F(k1 + k2, x)
where (K,+), (Y,+) are groups.
1The part including the probability of being able to re-encrypt was not included formally in [EPRS17],
but we add it here to formalise the understanding of ciphertext-dependence as presented in [EPRS17].
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Setup(1λ)→ params
a symmetric encryption scheme SE
a KH-PRF F : K ×X → Y
a hash function h










χ = x+ y
τ = h(m) + F(x, 0)
c̃ = SE .Enc(k, (χ, τ))
m1||m2|| . . . ||mn ← m
c̄0 = y
c̄i = mi + F(x, i)
c̄← c̄0||c̄1|| . . . ||c̄n
return c = (c̃, c̄)
Dec(k, c)→ m
(c̃, c̄)← c
(χ, τ)← SE .Dec(k, c̃)
if (χ, τ) = ⊥ : return ⊥
y = c̄0
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n :
mi = c̄i −F(χ− y, i)
if h(m) + F(χ− y, 0) 6= τ :
return ⊥
else return m
ReKeyGen(ki, kj , c̃)
$→ ∆ci,j
(χ, τ)← SE .Dec(k, c̃0)
if (χ, τ) = ⊥ : return ⊥
x′, y′
$← K
χ′ = χ+ x′ + y′
τ ′ = τ + F(x′, 0)




ReEnc(∆ci,j , c)→ c′




for 1 ≤ i ≤ n :
c̄′i = c̄i + F(x
′, i)
c = (c̃′, c̄′)
return c
Figure IV.1: ReCrypt [EPRS17], a ciphertext-dependent key
rotation scheme built using a symmetric encryption scheme
(SE .KeyGen,SE .Enc,SE .Dec) and KH-PRF F .
The authenticated key rotation scheme ReCrypt of [EPRS17] is given in Figure IV.1.
Because ReCrypt is a ciphertext-dependent scheme, ReCrypt.ReKeyGen also takes a ci-
phertext header c̃ as input. ReCrypt utilises a symmetric encryption scheme SE =
(SE .KeyGen,SE .Enc,SE .Dec) to encrypt the ciphertext header, and a KH-PRF F to encrypt
the body of the ciphertext.
ReCrypt uses an approach similar to the key encapsulation approach, but where both the
header and the body of the ciphertext are re-randomised during re-encryption. The update
token given by ReCrypt.ReKeyGen includes the new ciphertext header, together with the
values needed to update the body of the ciphertext accordingly. Essentially, re-encryption
adds new randomness x′, y′ to the existing randomness x, y used to encrypt the message,
and uses the key-homomorphic properties of F to perform this update without removing or
giving away the original randomness.
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Ciphertexts are of the form
(
c̃ = SE .Enc(k, (χ, τ)), c̄ = (y, {mi + F(x, i)}ni=1)
)
,
where χ = x+ y and τ = h(m) + F(x, 0). Re-encrypted ciphertexts will be of the form
(
c̃′ = SE .Enc(k, (χ′, τ ′)), c̄′ = (y′ + y, {mi + F(x+ x′, i)}ni=1)
)
,
where χ′ = x + x′ + y + y′ and τ ′ = h(m) + F(x + x′, 0). Since fresh ciphertexts and
re-encrypted ciphertexts have the same form (in other words, ReCrypt has transparency), it
is easy to see that the correctness of re-encryption follows from the correctness of encryption.
ReCrypt is an authenticated scheme in the sense that the tag τ can be used to verify that
the received message is the same one that was sent.
Recall that in order for a re-encryption scheme to be practically useful, it must offer
some efficiency gain over downloading and re-encrypting locally. The need to have the
re-encryption initiator download (or retain) the ciphertext header is justified by arguing
that the construction of ReCrypt allows for much larger messages to be re-encrypted. The
overall efficiency justification in [EPRS17] is through having a smaller update token than
the ciphertext, putting the bulk of the necessary processing on the server during the
re-encryption operation. However, we note that current implementations of ReCrypt do
not offer significant efficiency gains over alternative updatable encryption schemes, as
existing PRFs rely on comparatively expensive operations such as modular exponentiation.
See [LT18, Table 2] for further details.
Observations. ReCrypt is unidirectional in the sense that, in general, outputs of the token
generation function ReCrypt.ReKeyGen(ki, kj , c̃) cannot be used to re-encrypt arbitrary
re-encrypted ciphertexts under kj (c′ ← ReCrypt.ReEnc(∆ci,j , c)) back to encryptions of
the same message under ki. This is because new update tokens will not contain the same
randomness as the token ∆ci,j used in the update, and since re-encryption consists of
reversible arithmetic operations, other tokens that do not contain the same randomness
will not be able to reverse the transformation. However, since no new randomness is
added during ReCrypt.ReEnc, if the adversary obtains the update token ∆ci,j that was
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used to re-encrypt c to c′, they can trivially revert c̄′ back to c̄. The adversary cannot
recover c̃ from the update token, as the update token contains a replacement header as
opposed to a value to update the header with. The security games given in [EPRS17]
capture the adversary learning update tokens resulting from calls to ReKeyGen(ki, kj , c̃),
but not the specific update token used in creating the challenge re-encryption. Therefore
the idea of unidirectionality conveyed in [EPRS17] is conditioned on the adversary not
learning the specific update token used. These observations fuel our motivation for defining
unidirectionality and reversal attacks more formally.
IV: 2.3 Full re-randomisation
It is often not considered a requirement that re-encryption updates all components of the
ciphertext. However, full re-randomisation must be considered a necessary security property
for applications such as access revocation and key expiry. Recall from the key encapsulation
approach described in Chapter II that if parts of the ciphertext remain static, the PRE
scheme may not be appropriate for key rotation or access revocation.
One existing definition that implies all components of a ciphertext are updated upon re-
encryption is UP-REENC security in [EPRS17], defined for key rotation schemes. Informally,
UP-REENC security implies that given a re-encrypted ciphertext, an adversary should
be unable to tell which of two potential ciphertexts has been re-encrypted. It models
an adversary that can learn update tokens, re-encryptions and corrupted keys, subject
to the trivial win condition. We use UP-REENC as a starting point for implying full
re-randomisation in this chapter, but note that we discuss this area in much greater detail
in Section V: 2.1 when we explore Post-Compromise Security (PCS). For easier relation to
the public-key setting, in Definition IV.4 we describe a public-key variant of UP-REENC.
Definition IV.4. Consider the following security game:
ReEncIND-CPAPREA (1λ)







($)← AOReKeyGen,OReEnc,OChallenge1 (1λ, state)
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OReKeyGen(i, j)
($)→ ∆i,j
if (ski 6∈ Kcorrupt) ∧ (skj ∈ Kcorrupt) :
return ⊥






OReEnc(i, j, [∆i,j ], c)
($)→ c′
if (ski 6∈ Kcorrupt) ∧ (skj ∈ Kcorrupt) :
return ⊥
if (skj 6∈ Kcorrupt) ∧ (ski ∈ Kcorrupt) :
return ⊥




($)← ReEnc(∆i,j , c)
return c′
ChalReEnc(i, j, c0, c1)
$→ cb
if (|c0| 6= |c1|) :
return ⊥





($)← ReEnc(∆i,j , c0)
c′∗1
($)← ReEnc(∆i,j , c1)
called← true
return c′∗b
where boxed conditions apply only to bidirectional PRE schemes. A PRE scheme
PRE is ε-Re-Encryption Indistinguishable against Chosen Plaintext Attacks (ε-
ReEnc-IND-CPA-secure) if for all PPT adversaries A = (A0,A1):
Pr
[





If ε is negligible as determined by the security parameter λ then we say PRE is Re-
Encryption Indistinguishable against Chosen Plaintext Attacks (ReEnc-IND-CPA-secure).
The key difference between PRE-IND-CPA-security and ReEnc-IND-CPA-security is
that in the former the adversary is comparing potential messages with a ciphertext, whereas
the latter compares potential ciphertexts with a re-encrypted ciphertext. This definition
can easily be extended to symmetric PRE by providing the adversary with encryption
oracles for both keys, see [EPRS17].
In ReCrypt (Figure IV.1), re-randomisation is achieved by having randomness added
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in the creation of the update token, and then using this token to update every block of
the ciphertext. PRE schemes that fully re-randomise the ciphertext include [HRsV07],
which uses obfuscation to re-encrypt ciphertexts. The obfuscated function first decrypts
then encrypts without revealing either the message or any secret keys during this process.
New randomness is added during the ReEnc operation as opposed to during ReKeyGen.
In contrast, [ABH09] adds new randomness to the ciphertext both in ReKeyGen and in
ReEnc. Because existing work that re-randomises can do so in either ReKeyGen or ReEnc,
we consider the possibility that either ReKeyGen or ReEnc (or both) are randomised, but
do not make assumptions that either algorithm is randomised.
IV: 2.4 Data Origin Authentication
Finally, we describe a simplified approach to DOA, which we build on when we define COA
in Section IV: 6. DOA enables parties to verify the source of a message – this includes both
verifying the identity of the sender and the integrity of the message. One approach to this
in the symmetric setting is using a Message Authentication Code (MAC), a keyed function
that creates a tag on a message that can be used to verify that the message has not been
changed, and that it must have originated from a party in possession of the appropriate
secret key. One approach to authenticated symmetric encryption is to compute a MAC on
the message to create a tag τ , then encrypt (m, τ). The decryptor can then use τ to verify
the message2. This is essentially the approach used in ReCrypt [EPRS17] (Figure IV.1) to
provide authenticated re-encryption.
Alternatively, digital signatures (Definition II.3) may provide DOA in settings where
the same party who created the message also encrypted it, as is the case in a number of
scenarios. After creating the message, the encryptor signs the hash of the message using
their unique signature key, σ $← Sign(ssk, h(m)) before encrypting (m,σ). After retrieving
(m′, σ′), the verifier uses the verification key svk to verify whether σ′ is a signature on m′
using the encryptor’s key. As only the encryptor should know their signing key ssk, only
they would have been able to compute σ′, meaning that they must have been the one
to encrypt the ciphertext. This only works in where we can assume the same party who
2This approach only works as long as the verifier is trusted. However, we consider this to be a reasonable
assumption in this case, as the act of re-encrypting to the receiver’s key already implies they are considered
to be trusted.
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created the message also encrypted it.
IV: 3 Token Robustness
In this section we define what it means for a malicious proxy to be unable to re-encrypt
a ciphertext to a key it has never been encrypted under before. We discuss the other
possibility of unauthorised re-encryptions, namely re-encrypting ciphertexts back to keys
they have previously been encrypted under in Section IV: 4.
Recall that in a ciphertext-dependent PRE scheme, ReKeyGen takes an additional input
c̃ from the ciphertext to be re-encrypted, with the intention that the resulting update
token can only re-encrypt that ciphertext. Ciphertext-dependence does not eliminate
the possibility that the adversary can create an update token that allows it to correctly
re-encrypt a ciphertext to a key it has never been under before. Ciphertext-dependence
is mainly concerned with what can be re-encrypted using the update token, but does
not consider whether the token reveals information that might make other re-encryptions
possible. For example, if the token contains the ciphertext header, and then during re-
encryption the proxy verifies that this matches the ciphertext, then other valid update
tokens can easily be created by swapping out the header in the update token. This scheme
would be ciphertext-dependent, but it would be easy for a malicious proxy to forge an update
token that results in unauthorised re-encryptions. We therefore define token robustness – a
stronger notion than ciphertext-dependence.
Informally, token robustness states that even with access to a token generation oracle,
an adversary cannot create a new valid token which re-encrypts a ciphertext to a key it
was never previously encrypted under. This extends ciphertext-dependence by explicitly
modelling an adversary who sees a number of legitimate update tokens and attempts to
perform an unauthorised re-encryption. This is designed to compliment unidirectionality,
which examines re-encrypting to a key which the ciphertext has previously been under.




TokRobPREA,κ (λ) = 1
]
≤ ε, (IV.3)
where TokRob is given in Figure IV.2. If κ is polynomial and ε is negligible with respect to
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TokRobPREA,κ (λ)
params← Setup(1λ)
(pk1, sk1), . . . , (pkκ, skκ)← KeyGen(1λ)
Chonest, Thonest := ∅
for all m ∈M : chain[m] := ∅
(c, i, j,∆A)
($)← AOEnc,OReKeyGen(1λ, pk1, . . . , pkκ)
if (i, c) 6∈ Chonest : return ⊥
c′ ← ReEnc(∆A, c)
if (Dec(ski, c) = Dec(skj , c
′)) ∧ (j 6∈ chain[m]) :
return 1







OReKeyGen(i, j , c )→ ∆ci,j
∆
c
i,j ← ReKeyGen(ski, pkj , c̃ )
chain[Dec(ski, c)].add{j}








i,j , c)→ c′
if ∆
c
i,j = ⊥ :
∆
c
i,j ← ReKeyGen(ski, pkj , c̃ )
else if (i, j,∆
c
i,j ) 6∈ Thonest :
return ⊥
c′ ← ReEnc(∆ ci,j , c)




Figure IV.2: The token robustness game TokRob for assessing
whether a ciphertext-dependent PRE scheme allows an adversary
to create unauthorised update tokens.
the security parameter λ then we say that PRE has token robustness.
In the TokRob game, the adversary attempts to output a token ∆A which re-encrypts a
target ciphertext c from being under pki to being under pkj , where the underlying message
has never been encrypted under pkj . It has access to an encryption oracle OEnc, a token
generation oracle OReKeyGen and a re-encryption oracle OReEnc. The list chain[m] records
keys m has been encrypted (or can be re-encrypted) under by appending the appropriate
keys whenever OEnc or OReKeyGen are called. The adversary cannot win by submitting a
token that re-encrypts the key to another key in the chain. Note that we cannot define
token robustness using an indistinguishability game as it is not modelling a passive scenario
where the adversary’s goal is to infer information, but an active one where the adversary is
trying to create a value it should not be able to, similarly to creating a forged signature.
This game aims to model a malicious server trying to re-encrypt ciphertexts provided by
the client, and therefore another condition is that the adversary’s target ciphertext C must
76
IV: 4 Directionality Revisited
be an output of the OEnc oracle (or a re-encryption of such a ciphertext), and the challenger
maintains a list Chonest to keep track of these ciphertexts. This ensures the adversary gains
no additional advantage from storing information created when encrypting the ciphertext.
For example, in an ElGamal-based scheme, the encryption algorithm samples a random y
and sets c̃ = gy. If the adversary encrypts the message for themselves then they learn y,
which the server would not know in the cloud storage application. The list Chonest is used
to keep track of oracle-generated ciphertexts.
Theorem IV.1. No ciphertext-independent PRE scheme has token robustness.
Proof. If a PRE scheme is not ciphertext-dependent, then the same update token can be used
to re-encrypt more than one ciphertext. In the TokRob game, let c1 ← OEnc(i,m1), c2 ←
OEnc(i,m2). Then the adversary can submit (i, j, c1) to OReKeyGen to obtain ∆c1i,j and then
submit (c2, i, j,∆i,j) (in other words, set cA = c2,∆A = ∆i,j). Since j 6∈ chain[m2], the
adversary wins the game with probability 1.
Ciphertext-dependence alone does not imply token robustness. Recall our earlier
example of a ciphertext-dependent PRE scheme which had the intended ciphertext header
as part of the token, and during re-encryption verified that this matches the input ciphertext.
Then an adversary can trivially craft a valid token for a different ciphertext by replacing
the new ciphertext header in the update token with the header of a different ciphertext
under the same key. Since we have by Theorem IV.1 that a token robust scheme must be
ciphertext-dependent, we see that token robustness is a stronger notion than ciphertext-
dependence. Token robustness requires more than a check that the given token is meant
for a specific ciphertext by comparing values – it requires some mathematical computation
where a correct re-encryption is only possible using the appropriate update token.
IV: 4 Directionality Revisited
Whilst token robustness covers the risk of ciphertexts being re-encrypted to keys they have
never previously been under, the problem of re-encrypting to a key the ciphertext was
previously encrypted under relates to unidirectionality. Recall from Definition III.4 that
the existing idea of unidirectionality states that an update token ∆i,j cannot be used to
re-encrypt a ciphertext under pkj to pki. We argue that this notion is not sufficient for
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access control as it is lacks formality and it is unclear whether it covers the possibility that
re-encryptions from pki to pkj can be reversed. This informal notion also does not couple
well with ciphertext-dependence or token robustness. In this section we will elaborate on
this claim before offering a more fine-grained security definition, which we call λ-irreversible.
IV: 4.1 Problems with traditional directionality
Unidirectionality is required in a number of applications for security reasons. However, it
has not yet been defined as a security property. This is problematic, as it is not immediately
obvious whether different authors’ informal descriptions of unidirectionality amount to
the same thing. Formal security allows us a precise understanding of what kinds of re-
encryptions are prevented. A particular issue is that, if a single-hop PRE scheme prevents
∆j,i being learned from ∆i,j (which is one possible interpretation of unidirectionality), this
does not convey whether it is possible for ∆i,j to reverse a re-encryption, which may be
possible if ReEnc is deterministic.
We therefore formulate a security game Uni in Figure IV.4, which we believe formalises
the informal understanding of unidirectionality in the literature. In Uni, the adversary
receives two public keys pki, pkj and aims to take a challenge ciphertext cj which is an
encryption of an unknown message, and produce a ciphertext ci such that Dec(ski, ci) =
Dec(skj , cj). The adversary receives access to a token oracle OReKeyGen that returns tokens
from pki to pkj3. The adversary can choose the number of times N that a challenge
ciphertext can have been re-encrypted (its level), in which case the challenger generates
the intermediate keys, and returns the public keys to the adversary together with the
ciphertext. This accommodates both single and multi-hop PRE schemes, where N ∈ {0, 1}
for single-hop schemes.
Definition IV.6. A PRE scheme PRE is unidirectional if for all PPT algorithms A there
exists a negligible function negl(λ) such that
Pr
[
UniPREA (λ) = 1
]
≤ negl(λ) . (IV.4)
A PRE scheme PRE is bidirectional if there exists a PPT algorithm A that wins the
3In a ciphertext-dependent scheme, this oracle takes a ciphertext c as input, otherwise it takes no input.
Tokens generated by the challenge oracle also take the appropriate ciphertexts as input.
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UniPREA,λ (λ)
params← Setup(λ)




($)← AOReKeyGen,ChalEnc(1λ, pk0, pk0)
if (c1) 6∈ Cchal : return ⊥
if (Dec(ski, ci) = Dec(skj , cj)) :
return 1













if (N = 0) :
cN ← Enc(pk1,m)
else :




for ` ∈ {1, . . . , N} :
∆
c`−1





return (cN , pk0, . . . , pkN−1)
Figure IV.3: The unidirectionality game Uni – a formal security
game capturing the traditional notion of unidirectionality. Boxed
values show the variant for a ciphertext-dependent scheme.
unidirectionality game Uni with non-negligible probability.
This can easily be extended to symmetric PRE schemes by making the obvious ad-
justments. We believe that this definition formally captures the intuition behind unidi-
rectionality as it is currently understood in the literature. We hope that for applications
where unidirectionality is a security requirement, this definition can be used to assess the
suitability of potential PRE schemes.
IV: 4.2 Directionality reconsidered
Whilst reversal attacks are not of concern for email forwarding, the original motivation
for PRE, it is an important consideration for access control and key expiry as reversing a
re-encryption can mean regranting access to a revoked user. Uni does not cover reversal
attacks, as challenge ciphertexts have never been encrypted under pki. A server or revoked
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user aiming to perform a reversal attack would at some point know the old ciphertext and
potentially the information used to perform the re-encryption. As a malicious server aiming
to perform an unauthorised re-encryption could attempt such an attack, reversal attacks
warrant further consideration.
Before we proceed, we must address the obvious point. An assumption often made,
particularly in the access control literature, is that once a message (or ciphertext) is
known, it is known forever. However, this assumption does not always make sense in cloud
storage applications when considering revoked users. One of the most common reasons for
outsourcing storage is limited local space. Therefore, a user’s ability to retrieve a file at
one point does not necessarily mean they have the capacity to retain all files they have ever
had access to. Revoked users may try to decrypt a file that was previously encrypted under
a key known to them. In many existing schemes, if a revoked user is able to retain limited
information about the old ciphertext, they have an advantage in creating a re-encryption
under the old key. For example, in the key encapsulation method, as the data encryption
key is static, any entity who knows this key can create a re-encryption of the message under
any public key. Since the data encryption key is typically much shorter than the message,
it is unnecessary for such adversaries to retain full messages if they can instead retain keys,
This could make a significant difference in how realistic such an attack is for constrained
devices. Given increasing trends in having external storage as the default storage option
(see Section I: 1), we believe definitions addressing revocation that consider bounded storage
are worthy of consideration.
We also note that existing notions of unidirectionality do not fit well with ciphertext-
dependence. For ciphertext-dependent schemes, reversal attacks become more significant
than traditional unidirectionality since tokens are specific to each ciphertext and thus the
act of maliciously retaining the token implies a willingness to store something for each
ciphertext. If it is assumed that the server retains the update token, we should also consider
other information which they might retain.
Now that we have argued that current notions of unidirectionality are not suitable for
access control, we present a security definition for reversal attacks. We explain the key
principles behind this definition.
• Principle 1: Malicious storage cannot be prevented. It is impossible for one party to
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prevent another from storing extra information without additional assumptions. In
particular we cannot prevent the server from retaining the old ciphertext.
• Principle 2: The amount of storage required to reverse a process has a lower bound.
Whilst we cannot prevent a malicious server from retaining an old ciphertext, we can
ensure there is no ‘easier’ way for them to obtain the old ciphertext. By ‘easier’, we
mean that the server needs significantly less storage than it would if retaining the
components of the original ciphertext that change during re-encryption. This is similar
to the motivation behind an economically rational server considered in [vJO+12] –
the server would not double its storage in order to circumvent the scheme.
There are schemes such as [ABH09] where storage of the update token alone cannot
reverse a particular re-encryption, but retaining elements of the update token and elements
of the original ciphertext can reverse a re-encryption. For example, if the update token
contains a replacement ciphertext header, then reversal can be trivial by retaining the
original ciphertext header. If storing some component of the original ciphertext makes a
reversal attack successful, then we should assume that the adversary will do so, especially if
the amount of storage needed is at most the size of the update token. For practical reasons,
header values and update tokens are often designed to be small (as in [EPRS17]), and thus
can easily be retained. Current models of unidirectionality permit an adversary to retain
the update token in order to attempt to re-encrypt. We argue that there is no reason to
restrict the information an adversary may store to just update tokens, especially if the
adversary can retain other information and have a greater chance of success.
We now define a reversal attack game which takes into account the amount of information
an adversarial server may have retained during the re-encryption process using a storage
parameter λ. The following game has an adversary in three stages A = (A0,A1,A2). All
three adversaries receive the security parameter λ, storage parameter λ, public keys and
system parameters as input.
Stage 1: A0 receives a randomly chosen message m and decides which keys pki, pkj should
be used for encryption and re-encryption.
Stage 2: A1 receives the ciphertext c and update token ∆i,j and determines what should
be retained in the state stA, which is bounded by a storage parameter λ. Note
this adversary never receives the message. Since this adversary knows the storage
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Rev-ReEncPREA (1λ, 1λ, κ)
params← Setup(λ)











$← ReKeyGen(ski, pkj , c̃ )
stA
($)← A1(1λ, 1λ, pk1, . . . pkκ,∆
c
i,j , C)
if |stA| > λ : return ⊥
c′ ← ReEnc(∆ ci,j , c)
cA
($)← A2(1λ, 1λ, pk1, . . . , pkκ, stA, c′)
if Dec(ski, cA) = Dec(skj , c
′) :
return 1
else : return 0
Figure IV.4: The reversal game Rev-ReEnc. The A0 maintains a
state bounded by λ which is passed onto A1 who attempts to
reverse the re-encryption. Boxed values show the variant for a
ciphertext-dependent scheme.
bound, it can compute many potential states before selecting which one will be
passed on to A2.
Stage 3: A2 receives the state stA forwarded by A1 and the re-encrypted ciphertext c′,
and uses this to try to output a ciphertext cA which is an encryption of the
same message under the original key. This adversary never receives the message,
original ciphertext or the update token — they only receive the information
retained by A1.
Note that the ciphertext cA output by A2 does not need to be the original ciphertext —
it can be any encryption of m under pki. This emulates the scenario where the server
must decide how much information to retain about the old ciphertext and update token
before later attempting to reverse the re-encryption (or revert to an equivalent ciphertext –
another encryption of the same message under the same key).
Definition IV.7. Given a PRE scheme PRE, let |∆| denote the size of tokens given by
PRE with security parameter λ, let |c̃| denote the size of the ciphertext headers, let |c̄|
denote the size of the ciphertext body, and let s be the total size of ciphertext components
updated by ReEnc. Then for λ ∈ {0, |∆|, |c̃|, |c̄|, s}, we define the advantage of an adversary
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A = (A0,A1,A2) of winning the Rev-ReEnc game given in Figure IV.4 as:
AdvA,λ,κRev-ReEnc(1
λ)(1λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[Rev-ReEncPREA (1λ, 1λ, κ) = 1]− 1
2s−λ
∣∣∣∣ , (IV.5)
where κ is polynomial in terms of λ and 1
2s−λ
is the probability that an adversary who has
retained λ bits of c can correctly guess the remaining bits.
We say that a proxy re-encryption scheme PRE is λ-irreversible if for all PPT adver-
saries A = (A0,A1,A2), the advantage of winning the game is negligible:
AdvA,λ,κRev-ReEnc(1
λ)(1λ) ≤ negl(λ) . (IV.6)
Conversely, a PRE scheme is λ-reversible if there exists a PPT algorithm A that can win
the Rev-ReEncPREA,λ (λ) game with state stA of size at most λ, with non-negligible probability.
Remark. If a PRE scheme is λ-irreversible, then it is not λ′-irreversible for λ′ < λ.
Similarly, if a scheme is λ-reversible, then it is also λ′-reversible for λ′ > λ.
We restrict ourselves to logical choices of λ. We note that typically |∆| = |c̃|, and that
in PRE schemes which do not rely on a hybrid key encapsulation mechanism, components
of the ciphertext header and body are also usually the same size.
We briefly note that constructing this notion as an indistinguishability game is difficult
since the state which the adversary outputs is not fixed. For example, if the adversary
stores a truncated hash of the original ciphertext then the game cannot compute another
ciphertext, which makes indistinguishability difficult. Since this definition aims to convey
that an adversary should not be able to re-encrypt back to the old key, we do not consider
the lack of indistinguishability as a significant drawback.
We now formulate a definition for maximum irreversibility. Informally, the amount of
storage needed to reverse a re-encryption is at least the size of the old ciphertext components
that were updated.
Definition IV.8. A PRE scheme is maximally irreversible if it is s-reversible, where s is
the total size of the ciphertext components updated by ReEnc.
Clearly, maximum irreversibility is stronger than traditional notions of unidirectionality
as the adversary sees an original ciphertext under pki.
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IV: 4.2.1 Observations
1. The storage bound λ can be considered similarly to the security parameter λ in that
the larger λ is, the more secure the scheme is. However, even small values for λ are
still meaningful since they convey how easy it is to reverse a re-encryption and can
therefore be used to compare different schemes.
2. The most useful values which λ can take are λ = |∆|, as this is comparable to
traditional bidirectionality, or λ = s, as this makes a scheme maximally irreversible.
In general, useful values are in the range |∆| ≤ λ ≤ |s|.
3. If a scheme is both ReEnc-IND-CPA-secure and maximally irreversible then it is
|C|-irreversible.
4. All traditionally bidirectional4 schemes can be shown to be |∆|-reversible, but there
also exist |∆|-reversible schemes which are not traditionally bidirectional, as we
shall see in Section IV: 4.3. Since more attacks are covered, saying that a scheme is
|∆|-reversible is stronger than saying it is bidirectional in the traditional sense.
5. Our definition also applies to schemes where the ciphertext is not fully re-randomised
upon re-encryption (not ReEnc-IND-CPA-secure), since best-achievable unidirection-
ality only requires that the state is the size of the number of components which are
updated as opposed to the entire ciphertext.
6. We assume that the ciphertext is as compact as it could be, so for all ciphertexts
c there is no compression function which allows c to be stored as c∗ with |c∗| < |c|.
For example, IND$-CPA-security implies that ciphertexts are indistinguishable from
random strings, so for schemes with this property only storing a subset of the bits
means the adversary can do no better than guessing to obtain the remainder of the
ciphertext. If the ciphertexts can be compressed, we can apply the definition to a
compressed version of the PRE scheme by having encryption compress the ciphertext,
decryption decompress it and have the re-encryption function perform decompression
and compression.
Token robust schemes can be either unidirectional or bidirectional. In other words,
token robustness says nothing about directionality. However, note that if a scheme is token
robust and we can prove that the only way of reversing a re-encryption is by storing a
4The informal notion that an update token ∆i,j can also re-encrypt from pkj to pki.
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state the size of the original ciphertext, then this is the best notion of unidirectionality
that can be achieved without assuming that the adversary honestly deletes old ciphertexts.
In Section IV: 5 we use this definition to define best-achievable unidirectionality. By
considering unidirectionality in this way, the problem of creating a unidirectional multi-hop
PRE scheme may be solved more easily using token robustness and could therefore lead to
more unidirectional multi-hop schemes that are practically implementable.
IV: 4.3 Existing schemes under the new definition
Some traditionally unidirectional schemes are |∆|−reversible. For ciphertext-
dependent schemes, this means they are bidirectional. In both [EPRS17] and [BLMR13],
the update token consists of the new header and another value used to change the body of
the ciphertext using an arithmetic operation. We can generalise this by saying ∆ = (∆0,∆1),
where ∆0 = c̃′ and (∆1)−1 is easily computable. To reverse the re-encryption, the adversary
A1 retains the old header c̃, and computes the inverse of ∆1, setting stA = (c̃,∆−11 ). Then
A2 can recover c← ReEnc(stA, c′) to win the game. Note that A does not need to retain
∆0 as this is contained in the new ciphertext. The state stA is clearly the same size as
∆ = (c̃′,∆1), and we can therefore consider such schemes to be |∆|-reversible. Since any
adversary willing to store information of size up to |∆| will not restrict themselves to
retaining ∆ alone, our definition better reflects the intuition behind bidirectionality. In
particular, because [EPRS17] is ciphertext-dependent, it should be considered bidirectional
under these realistic assumptions.
Some existing bidirectional schemes are maximally irreversible. In the multi-hop
PRE scheme of [CH07], ReKeyGen takes two secret keys as input and the ciphertext includes
a number of components including B = (ga)r, where pk = ga, sk = a and r $← Zq. The
re-encryption token takes as input two secret keys a, b and outputs ∆a,b = b/a, which is
then used to update B and no other part of the ciphertext. Since both the ciphertext
element B and the re-keying token ∆a,b are integers modulo q, an adversary hoping to
reverse the re-encryption by storing ∆a,b could have simply retained B. Particularly for
applications where there is one message per key pair, the server would need to store one
token per re-encrypted ciphertext, in which case they could have retained every original
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ciphertext 5. Similarly, the original symmetric PRE scheme [BBS98] may also be considered
maximally irreversible.
IV: 5 Proxy Re-Encryption in the Malicious model
We now combine our contributions in Sections IV: 3 and IV: 4 to define a model where
the server cannot perform encryptions unless initiated by a client. We thus explore
malicious behaviours other than breaking confidentiality. We discuss some conditions which
apply to re-encryption generally, before explaining the stronger conditions specific to our
setting. Clearly, correctness is a necessary property of all PRE schemes. We consider
ReEnc-IND-CPA-secure as another necessary condition, despite the fact that this is not
the case in much existing work [BBS98,AFGH05,CH07,LV08a,CWYD10], as we aim for
PRE to be used for revocation and key expiry.
In the malicious model, we must ensure that giving the server the ability to perform
some re-encryptions does not mean they can perform unauthorised re-encryptions. In
particular, we want our setting to consider revoked users who are honest-but-curious in that
they may try to decrypt re-encrypted ciphertexts, but do not collude with the server directly.
We thus require a means of ensuring that only authorised re-encryptions are possible. The
inability to perform unauthorised re-encryptions breaks down to two necessary properties:
1. Token Robustness. No matter how many re-encryption tokens the server sees, the
server cannot use these to form a token which encrypts a ciphertext to a new key.
This means the adversary is unable to share messages with users who have not had
access to them before. Ciphertext-dependence is reasonably trivial to achieve for
ElGamal-based schemes such as [BBS98] by having the randomness used to encrypt
the message input to ReKeyGen. We build on this existing technique [EPRS17] to
create a token robust scheme.
2. Maximal irreversibility. The token used to perform a re-encryption cannot be
used to reverse that re-encryption. This is particularly necessary when considering
revocation and key expiry. If re-encryption has been performed to revoke access, then
5As the value B is unique for each ciphertext, retaining B for one ciphertext does not allow a different
ciphertext to be re-encrypted whereas the update token can re-encrypt any ciphertext in either direction.
This further demonstrates why token robustness is a necessary requirement.
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reversing that re-encryption regrants access to the revoked user. Our definition of
maximal irreversability conveys this under realistic assumptions.
We combine these definitions to form the following definition which is a requirement
for a PRE scheme used to enforce changes to access control policy on a malicious server.
Definition IV.9. A PRE scheme is best-achievable unidirectional if it is both token robust
and maximally irreversible.
Token robustness implies that a token ∆cii,j cannot be used to re-encrypt a ciphertext
cj
$← Enc(pkj ,m) where cj 6= ci (except with negligible probability), which covers the
traditional notion of unidirectionality. Coupled with maximal irreversibility, this means
that given a re-encrypted ciphertext cj under pkj , the only way that the adversary can
produce a ciphertext ci such that Dec(ski, ci) = Dec(skj , cj), where pki is the original key,
is by retaining a state the size of the original ciphertext during the re-encryption process.
We show in Section IV: 5.1 that it is possible to have a scheme which is best-achievable
unidirectional using a simple adaptation of ElGamal-based PRE, and prove its security
under the DDH assumption.
IV: 5.1 A Secure PRE scheme in the malicious model
Recall that for PRE suitable for access control, we require a multi-hop scheme. For PRE
in the malicious model, we require a scheme which is unidirectional, ciphertext-dependent
and token robust. We present our scheme in Figure IV.5, based on ElGamal encryption.
Lemma IV.1. The scheme given in Figure IV.5 is correct.
Proof. Encryptions have the form c = (gy,m · gxy) for message m and public key gx.
Decrypting using secret key x results in m′ = c̃−x · c̄ = (gy)−x ·m · gxy = m, as required.
The update token resulting from ReEnc(ski = xi, pkj = gxj , c̃ = gy) has the form
∆ci,j = (g
y′ , gxjy
′−xiy), meaning that re-encrypted ciphertexts have the form cj = (gy
′
,m ·
gxiy · gxjy′−xiy) = (gy′ ,m · gxjy′), which is the same as a fresh ciphertext under gxj , so
correctness follows.
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Setup(1λ)→ params
p large prime
g a generator of Zp
M = Zp
T = K = Z∗p












c̄ = m · pky = m · gxy
return c = (c̃, c̄)
Dec(sk, c)→ m
m′ = c̃−sk · c̄ = (gy)−x ·m · gxy
return m′







y′ · c̃−ski = gxjy
′
· g−xiy




c̃′ = a = gy
′
c̄′ = c̄ · b = m · gxiy · gxjy
′−xiy
return c′ = (c̃′, c̄′)
Figure IV.5: An ElGamal-based scheme similar to the one given
by Blaze et al [BBS98] which is best-achievable unidirectional and
token robust.
IV: 5.2 Security analysis
First we show our construction is ReEnc-IND-CPA, then best-achievable unidirectional,
and finally token robust.
Theorem IV.2. The scheme described in Figure IV.5 is ReEnc-IND-CPA under the DDH
assumption.
Proof. Recall that in the ReEnc-IND-CPA game, the adversary does not learn the precise
update token used to perform the re-encryption (similarly to [EPRS17]). Therefore it
suffices to show that a re-encrypted ciphertext has the same form as a fresh encryption
of the message under the new key. In other words, re-encrypted ciphertexts under xj are
identically distributed to ciphertexts encrypted for the first time under xj . We have already
demonstrated this in the proof of Lemma IV.1.
Proving ReEnc-IND-CPA therefore reduces to ElGamal being IND-CPA.
Theorem IV.3. The scheme in Figure IV.5 is best-achievable unidirectional.
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We prove this through two lemmas, first showing that the scheme is maximally irre-
versible then that it has token robustness.
Lemma IV.2. The scheme described in Figure IV.5 is maximally irreversible under the
DDH assumption.
In this proof we need to show that the adversary must retain a state of size λ =
s = 2|x|, where x ∈ Zp, as the token and ciphertext components are all the same size
(|∆| = |c̃| = |c̄|) and all elements of Zp, and both ciphertext components are updated during
re-encryption. We do not consider the advantage of the adversary storing gxiy−xjy′ and
only part of gy (or vice versa) here, but in Section IV: 6.3 we discuss unidirectionality when
λ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , s− 1, s}.
Proof. As the old header is replaced independently of the update token, the update token
alone cannot be used to reverse a ciphertext. If an adversary has both the re-encryption token
used as well as the first component of the old ciphertext, then reversing the re-encryption
is trivial. We demonstrate that retaining both values would require the same amount of
storage as retaining the original ciphertext, and therefore is maximally irreversible.
First we observe that c̄ and ∆c(1)i,j can be considered interchangeably as components to
be retained in stA. For simplicity, we only consider ∆
c(1)
i,j as a potential input to stA. There
are only two values which can revert re-encryption of the ciphertext – the old ciphertext
header c̃ and ∆c(1)i,j . For the scheme to be best-achievable unidirectional, we need to show
that both values must be retained for a successful reversal attack.
We begin by showing that an adversary who only retains ∆c(1)i,j = g
xiy−xjy′ cannot
derive c̃ = gy. We first recall the DDH assumption which states, given (ga, gb, ge) where
either e = ab or e $← Z∗p, no PPT adversary can distinguish which was given.
In addition to gxiy−xjy′ , we also assume that the server knows the public keys gxi , gxj
and the header of the new file, gy′ . For simpler notation, let a = xi, b = xj , d = y, e = y′.
The adversary’s task is therefore: given (a, gb, ge, gbe−ad), find gd. We show that if there
exists an adversary B such that B(a, gb, ge, gbe−ad)→ gd for a, b, d, e $← Z∗p, then this would
break DDH — given a DDH challenge (ga, gb, gf ), we could sample a, d $← Z∗p and call
B(a, gb, ge, gf−ad) → gd′ . If gd′ = gd then f = be, breaking DDH. We therefore conclude
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For the other direction, we note that the adversary being able to calculate gbd−ac from
(a, gb, gd, gc) would clearly also break DDH. We therefore conclude that gxjy′−xiy cannot
be recovered from (xi, gxj , gy
′
, gy).
It remains to show that the adversary cannot output an equivalent ciphertext (gŷ,m·gxiŷ)
for some ŷ ∈ Z∗p given (gy
′
,m · gxjy′), xi, gxj . To do this the adversary would need to be
able to derive m by calculating gxjy′ , which would again imply the DDH assumption can
be broken.
This proof shows that the attacker needs to store at least as much as if they were
storing the original ciphertext. This means any successful method for obtaining a copy
of the message under the old key will be less efficient than simply retaining the original
ciphertext.
Lemma IV.3. The scheme in Figure IV.5 has token robustness under the CDH assumption.
Proof. To win the token robustness game, the adversary must output a token which re-
encrypts an honestly-generated ciphertext so that it is under a key that it has not been
encrypted under before.
Recall that the encryption oracle Enc(i,m) outputs a ciphertext of the form (gy,m ·gxiy)




′−xiy). Let the challenge input ciphertext be denoted cAi = (g
y,m · gxiy). Then
the adversary must output a token of the form ∆A = (gy
′
, gxjy
′−xiy), where j 6∈ chain(m).
It may be possible that querying two completely different keys and a different ciphertext
cl = (g
yl ,m · gxlyl) results in a token ∆cll,k = (g
yk , gxkyk−xlyl), where gxkyk−xlyl = gxiy−xjy′ ,
but this only occurs with negligible probability.







′′−xiy). The adversary’s goal is to output an update token ∆A = (gy′ , gxjy′−xiy),
where xi = ski and c = (gy,m · gxy) is the ciphertext output by A to be re-encrypted to a
new key. We note that it is trivial for the adversary to calculate gxjy′ for some y′ $← Z∗p




′ . To create a winning ∆Ai,j , it remains for A to calculate
gxiy. Since the ciphertext is honestly generated (cAi ∈ Chonest), the adversary does not know
y.
Since factoring is a difficult problem modulo p (otherwise, ElGamal would not be
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for some xk ← KeyGen(1λ), y′′ ∈ Z∗p. We conclude that the adversary can only compute
ciphertexts of the correct form for keys pki where i ∈ chain(Dec(ski, cAi )). Since the
adversary must output a token for a new key to win the game, we conclude the scheme is
token robust.
We have shown that our scheme is suitable for the malicious model according to the
goals we outlined at the beginning of this chapter. This means a malicious server will be
unable to perform unauthorised re-encryptions on stored files, as much as is possible to
guarantee given realistic storage assumptions.
IV: 6 Authenticating Re-Encryption
We now present an alternative approach to ensuring that re-encryptions have been initiated
by honest parties by revisiting the traditional notion of DOA. Recall from Section IV: 2.4
that traditionally, data origin authentication is intended for settings where the party who
created the message also encrypts it. This means that it is sufficient for the appropriate
tag to tie the identity of the sender to the message prior to encryption. However, for PRE
this is not always the case. In situations where there is one key per party, then the act
of having created the re-encryption key would imply knowledge of ski, meaning that the
receiver can be sure that re-encryption was initiated by the party whose public key is pki.
Therefore a correct re-encryption implies that the re-encryption was initiated by a party
with access to the message.
However, in applications where more than one party shares an encryption key, such as
some access control systems, proof of having used this key is not sufficient to authenticate
the encryptor / re-encryption initiator. For the DOA mechanism discussed in Section IV: 2.4,
the underlying signature will not change when the ciphertext is re-encrypted, so the original
encryptor will be the one whose identity is tied to the ciphertext. Whilst this may be
desirable in some applications, our focus is on authenticating who initiated the most recent
re-encryption of the ciphertext. Since existing methods for achieving DOA should be simple
extensions to any PRE scheme, we restrict our focus to COA. Both signatures and PRE
could be combined to create an authenticated PRE scheme. This is useful in auditing
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changes to access control policy, or enabling users to verify which user has revoked their
access.
For example, consider the scenario where keys represent classifications, so groups with
the appropriate classification have the secret key. Now suppose that Alice shares a file
with Mallory. She re-encrypts the ciphertext so it can now be decrypted by anyone in
Mallory’s group. Mallory now wants to re-encrypt this file to share it with Bob without
Alice’s permission. In a traditional PRE scheme, when this second re-encryption happens,
it is unknown which of the people in Mallory’s group generated the update token, so there
is no proof that Mallory is the one who shared the file without authorisation. Digital rights
management can be considered a real world application of this scenario – if Mallory is
pirating music and trying to pass off pirated copies as legitimate, then anyone can verify
that Mallory is the distributor and not the owner of the rights. We acknowledge that
Mallory could simply share the file unencrypted, but this is an unavoidable risk when
sharing files.
We aim to define a concept whereby the identity of the re-encryption initiator (or
encryptor in the case of a fresh encryption) can be verified from the ciphertext in a way
that carries the same unforgeability guarantees as DOA. In other words, Alice will be able
to verify that Mallory was the party who performed the re-encryption. Now that we have
outlined the distinction between DOA and what we are trying to achieve, we formulate the
notion of Ciphertext Origin Authentication (COA).
IV: 6.1 Correctness upon verification
Most Authenticated Encryption (AE) and Signcryption schemes [Zhe97] use a mechanism
where during the decryption process an authentication check is made, and the receiver is
supposed to terminate the decryption process if the check fails. Such a check is also made
in [EPRS17]. However, if corrupted users are being considered then honest termination of a
process is not guaranteed – a malicious user could ignore the outcome of the authentication
check and derive the message regardless. We therefore aim for compulsory COA that
provides stronger security against users who want to change the access controls without
being caught, as the message can only be derived if identity is verified correctly. We call
this correctness upon verification and consider it a secondary goal.
92
IV: 6 Authenticating Re-Encryption
The most intuitive way of proving which entity encrypted a message is to show proof
of knowledge of the secret information used to form the new ciphertext. In our scheme
outlined in Figure IV.5 this is the value y. However, the COA check must not leak y as
this will enable decryption using the public key. Therefore, we need the initiator to prove
that they know y without revealing it.
Recall the basic ElGamal signature scheme Figure II.3. The hash of the message m is
signed so as to enable the signing of arbitrary length messages. We can see correctness as
svkσ0 · σσ10 = (g
x)r · rs
= gxr · (gk)(h(m)−xr)k−1
= gxr · gh(m)−xr
= gh(m).
We can obtain a mandatory COA check by replacing gy in our original scheme (Fig-
ure IV.5) with an ElGamal signature on y signed using the initiator’s signing key. Note
that we do not need to sign the hash of y, as y is already a random value in the correct
range. We also adapt the Verify algorithm so that instead of it returning 0 or 1 to indicate
a pass or fail, it derives a specific value a. We call the resulting algorithm VerRetrieve and











$← Zp, r = gk
s = (y − xr)k−1 mod p− 1
σ = (r, s)
return σ
VerRetrieve(svk, σ)→ a
(r, s) = σ
a = svkr · rs = (gx)r · rs
return a
Figure IV.6: A variation on ElGamal signatures where verification
returns a value a as opposed to a bit.
Ciphertexts now have the form c = (σ,m · gxy). By the correctness of ElGamal
signatures, VerRetrieve(svk = gx, σ) should return a = gy if σ was signed using ssk = x,
since (gx)r · rs = gxr · gk(y−xr)k−1 = gy. Since y is not revealed during this process, this
adaptation should still meet the security properties proved in Section IV: 5.2. Since gy
is needed for decryption, if follows that correctly deriving gy is necessary to derive the
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correct message. Correctly deriving gy relies on correct verification during decryption,
meaning that verification is not optional, and so the decryptor cannot deny knowledge of
who encrypted the message.
However, if the scheme is only adapted with the change described in this section, then
there is no confirmation that the obtained message m is the correct one, so by extension
the receiver cannot verify that gy is correct. Suppose that Alice encrypts a message m to
obtain a ciphertext (σA, cA), and that she now shares this with Mallory (so Mallory knows
x). Mallory can forge Alice’s signature on a message mM of her choice encrypted under




′, σA)→ (σA, cM )







return (σA, cM )
Then receivers of (σA, cM ) will conclude that Alice encrypted the message mM , not
Mallory. We note that the encryption used here can either be done using the same secret
key (x′ = x) or a different one (x′ 6= x). This is a realistic scenario in access control schemes
where decryption keys are shared, and the attack means that anyone who knows the secret
key can forge the encryptor’s signature. Therefore in order to have COA, we also need a
message integrity check.
We propose adapting the encryption mechanism to replace c̄ = m · gxy with c̄ =
(gxŷ·h(m),m · gxy), where ŷ $← Z∗p, and adding the matching signature to the header. So
c̃ now contains two signatures – one used to derive gy and the other used to verify the
message m.
We redefine ReKeyGen as authReKeyGen, which additionally takes the correct signature
verification key svkA and re-encryption initator’s signing key sskB as input. To achieve
best-achievable unidirectionality, authReKeyGen selects a new ŷ uniformly at random so
that new entropy is added throughout the ciphertext. Then to verify the derived message
m′, the receiver derives â from σ and confirms that axh(m′) = c̄0. If they match then we
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Setup(1λ)→ params
p large prime

















$← Zp, r = gk
s = (y − ssk · r)k−1 mod p− 1









$← Z∗p, σ ← Sign(ssk, y)
ŷ
$← Z∗p, σ̂ ← Sign(ssk, ŷ)
c̃ = (σ, σ̂)
c̄ = (pkŷ·h(m),m · pky)
return c = (c̃, c̄)





m′ = a−sk · c̄1
if âsk·h(m










$← Z∗p, σ′ ← Sign(sskB , y′)
ŷ′
$← Z∗p, σ̂′ ← Sign(sskB , ŷ′)
c̃′ = (σ′, σ̂′)
∆ci,j = (c̃
′, (pkj)








c̄′ = (c̄0 ·∆1, c̄1 ·∆2)
return (c̃′, c̄′)
Figure IV.7: The scheme given in Figure IV.5 adapted such that it
also provides ciphertext origin authentication. Receivers must
verify the encryptor (re-encryption initiator) of the ciphertext to
decrypt the message.
have both message integrity and COA. Therefore this mechanism provides a means of
pairing gy with m and associating this with the identity of the encryptor (or re-encryption
initiator). The full adapted scheme is given in Figure IV.7.
IV: 6.2 COA in other schemes
COA can be added to other schemes. It is sufficient to create a signature using the
encryptor’s signing key and the randomness used to form the ciphertext and changing
re-encryption and decryption accordingly. We now demonstrate how to extend existing
schemes to offer COA. For other ElGamal-based schemes including [BBS98,LV08b,LT18],
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a similar adaptation to the one made in Section IV: 6.1 can be made.
We now propose an extension to ReCrypt [EPRS17]. Whilst ReCrypt uses symmetric
PRE for re-encryption, we believe that COA is still valid for symmetric encryption. Recall
that a COA check can either be optional or compulsory, depending on whether corrupted
users are considered. In ReCrypt, the message integrity check is optional and it is therefore
arguable whether an optional COA check suffices in their model. We first describe a simple
extension which creates an optional check here.
For a basic extension, the ciphertext should replace χ with (χ, σ = Sign(x, χ)) and
decryption should include the step Verify((gx), σ, χ) and only return m if this outputs
1. We note that this may be preferable to our scheme in Figure IV.5 depending on the
application, as it could theoretically permit the re-encryption of longer messages (dependent
on the existence of an efficient KH-PRF, F), with the caveat that it is not best-achievable
unidirectional.
Since ReCrypt is not an ElGamal-based scheme, the adaptation for a mandatory COA
check is more complicated. Essentially, we replace x, y $← K and χ = x+ y in the ciphertext
header by having x, y $← {i, j, : i+ j = gr} for r $← Z∗p and setting χ = gr. Then by signing
r, VerRetrieve will return gr = χ and decryption is adjusted accordingly. Note that we
move y from the ciphertext body into the ciphertext header, as it is now needed to generate
update tokens. The full extension is described in Figure IV.8.
IV: 6.3 Other choices for λ
Recall that in our definition of unidirectionality (Definition IV.7), the security parameter λ
is set according to the size of ciphertext components (λ ∈ {0, |∆|, |c̃|, |c̄|, s}, where s is the
total size of ciphertext components updated during re-encryption). A more fine-grained
definition would be to allow λ to be any number of bits λ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , s}. We decided
against this definition since, although it is more fine-grained in terms of security, it makes
proofs much harder for what we consider not to be a significant distinction in practice.
The main difference in terms of proofs is that the more fine-grained options for λ require
additional proofs that an adversary who only retains part of a component has no real
advantage in calculating the rest. Ultimately, whilst retaining certain values such as the
old header or the update token make sense, it is harder to envisage or justify an adversary
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Setup(1λ)→ params
a symmetric encryption scheme SE
a KH-PRF F : K ×X → Y
a hash function h

















$← {i, j, : i+ j = gr}
σ ← Sign(ssk, r)
τ = h(m) + F (x, 0)
c̃ = (Ek(σ, τ), y)
m1||m2|| . . . ||mn ← m
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n :
c̄i = mi + F (x, i+ 1)
c̄← c̄0||c̄1|| . . . ||c̄n
return c = (c̃, c̄)
authDec(k, svk, (c̃, c̄))→ m
(c̃, c̄)← c
(σ, τ)← Dk(c̃0)
if (σ, τ) = ⊥ : return ⊥
χ← VerRetrieve(svk, σ)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n :
mi = c̄i − F (χ− y, i+ 1)
if h(m) + F (χ− y, 0) 6= τ :
return ⊥
else : return m
authReKeyGen(ki, svkA, kj ,xB, c̃)
($)→ ∆ci,j
(σ, τ)← Dki(c̃0)
if (σ, τ) = ⊥ : return ⊥
χ← VerRetrieve(svkA, σ)




$← {i, j, : i+ j = gr
′
}
σ′ ← Sign(sskB , r′)
a = x′ − x
τ ′ = τ + F (a, 0)
c̃′ = (Ekj (σ′, τ ′), y′)
return ∆ci,j = (c̃
′, a)
ReEnc(∆ci,j , c)→ c′
(c̃′, a)← ∆ci,j
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n :
c̄′i = c̄i + F (a, i+ 1)
return (c̃′, c̄′)
Figure IV.8: ReCrypt [EPRS17] with compulsory Ciphertext
Origin Authentication.
who is additionally retaining some number of bits of other values.
To demonstrate how proofs become more complex for more fine-grained choices of
λ, we now show that our scheme in Figure IV.5 is also best-achievable unidirectional in
this stricter sense, on the condition that the prime p chosen by the Setup algorithm is a
Mersenne prime, which is to say that p = 2n − 1 for some n. To prove that our scheme is
best-achievable unidirectional, we need the following lemma, after which best-achievable
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unidirectionality follows from a trivial adaptation of Lemma IV.2.
Lemma IV.4. Let p = 2n − 1 be a (Mersenne) prime and let a, b $← Z∗p. Then, for all
PPT algorithms B there exists a negligible function negl(λ) such that:
Pr
[





+ negl(λ) , (IV.7)
where [gab]λ denotes the λ known bits of g
ab.
Proof. Since p is a Mersenne prime it has the form 2n− 1, and so is n bits long and there is
a bijection between integers in Zp and bitstrings of length n. In other words every integer
in Zp can be represented as a bitstring. Therefore random elements of Zp can be modelled
as random n-bit strings. More specifically, elements ga, where a $← Z∗p, can be considered
as random n-bit strings.
We proceed by induction.
Base case: λ = 0. By the CDH assumption, the adversary cannot compute gab with
probability significantly greater than 12n .
Assume for λ = i. An adversary who knows the first i bits of gab cannot calculate the
remaining n− i bits with probability higher than 1
2n−i
.
We now consider a variant of the DDH game which factors in the adversary’s knowledge
of i bits of gab. We denote by [gab]λ the λ known bits of g
ab. Let a, b be selected
uniformly at random and let c be selected at random with the condition that [gc]i = [gab]i:
a, b
$← Z∗p, c
$← {x ∈ Z∗p : [gx]i = [gab]i}. A consequence of assuming that our hypothesis
is correct for i is that an adversary cannot distinguish between (ga, gb, gab) and (ga, gb, gc)
with non-negligible probability. If our assumption was false, the adversary would have an
advantage in this game with probability > 1
2n−i
.
Show for λ = i + 1. For a, b $← Z∗p, c
$← {x ∈ Z∗p : [gx]i = [gab]i}, we have that
[gc]i+1 6= [gab]i+1 with probability 12 . In other words, the bit which the adversary is
trying to predict is going to be different from gab in gc with probability 12 . Suppose for a
contradiction that the adversary has a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing (ga, gb, gab)
from (ga, gb, gc). This would mean an adversary has an advantage of winning the variant of
DDH in case i half the time, whenever [gc]i+1 6= [gab]i+1. This makes the assumption in





. Therefore, by contradiction, an adversary has no significant advantage
calculating another bit of gab over guessing. Overall, the adversary cannot compute the
remaining bits gab with probability significantly greater than 1
2n−i−1
.
We conclude that knowledge of the first λ bits of gab in addition to (ga, gb) does not
help the adversary compute the remaining bits of gab with probability greater than 1
2n−λ
when p is a Mersenne prime.
IV: 7 Summary
We revisited the notion of unidirectionality in PRE schemes and provided a formal security
definition that covers reversal attacks. We have shown how, under this new definition,
existing PRE schemes which are considered traditionally bidirectional may be considered
unidirectional, and vice versa. We also outlined properties that a PRE scheme needs in
order to be considered secure in the malicious model, in particular defining token robustness
— the inability of the server to forge update tokens. Finally, we introduced a new notion of
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In this Chapter
In Section III: 5 we discussed the application of using PRE for access revocation, or as a key
rotation mechanism to enforce key life cycles. We used the key encapsulation mechanism to
demonstrate that if re-encryption does not fully re-randomise a ciphertext, particularly the
part of the ciphertext that contains the message (as is the case for a number of schemes in
the literature), then it may be possible for parties who have the original ciphertext and the
old secret key to derive the message from a re-encrypted ciphertext. In Section IV: 2.3 we
gave one definition that implies the ciphertext is re-randomised upon re-encryption, but
did not discuss existing approaches to this, or implications of re-randomisation in detail. In
this chapter, we seek to create a strong definition which implies that only the new secret
key must remain uncompromised for the re-encrypted ciphertext to hide the message. Our
overall aim is to define a security property such that schemes with this property can be
used for access revocation and key expiry, and provide a fitting construction.
V: 1 Introduction
The contributions of this chapter are joint work with Alex Davidson, Amit Deo and Keith
M. Martin. My personal contribution includes the definition of Post-Compromise Security
for PRE and its analysis, and the construction (BV-PRE) that meets the definition. Amit
Deo provided the variant of BV-PRE that is source-hiding and its analysis. Elements of this
chapter were published at ACISP 2019 [DDLM19a], including our definition of PCS, its
analysis and (BV-PRE. A full version of the published work which includes the proofs is
published on the Cryptology ePrint Archive [DDLM19b].
Motivation for exploring Post-Compromise Secure PRE was provided by Katriel
Cohn-Gordon.
V: 1 Introduction
For PRE to be useful in enforcing key rotation and access revocation, we would need
corruption of past keys to not impact the security of re-encrypted ciphertexts. We are
inspired by the work of Cohn-Gordon et al. [CCG16] who define Post-Compromise Security
(PCS) for messaging protocols. The high-level definition of PCS is as follows:
Definition V.1 ( [CCG16]). ‘A protocol between Alice and Bob provides Post-Compromise
Security (PCS) if Alice has a security guarantee about communication with Bob, even if
Bob’s secrets have already been compromised.’
Note that PCS differs from forward security, which conveys that the compromise of
future states does not affect the security of past ones. PCS conveys whether a cryptographic
scheme can regain security after a session or party has been compromised. The difference
can be seen visually in Figures V.1 and V.2. A definition of PCS for PRE schemes is clearly





Figure V.1: Forward security implies





Figure V.2: Post-compromise security




As Definition V.1 only provides the bare intuition, the ‘security guarantee’ is left open
so that it can be tailored to the application, which is what we will do for PCS in PRE in
this chapter.
Motivation for PCS PRE. One particular application of post-compromise PRE of
interest is to complement PCS of messages in transit, by giving PCS to backed-up messages
stored in the cloud. The Signal Protocol for encrypting messages in transit between two
devices provides strong, modern, provable security guarantees including PCS [CCG16].
However, most users expect to keep their messages when they lose their device or buy a
new one; thus, popular Signal implementations such as WhatsApp back up client messages
to public cloud services. Unfortunately, this backup is encrypted using a static encryption
key. This means that while messages in transit have PCS, these properties are lost once
messages are backed up. If an adversary compromises a device and obtains the static cloud
backup key, they can retain this to compromise future messages once they are backed up.
Assuming that all message history is stored locally, the updated message history could
be encrypted under a new key and re-uploaded at regular time intervals, but this will have
a huge cost both in terms of computation and bandwidth, particularly as much messaging
is done via smartphones. A PRE scheme with PCS could be used instead, so that the PCS
of messages in transit is extended to message backups.
Another use of PCS PRE is to revoke access from subscribers. For example, data stored
by third parties may be subject to contractual agreements, as is the case with streaming
services such as Netflix, who buy the rights to share content owned by production companies.
The streaming services make the content available to subscribers only for the period of time
indicated in a license, and must therefore ensure that this content cannot be accessed either
by non-subscribers, or subscribers residing in a geographical region not specified by the
license. They also must ensure that, as much as possible, content cannot be permanently
downloaded and thereby stolen by a malicious subscriber.
V: 1.1 Contributions
In this chapter, we set out the first formalisation of PCS for PRE schemes. In our model,
the adversary cannot distinguish which of two ciphertexts has been re-encrypted given
the old key, old ciphertexts and the token used to perform the re-encryption. In other
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words, we view a compromise as the loss of all previous public and secret states associated
with a given ciphertext, and limit the information that must remain secret to the current
secret key alone. To date there is no related security definition that gives the adversary the
update token used in the challenge re-encryption. Our definition implies unidirectionality as
opposed to treating unidirectional and bidirectional schemes differently, and that additional
randomness beyond that given in the update token is added upon re-encryption. Since we
do not make as many assumptions concerning which algorithms are deterministic or on the
flow of re-encryption operations, our security model can be applied to more general PRE
schemes and applications than similar definitions in the literature (see Section V: 2).
We analyse our model, proving several results that associate PCS with existing security
models for PRE and related primitives such as updatable encryption [LT18], and provide
separating examples that distinguish PCS as a separate security characteristic in its own
right. We demonstrate in Theorems V.1 and V.2 conditions under which schemes that have
PCS are also IND-HRA-secure. As these additional properties are common in practical
PRE schemes, this means that proving PCS is sufficient for proving that such schemes
provide message confidentiality. One of our major contributions in Theorem V.3 is to
show that a PRE scheme that is both source-hiding and secure against chosen plaintext
attacks also has PCS, meaning one of the six PRE schemes presented by Fuchsbauer et
al. [FKKP18] has PCS.
However, source-hiding PRE schemes were designed with different goals in mind
(namely security with adaptive key corruptions, which we discuss in Chapter VI) and do
not necessarily yield the most practical lattice-based PREs with PCS. We therefore give
a new PRE scheme, pcBV-PRE, adapted from BV-PRE– the practical scheme of Polyakov
et al. [PRSV17] whose security depends on the RLWE assumption. We prove that our
adaptation achieves PCS and is IND-HRA-secure via a tighter reduction than using the
combination of properties previously mentioned, meaning that source-hiding is sufficient,
but not necessary for achieving PCS.
The advantage of this is that we can prove security for general re-encryption graphs, as
opposed to only acyclic graphs as in [PRSV17], or only trees and chains as in [FKKP19].
Moreover, the other existing lattice-based source-hiding PRE scheme [FKKP19, Construc-
tion 2.b] ( [FKKP18, Construction 7.b]) is forced into sub-optimal parameter choices that
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render their assumptions much stronger (with respect to the approximation factors of
solving worst-case lattice problems), and much less efficient, and dramatically limits the
number of times a ciphertext can be re-encrypted. Our new scheme is much more efficient
than [FKKP19, Construction 2.b] since we leverage the speed of BV-PRE with minimal
changes.
Chapter structure. We begin by reviewing related work in Section V: 2. In Section V: 3
we define Post-Compromise Security (PCS) and show how our definition relates to other defi-
nitions in the literature, giving separating examples and security reductions. In Section V: 4,
we give an explicit, efficient construction, pcBV-PRE, by modifying the lattice-based PRE
scheme BV-PRE [PRSV17] to show that our notion of PCS can be satisfied by natural exten-
sions of current practical PRE schemes. We give an analysis of pcBV-PRE in Section V: 5
and discuss alternative techniques for proving PCS that do not rely on source-hiding.
V: 2 Related work
In this section, we explore three main areas – re-encryption security definitions that
model re-randomisation (Section V: 2.1), results that demonstrate how to prove IND-HRA
security (Section V: 2.2), and finally BV-PRE which we use as a basis for our construction
(Section V: 2.3).
V: 2.1 Ciphertext re-randomisation
As explained in Section III: 4.2, to effectively model security after key revocation, we need
a definition which implies that re-encryption updates all components of the ciphertext. In
particular, we aim for a scheme which adds new randomness during re-encryption as a
means of preventing successful reversal attacks, so that the re-encrypted ciphertext is as
secure as a fresh encryption under the new key. We refer to this as re-randomisation.
There is little work on requiring re-encryption to also re-randomise. In Section IV: 4.2 we
discussed defining the inability to regain the original ciphertext by considering an adversary
who retains some information about the ciphertext prior to re-encryption. However, this
approach does not account for the possibility that multiple revoked users store parts of the
original ciphertexts and collude, as is a concern in [CCV12,Coh19,PRSV17]. Modelling
104
V: 2 Related work
these possibilities leads to more complicated proofs than alternative approaches, as we saw
in Section IV: 6.3.
One such alternative is to take the same approach as for ReEnc-IND-CPA-security
(Definition IV.4), where the adversary must guess which of two ciphertexts has been
re-encrypted. For example, in [CH07], Canetti and Hohenberger discuss a notion for
re-randomising ciphertexts (which they call unlinkability) in the context of creating a CCA
definition. More recent work discussing re-randomisation is in the related areas of key
rotation and updatable encryption (see Appendix A). Recall that these differ from PRE in
that they are symmetric schemes, updates happen sequentially from ki to ki+1, and they
name full re-randomisation as a necessary security goal.
In their paper on key rotation, Everspaugh et al. defined UP-REENC [EPRS17], another
notion that implies full re-randomisation upon re-encryption. Interestingly, similarly to
the ReEnc-IND-CPA experiment ReEncIND-CPAPREA (λ) (Section IV: 2.3), their challenge
oracle takes key indices as input but no update token, meaning that unless ReKeyGen is
deterministic, the adversary never learns the update token used to perform the encryption.
This is crucial to their security proof as their construction, ReCrypt (Figure IV.1), allows an
adversary who has learned the update token to reverse the re-encryption of the challenge
ciphertext and therefore does not cover full compromise of the user who generated the
update token. In Chapter IV, we argued that unidirectionality and compromise of update
tokens is an important factor to consider in PRE. We therefore aim for a strong notion
of PCS which implies that only the new secret key must remain uncompromised for the
re-encrypted ciphertext to be secure.
PCS for Updatable Encryption. A particular work of note is [LT18], where Lehmann
and Tackmann define IND-UPD – a form of PCS for updatable encryption. This is similar
in nature to IND-HRAPREA (1λ) (Definition III.8), except that instead of the challenge
being an encryption of either m0 or m1, it is a re-encryption of either c0 or c1 as in
ReEncIND-CPAPREA (λ).
A main difference in security for updatable encryption is that instead of re-encrypting to
arbitrary keys, IND-UPD considers epochs where keys are updated sequentially, meaning the
resulting re-encryption graph will be a chain (or group of chains). We describe a selective
variant of the IND-UPD experiment in Figure V.3. Note that we adapt the notation
105
V: 2 Related work
and syntax used in [LT18] to that introduced in Chapter III, but that our formulation is
equivalent to the one given in [LT18]. IND-UPD is modelled using an oracle ONext which
updates the global state by incrementing the epoch number e, generating a key ke for
the new epoch and the update token ∆e−1,e from the previous epoch to the current one.
OEnc only encrypts under the current epoch key ke, and OReEnc only re-encrypts from the
previous epoch to the current one. Unlike the definitions we have given so far, update
tokens and re-encryptions of the challenge are generated by ONext and only learned by the
adversary when it calls OLearnTok or OLearnChal respectively.
Definition V.2. An updatable encryption scheme UE is ε-sIND-UPD-secure (selectively









where sIND-UPDUEA (1λ) is defined in Figure V.3.
If ε is negligible as parameterised by λ, then we say the scheme is (selectively) IND-
UPD-secure.
Whilst IND-UPD is defined for updatable encryption schemes, it can easily be applied
to symmetric PRE schemes when restricted to applications where the resulting encryption
graph will be a chain. We give pksIND-UPD, a simple adaptation of sIND-UPD for public-key
schemes, in Appendix D.
We now make several observations on some of the conditions imposed in
sIND-UPDUEA (1λ):
• IND-UPD-security does not imply that ciphertexts are re-randomised upon re-
encryption. This is because of the condition in OReEnc that if ReEnc is deterministic,
the adversary cannot have re-encrypted either of the potential challenge ciphertexts
c̄0, c̄1 chosen by A0.
• The adversary cannot learn the update token ∆e∗−1,e∗ leading to the epoch e∗ where
the challenge is created. This is enforced as a condition in OLearnTok.
• An updatable encryption scheme can be bidirectional and still be IND-UPD. This is
enforced by the challenge graph as bidirectionality adds an undirected edge to the
graph in OLearnTok, meaning the adversary cannot have learned any update tokens
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e := 0, k0
$← KeyGen(1λ), e∗ := ⊥,DRG := {v0}









(e, c1) 6∈ Chonest
)
∨ (|c0| 6= |c1|) :
return ⊥





($)← AOEnc,ONext,OReEnc,OLearnTok,OReEnc1 (1λ, state)
Kchal ← UpdateChallengeKeys(Kchal,DRG)
if Kchal ∩ Kcorrupt 6= ∅ : return ⊥












∆e−1,e ← ReKeyGen(ke−1, ke)
if e∗ 6= ⊥ :
c∗e ← ReEnc(∆e−1,e, c∗e−1)
Cchal.add{(e, c∗e)}
OReEnc(ce−1)→ ce
if (e− 1, ce−1) 6∈ Chonest :
return ⊥
if (ReEnc is deterministic) ∧ (e = e∗) :
if (ce−1 = c̄0) ∨ (ce−1 = c̄1) :
return ⊥







if (i > e) ∨ (i = e∗) : return ⊥
if PRE is unidirectional :
DRG.add{→e i−1,i} // directed edge
else (PRE is bidirectional) :






Figure V.3: A selective variant of IND-UPD [LT18] (with adapted
notation). The adversary needs to determine which of two
ciphertexts was re-encrypted. e denotes the current epoch, e∗
denotes the epoch where the challenge is called, and c∗i denotes the
challenge ciphertext under ki.
used to create a challenge ciphertext.
We will address these points when we build our own definition in Section V: 3. We
provide separating examples in Section V: 3.3 to demonstrate that our definition of PCS is
stronger.
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V: 2.2 Proving HRA security from CPA
We note that, as Cohen points out in his motivation of IND-HRA security (Definition III.8),
re-encryption schemes where re-encryption appends an encryption of the old secret key using
the new secret key to the ciphertext (∆i,j
$← Enc(pkj , ski), c′ ← (c,∆i,j)) are considered
secure in the CPA setting. This is a result of the strict separation of keys meaning that
no re-encryptions from challenge keys to corrupted ones can be made, as we depicted in
Figure III.5. Such constructions do not meet our intuition of PCS as we need to consider
the compromise of keys that were once used for the challenge ciphertext. We also note
that honest re-encryptions are considered in IND-UPD, although this terminology is not
used in [LT18]. For these reasons, we choose to create a definition of PCS with honest
re-encryptions.
As we choose to allow for honest re-encryptions in our definition of PCS, existing work
that proves HRA security from CPA security with additional properties is relevant to our
work. There are a few properties defined in the literature that a PRE scheme can have that
lift the scheme from being CPA secure to being HRA secure. One such property that was
defined by Cohen is re-encryption simulatability.
Definition V.3. [Coh19, Definition 7]. A PRE scheme PRE is re-encryption simulatable
if there exists a PPT algorithm ReEncSim such that with high probability over aux, for all
m ∈M:
(ReEncSim(pki, pkj , skj , c,m), aux) ≈s (ReEnc(∆i,j , c), aux),









aux = (pki, pkj , skj , c,m).
Cohen outlines a theorem stating that PRE-IND-CPA-secure PRE schemes that have
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this property are IND-HRA-secure [Coh19, Theorem 5]. The proof shows how an ad-
versary ACPA in PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ) can simulate IND-HRAPREA (1λ) by replacing the
re-encryptions that cannot be made in PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ) with outputs of ReEncSim.
Re-encryption simulatability implies that this simulated game and the real game are indis-
tinguishable, and so ACPA can use a successful adversary AHRA in IND-HRAPREA (1λ) to win
PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ).
Fuchsbauer et al. [FKKP19] expand on Cohen’s work in defining source-hiding as part
of their work on proving security with adaptive key corruptions. We note that the definition
of a PRE scheme given in [FKKP19] has explicit levelling, where the encryption function
takes a level ` for the ciphertext to be encrypted at. Informally, in a source-hiding scheme, a
re-encrypted ciphertext is indistinguishable from a fresh encryption of the same underlying
message using the same key, even given both key pairs, the old ciphertext and the update
token and the message. This means re-encrypted ciphertexts reveal no history as to the
keys they were previously encrypted under, or similarities between components of previous




















if called ∨ (`∗ + 1 > L) :
return ⊥
c∗ ← Enc(pk0,m∗, `∗)
c′
(0) $← ReEnc(∆0,1, c∗)
c′





Figure V.4: Experiments for the source-hiding property. Here, `
denotes a level for the ciphertext to be encrypted at. L is the
correctness bound (the number of times a ciphertext can be
re-encrypted without breaking the correctness conditions).
Definition V.4. [FKKP19, Definition 9]. A PRE scheme PRE is said to be ε-source-
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where SHPREA (1λ) is defined in Figure V.4.
If ε is negligible as parameterised by λ, then we say the scheme is source-hiding (SH).
We describe a simple variant of source-hiding for symmetric PRE schemes in Appendix C
for easier use with symmetric re-encryption primitives.
Fuchsbauer et al. also define weak key privacy and show PRE schemes with weak key
privacy that are source-hiding and IND-CPA-secure in the traditional sense (Definition II.7)
are also secure against adaptive HRAs, with sub-exponential loss for some re-encryption
graphs. More specifically, they show quasi-polynomial loss in security when lifting to
adaptive corruption for trees and chains, and exponential loss otherwise. The loss is due to
the fact that the definition of source-hiding is single-challenge and has only two key pairs.
This means the simulator needs to guess in advance which keys the adversary will ask for
an honest re-encryption of, as well as which ciphertext will be re-encrypted so that the
simulator can integrate the source-hiding challenge into the right place. This only works if
they guess correctly, which leads to the loss in security. We use and discuss this technique
in Section V: 3.4.
V: 2.3 BV-PRE
Finally, we discuss BV-PRE [PRSV17], the PRE scheme that forms the basis for our
own construction. Recall that lattice-based cryptography provides a means of creating a
unidirectional, multi-hop PRE scheme with transparency. Unlike unidirectional ElGamal-
based schemes, unidirectional lattice-based schemes to not need to rely on bilinear pairings,
which typically result in single-hop schemes, as discussed in Section III: 4.In 2017, Polyakov,
Rohloff, Sahu and Vaikuntanthan presented BV-PRE [PRSV17], a unidirectional, multi-hop
PRE scheme with transparency based on BV encryption (see Section II: 4.2). They also
present an efficient software implementation for BV-PRE.
However, Polyakov et al. assume a different workflow in their definition of a PRE
scheme, introducing additional parties. This is partly because they define PRE specifically
in the context of publish/subscribe systems, where PRE is used to re-encrypt ciphertexts
under the publisher’s public key to ciphertexts under the subscriber’s public key. The
parties and workflow assumed in [PRSV17] are as follows:
• A policy authority generates a key pair for the publisher, Alice, and sends her the
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public key.
• When Alice has created her subscribe-able content, she encrypts it then stores it with
a PRE server.
• When Bob subscribes, he sends his public key to the policy authority, who uses it to
create an update token ∆A,B from Alice’s key to Bob’s, which is sent straight to the
PRE server.
• The PRE server then re-encrypts Alice’s ciphertext before forwarding the re-encrypted
ciphertext to Bob, who can then access the content.
In this workflow, it is not necessarily the case that the public keys used for generating
update tokens are also used for encryption. We describe BV-PRE in Figure V.5.
This construction uses the key switching technique described in [BV11] to reduce error
growth. This technique re-linearises a ciphertext by splitting it into parts before processing,




cι · (2r)ι. (V.1)
It is important to minimise the size of the error added upon re-encryption, as if the error
gets too large then the message will not decrypt correctly. Therefore, error growth directly
affects the correctness bound, as we shall demonstrate for our scheme, pcBV-PRE, in
Section V: 5.1.
BV-PRE uses the algorithm Preprocess to output the ‘public’1 key ‘pkj ’ used for re-
encryption. We note that, given ∆i,j = {(βι, γι)}blog2(q)/rcι=0 and ‘pkj ’, it is possible to
calculate ski by computing
sι · (2r)ι = θι − γι
for ι ∈ {0, 1, . . . , blog2(q)/rc}. Therefore, the ‘public’ key used to create update tokens
cannot actually be made public. It is this fact that Cohen uses to prove that BV-PRE is
not IND-HRA-secure [Coh19, Theorem 4].
However, Polyakov et al. created a fast, optimised implementation of BV-PRE, which
has a lower time and space complexity than existing lattice-based PRE schemes. They
1This key is also referred to as ‘public’ in [PRSV17], acknowledging that it cannot actually be made
public.
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Setup(1λ)→ params
Choose positive integers q, n
Choose plaintext modulus p
Choose key switching window r







b = a · s+ pe







c0 = b · v + pe0 +m
c1 = a · v + pe1














θι = βι · sj + peι
return ‘pkj ’ = {(βι, θι)}
blog2(q)/rc
ι=0
ReKeyGen(ski, ‘pkj ’)→ ∆i,j
si ← ski, {(βι, θι)}
blog2(q)/rc
ι=0 ← ‘pkj ’
for ι ∈ {0, 1, . . . , blog2(q)/rc} :
γι = θι − sι · (2r)ι
∆i,j = {(βι, γι)}blog2(q)/rcι=0
return ∆i,j
ReEnc(∆i,j , c)→ c′
{(βι, γι)}blog2(q)/rcι=0 ← ∆i,j
(c0, c1)← c












return c′ = (c′0, c
′
1)
Figure V.5: BV-PRE [PRSV17], a PRE scheme based on the BV
encryption scheme (Figure II.2). Uq is the discrete uniform
distribution over Rq and χe is a Be-bounded discrete Gaussian
error distribution.
also make optimised parameter choices and discuss trade-offs, concluding that BV-PRE
is suitable for use on low-resource embedded systems. We refer the interested reader
to [PRSV17, Sections 7–9] for details. We note therefore that if BV-PRE can be made fully
public-key and fit the traditional PRE workflow, then this will result in a desirable PRE
scheme from a practical perspective.
V: 3 Strong Post-Compromise Security for PRE
In this section, we create a definition for strong PCS for public-key PRE schemes. We begin
by justifying our motivation, explaining why we believe existing definitions are insufficient
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for PCS.
We have two main motivations for creating a new definition for PCS in the context of
PRE. The first is that there is currently no definition that implies unidirectionality and
ciphertext re-randomisation. We believe that the distinction of whether a PRE scheme
is unidirectional or bidirectional is vital in the post-compromise scenario to model the
corruption of used update tokens, and hence we define PCS to explicitly mean that schemes
meeting the definition must be unidirectional. We note that there may be some applications
where bidirectionality is preferred (such as using PRE as to share files between trusted
parties), we aim for unidirectionality as this can be used for a larger number of applications,
and allows us to model the compromise of the update tokens used to create a challenge
re-encryption. The second motivation is a matter of existing definitions inherently assuming
which of the algorithms in the PRE scheme are probabilistic, which introduces problems
when considering a post-compromise scenario. We now discuss these in further detail.
Explicit unidirectionality. We use IND-UPD [LT18], the most relevant definition in
the existing literature to make our case. IND-UPD places restrictions based on inferable
information, as defined by the [LT18] notions of directionality:
• When skj cannot be derived from ski and ∆i,j (LT-unidirectional)2
• When skj can be derived from ski and ∆i,j (LT-bidirectional).
In the LT-unidirectional case, the adversary can acquire re-encryption tokens from a
corrupted key to a challenge key, but not the other way around. In the LT-bidirectional
case, the adversary is additionally prevented, by definition, from learning tokens from
challenge keys to corrupted keys or vice versa. These preventions are necessary to enforce
the trivial win condition. This means that for bidirectional schemes, the adversary queries
tokens in such a way that the resulting re-encryption graphs form disjoint sub-graphs – one
containing corrupted keys and the other containing challenge keys. We consider this too
restrictive for the intuition of PCS.
Since the derivability of the new secret key is implicit information to the game, meeting
the definition itself says nothing about directionality and therefore the extent to which
2The general understanding of unidirectionality is not so strong - the new key does not necessarily have
to be derivable, but the token and old key should lead to the message being learned. We suspect that for
symmetric PRE schemes, LT-unidirectionality is equivalent to the general understanding but we do not
claim this to be true as we do not present any formal comparison in this thesis.
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update token compromise is of concern. We believe that it is better for directionality to be
explicit as it allows practitioners to understand the security of a scheme more clearly.
Assuming probabilistic algorithms. We use two existing security definitions which
explicitly consider re-randomisation [EPRS17,LT18] as an example of the problems this
creates. The [EPRS17] definition of a key rotation scheme assumes that ReKeyGen is
randomised but ReEnc is deterministic. This leads to a necessary condition that the
update token used to create the challenge re-encryption cannot be learned by the adversary,
otherwise the adversary could use it to re-encrypt the input ciphertexts locally and compare
this to the challenge to win the game. The adversary is allowed to learn other tokens
going from corrupted to challenge keys using an oracle OReKeyGen, but not the exact token
used to perform the re-encryption. This means, UP-REENC [EPRS17] does not model
compromise of the update token used. To model compromise of the token used, as we aim
to do, it is therefore important that new randomness is introduced in ReEnc to prevent
trivial downgrading of the challenge ciphertext if the adversary compromises the update
token used.
In the [LT18] definition of an updatable encryption scheme, the opposite assumption
is made – that ReEnc is randomised and ReKeyGen is deterministic. This means that for




security game (and pksIND-UPDUEA (1λ)) by having one update token ∆i−1,i created when ki
is generated and later having oracles reveal tokens to the adversary. This is less fitting for
schemes where ReKeyGen is randomised and there are multiple tokens per key pair3. More
importantly, such an assumption implicitly rules out some methods for masking the secret
key in the update token, which is important for PCS. BV-PRE [PRSV17] is an example of
this, where knowledge of the key ‘pkj ’ together with ∆i,j can be used to derive ski. Another
example is ElGamal-based symmetric PRE schemes (e.g. [BBS98, LT18]) where update
tokens have the form ∆i,j = skj/ski. Clearly, given the update token, compromise of the
old key leads to compromise of the new key. Introducing some randomness gives a means
of masking the new key, which is necessary for unidirectionality. It also means that the
client does not need to fully rely on the proxy to be assured of new randomness, which is
3Interestingly, other works such as [FKKP19] take a similar approach to the adversary learning update
tokens, despite their assuming randomised tokens.
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more appropriate for some trust scenarios. As we aim for security against malicious proxies,
we would prefer for the client to provide trustworthy new randomness for the re-encrypted
ciphertext.
For constructions where randomness is added in both ReKeyGen and ReEnc, neither
definition is suitable. It is therefore of interest to create a security notion for PCS which
factors in the possibility that both the ReKeyGen and ReEnc algorithms are probabilistic.
V: 3.1 Post-Compromise Security
We model PCS using an adversary A who chooses two ciphertexts (whose decryption key
can be known) and a re-encryption token, and receives a challenge ciphertext which is
a re-encryption of one of the original ciphertexts created using the specified token. A
attempts to distinguish which ciphertext was re-encrypted. This models the compromise of
all key-related material prior to the challenge re-encryption.
Unlike some previous definitions, we allow A to corrupt the secret key with which the
update token was generated. As in IND-HRA security, we also allow A to re-encrypt honestly
(oracle)-generated non-challenge ciphertexts to corrupted keys. Challenges are obtained via
the challenge oracle ChalPCReEnc which will only accept as input honestly-generated ciphertexts
of the same length, and honestly-generated update tokens. The challenger maintains the
lists Chonest and Thonest to enforce this.
Here we present a formal definition of PCS with selective key corruptions for general
PRE. The first stage adversary A0 can access a key generation oracle OKeyGen and key
corruption oracle OCorrupt and the second stage adversary A1 can access the challenge oracle
ChalPCReEnc and re-encryption oracle OReKeyGen, and use these to adaptively determine the
re-encryption graph. As in previous definitions, Kcorrupt and Cchal are also maintained, which
record corrupted keys and challenge ciphertexts, respectively, and are used to enforce the
trivial win condition.
Definition V.5. A PRE scheme PRE is said to have (selective) ε-Post-Compromise
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OPCReEnc(i, j, [∆i,j ], c)
if
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($)← ReEnc(∆i,j , c)
Chonest.add{(j, c′)}
if (i, c) ∈ Cchal :
Cchal.add{(j, c′)}
return c′
ChalPCReEnc(i, j, [∆i,j , ] c0, c1)








(i, c1) 6∈ Chonest
)
return ⊥




$← ReEnc(∆i,j , c0)
c′1
$← ReEnc(∆i,j , c1)
Chonest.add{(j, c′b)}, Cchal.add{(j, c′b)}
called← true
return c′b
Figure V.6: The PCS game. This reflects full compromise of the
old secret key and update token used to perform the re-encryption.
Unlike IND-HRAPREA (1λ), there are no conditions that only apply
to bidirectional schemes.
where PostCompPREA (1λ) is defined in Figure V.6.
If ε is negligible as parameterised by the security parameter, then we say the scheme
has (selective) Post-Compromise Security (PCS).
We give a definition of PCS for symmetric PRE schemes in Appendix C.
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V: 3.2 Basic observations
We make some observations on what our definition of PCS implies. We note that, as we
are modelling ciphertext independent schemes, it is sufficient to use the informal definition
of unidirectionality.
Lemma V.1. No PRE scheme where ReEnc is deterministic has PCS.
Proof. If ReEnc is deterministic then A can submit (c0, c1, i, j,∆i,j) to ChalPCReEnc to learn
a challenge c′. Then A can locally compute c′0 ← ReEnc(∆i,j , c0) and compare this with
c′. If they match then output b′ = 0, otherwise output b′ = 1. This approach wins with
probability 1.
Lemma V.2. PCS implies unidirectionality.
Proof. We show that if a scheme is bidirectional then it cannot have PCS. Bidirectionality
implies that an update token ∆i,j , can be used to re-encrypt from pkj to pki. The adversary
A proceeds as follows: A first corrupts a key ski, then creates two ciphertexts c0
$←
OEnc(i,m0), c1
$← OEnc(i,m1) and update token ∆i,j
($)← OReKeyGen(i, j), before submitting
(c0, c1, i, j,∆i,j) to the challenge oracle, receiving a challenge c′∗b . A then re-encrypts c′∗b
back to pki, and decrypts the result using ski to win the game.
This means an easy way to disprove PCS for existing schemes is to either point out
that ReEnc is deterministic or to show bidirectionality.
Lemma V.3. PCS implies maximal irreversibility (Definition IV.8).
Proof. Clearly, PCS implies the re-encryption cannot be reversed given the old ciphertext
and update token, which involves retaining a state larger than the original ciphertext.
V: 3.3 Separating examples
We now demonstrate the relationship between PCS and existing security notions and
constructions by means of a number of separating examples. In this way, we demonstrate
that PCS is stronger than existing similar notions. Here we use pksIND-UPDPREA (1λ), the
public-key variant of sIND-UPDPREA (1λ) (see Appendix D), for more direct comparison,
but note that similar claims can be made between sIND-UPDPREA (1λ) and the symmetric
variant of PostCompPREA (1λ) described in Appendix C.
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Lemma V.4. pksIND-UPD-security does not imply PCS.
Proof. Let PRE be a pksIND-UPD-secure PRE scheme where ReEnc is deterministic. By
Lemma V.1, this scheme does not have PCS.
Lemma V.5. Let PRE be a PRE scheme where ReKeyGen is deterministic. If PRE has
PCS, then it is pksIND-UPD-secure.
Proof sketch. Assume κ key pairs are generated, and that t keys are corrupted by the end
of the game. The PostCompPREA (1λ) adversary A can simulate pksIND-UPDPREB (1λ). As in
pksIND-UPDPREB (1λ), A maintains an epoch counter e. Before the challenge is issued, A
can simulate ONext by incrementing e, corrupting ske−1 and obtaining OReKeyGen(e− 1, e)
between the old key and the new. This will not affect the trivial win condition in PostComp,
as the corruption of keys and tokens leading to the challenge is permitted. When B0 ends,
A0 sets e∗ := e before guessing which remaining keys with index i > e∗ that B1 will corrupt,
which leads to a polynomial loss in security. A1 creates the challenge ciphertext by calling
c∗ẽ
($)← ChalPCReEnc(c0, c1, ẽ− 1, ẽ). A1 can update both challenge and honest ciphertexts using
OReEnc, and corrupting tokens can be simulated with calls to OReKeyGen.
We note that this is not a perfect simulation, as in pksIND-UPDPREB (1λ) the challenge
ciphertext is encrypted through every key. However, in schemes which have been proven
to be IND-UPD, re-encrypted ciphertexts are independent of the old secret key, and
we conjecture that this is a requirement of IND-UPD, in which case the simulation is
indistinguishable. We note that it is difficult to prove exact relations as the definitions
are ultimately intended for different re-encryption primitives with different applications in
mind. However, we present this comparison as IND-UPD is the most relevant definition
with which to compare PCS PRE.
Lemma V.6. IND-HRA-security 6=⇒ PCS.
Proof. Let PRE = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec,ReKeyGen,ReEnc) be a IND-HRA-secure PRE
scheme, and let (SE .KeyGen,SE .Enc,SE .Dec) be a IND-CPA-secure symmetric encryp-
tion scheme for the traditional notion of IND-CPA security. We now define a PRE scheme
PRE = {KeyGen,Enc,Dec,ReKeyGen,ReEnc} using the key encapsulation method as fol-
lows:
• KeyGen(1λ) $→ (pk, sk) : (pk, sk) $← KeyGen(1λ)
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• Enc(pk,m) $→ c : k $← SE .KeyGen(1λ), c0
$← Enc(pk, k), c1
$← SE .Enc(k,m), c =
(c0, c1)
• Dec(sk, c)→ m′ : k′ ← Dec(sk, c0),m′ ← SE .Dec(k′, c1)
• ReKeyGen(ski, pkj)
($)→ ∆i,j : ∆i,j
($)← ReKeyGen(ski, pkj)
• ReEnc(∆i,j , c)
($)→ c′ : c′0
($)← ReEnc(∆i,j , c0), c′ = (c′0, c1)
This scheme is also IND-HRA-secure, but does not have PCS. An adversary A can
submit two ciphertexts to the challenge oracle, and compare the second part of the challenge
re-encryption with the submitted ciphertexts to win the game.
Lemma V.7. PCS 6=⇒ PRE-IND-CPA security (or by extension IND-HRA security).
Proof. Let PRE = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec,ReKeyGen,ReEnc) be a PRE scheme that is
PRE-IND-CPA-secure and has PCS. We use it to construct the following PRE scheme:
• KeyGen(1λ) $→ (pk, sk) : (pk, sk) $← KeyGen(1λ)
• Enc(pk,m) $→ c : c1
$← Enc(pk,m), c := (m, c1)
• Dec(sk, c)→ m′ : m′ ← Dec(sk, c1)
• ReKeyGen(ski, pkj)
($)→ ∆i,j : ∆i,j
($)← ReKeyGen(ski, pkj)
• ReEnc(∆i,j , c)
($)→ c′ : c′0
$← Enc(pkj , 0), c′1
($)← ReEnc(∆i,j , c1), c′ = (c′0, c′1)
Clearly this scheme is not PRE-IND-CPA-secure (or by extension IND-HRA-secure), as
fresh ciphertexts contain the plaintext. However, the scheme has PCS, as re-encryptions c′1
will be unrelated to c1, since PRE has PCS, and the creation of c′0 is independent of both
c0 and ∆i,j .
This counterexample relies on the underlying encryption scheme not being IND-CPA,
which is unlikely to be a concern in practice. We now present two theorems which suggest
that many practical PRE schemes with PCS are also IND-HRA-secure.
Theorem V.1. Let PRE be a PRE scheme with transparency. Then if PRE is ε-PCS, it
is also ε-IND-HRA-secure.
Proof. For a PRE scheme PRE with ε-PCS, no PPT adversary can guess the underlying
message mb of the challenge re-encryption c′∗b with advantage greater than ε, as this would
lead to a win with advantage greater than ε. As the adversary knows the underlying
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messages of the challenge input ciphertexts c0 and c1 and has transparency, it follows that
fresh encryptions of the same message under the same key are indistinguishable regardless of
level, particularly level-0 ciphertexts (otherwise known as fresh ciphertexts). Therefore, no
PPT adversary can distinguish a fresh encryption of mb with advantage greater than ε, even




We conclude that PRE is also ε-IND-HRA-secure.
We note that the converse to Theorem V.1 does not hold – a PRE scheme with
transparency that is IND-HRA-secure is not necessarily PCS. This is demonstrated by a
similar example to the one in Lemma V.7, where PRE also has transparency.
Theorem V.2. Let PRE be a PRE scheme with PCS where the underlying encryp-
tion scheme is IND-CPA-secure (in the traditional PKE setting). Then PRE is also
IND-HRA-secure.
Proof. As in proof of Theorem V.1, we note that PCS implies that re-encryption does not
reveal the underlying message, either in the re-encryption process or in th re-encrypted
ciphertext. As fresh ciphertexts also do not reveal the underlying message, the result
follows.
This means that, to prove that a PRE scheme with PCS is IND-HRA-secure, it is
sufficient to demonstrate that either the underlying encryption scheme is IND-CPA-secure,
or that the scheme has transparency. As transparency is desirable from an efficiency
perspective and that there has been a recent trend in creating new schemes with transparency,
we conjecture that this result will apply to a significant number of PRE schemes that
provably have PCS.
V: 3.4 PCS via source-hiding
In this section we show that a PRE scheme that is both source-hiding and
PRE-IND-CPA-secure also has PCS.
Theorem V.3 (main). Let PRE be a PRE scheme with transparency which is both
PRE-IND-CPA-secure and source-hiding. Then PRE also has PCS.
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More specifically, if PRE is ε1-PRE-IND-CPA-secure and ε2-source-hiding, then it also
has ε-PCS where
ε ≤ ε1 + κ(κ− 1)(QE +QHRE + 1)(QHRE + 1) · ε2 < negl(λ) ,
for some negligible function negl(λ), where QE is the number of queries A makes to OEnc,
and QHRE is the number of re-encryption queries for non-challenge ciphertexts that A
makes to OReEnc.
The intuition behind this is that source-hiding implies that non-challenge ciphertexts
can be replaced by fresh encryptions at the appropriate level. Therefore, an adversary in the
CPA experiment can simulate the HRA experiment and gain the advantage of any successful
PCS adversary. We give a reduction-based proof based on the proof of [FKKP18, Lemma
7] that a PRE scheme that is both source-hiding and PRE-IND-CPA-secure has PCS.
Proof. We prove this theorem using a sequence of game hops, breaking the proof down
into a number of lemmas. Let PostCompSH be a variant of the PostComp game where all
re-encryptions of non-challenge ciphertexts and the re-encryption made by ChalPCReEnc are
replaced with fresh encryptions at the appropriate level. We first demonstrate that PostComp
and PostCompSH are computationally indistinguishable, before showing how PRE being
PRE-IND-CPA-secure implies there is no PPT adversary that can win PostCompSH with
non-negligible advantage.
Lemma V.8. The advantage ε′2 of any PPT algorithm in distinguishing between
PostCompSH and PostComp is bounded by
ε′2 ≤ κ(κ− 1)(QE +QHRE + 1)(QHRE + 1) · ε2.
Proof. We use a hybrid argument where re-encryptions are replaced one at a time. Let
H0 := PostCompPREA (1
λ), and let Hk be identical to Hk−1 except that the kth re-encryption
is replaced by a fresh encryption, limited to re-encryptions of non-challenge ciphertexts or
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We describe how an adversary A trying to win the source-hiding game SH with challenge
bit d $← {0, 1} can perfectly simulate either Hk−1 or Hk, depending on d. Therefore, if
there exists a PPT distinguisher D that, with advantage δ, outputs d′D = 0 to indicate
that it is playing Hk−1 and d′D = 1 to indicate that it is playing H
k, then A can run D
as a subroutine and set d′ = d′D to win SH. Because QHRE + 1 replacements need to be
made in total (all the honest re-encryptions plus the re-encryption performed during the
challenge), the advantage of distinguishing between PostComp and PostCompSH is bounded
by ε′2 ≤ δ · (QHRE + 1).
A first sets b $← {0, 1} as the challenge bit in PostCompPRE(1λ). Note that SH only has






1 ), and that the challenge Chal
SH
ReEnc/Enc(m, `) returns
both the fresh encryption c∗ and the challenge c(b). Therefore, A must first guess which
ciphertext c and key indexes i∗, j∗ will be input for the kth replacement. A responds to the
kth re-encryption query as follows:







these as (pki∗ , ski∗), (pkj∗ , skj∗) respectively, and then self-generates the remaining
κ− 2 key pairs for PostCompPREA (1λ).
• WhenD makes the query that leads to the creation of c under pki (which could be either
through OEnc or OReEnc)), if i 6= i∗ then the reduction aborts. Otherwise the reduction
takes the underlying message and uses it to query ChalSHReEnc/Enc(m, `)
$→ (c∗, c′(b)) and
returns c∗ to the adversary. Note that c∗ is created via oracles, either by OEnc(i,m)
or by calling OReEnc on an oracle-created ciphertext. This means that for a pair (i, c)
where c is an oracle-created ciphertext under pki, A will know the underlying message
m and the number of times ` that the ciphertext has been (or appears to have been)
re-encrypted.
• Let OReEnc(i∗, j, (∆i∗,j), c) be the kth re-encryption that D queries, where c is an
honest ciphertext. If c 6= c∗ or j 6= j∗, the reduction aborts. Otherwise, A returns
the challenge c′(b) it received from the source-hiding game.
Note that for the challenge ciphertext, because A has chosen b they can easily simulate the
challenge.
To distinguish between Hi and Hi+1, the adversary must have guessed i, j correctly,
resulting in a loss of κ(κ − 1), and must also have guessed which encryption will be the
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input for the kthre-encryption, resulting in a loss of at most (QE +QHRE + 1). Because
PRE is ε2-source-hiding by assumption, we conclude that δ ≤ κ(κ−1)(QE +QHRE + 1) · ε2.
As there are QHRE + 1 hybrids, by the triangle inequality we have that ε′2 ≤ κ(κ− 1)(QE +
QHRE + 1)(QHRE + 1) · ε2, as required.
Lemma V.9. If PRE is ε1-PRE-IND-CPA-secure, then the advantage ε′1 of winning
PostCompSHPREA (1
λ) is bounded by
ε′1 ≤ ε1.
Proof. We demonstrate how an adversary A in PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ) can sim-
ulate PostCompSHPREB (1λ). Thus, if there exists a PPT adversary B that
wins PostCompSHPREB (1λ) (returning b′B) with advantage ε
′
1, then A can win
PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ) with the same advantage by returning b′ = b′B. A simulates
PostCompPREB (1
λ) by responding to oracle queries made by B as follows:
• A simulates OEnc as described in PostCompPREA (1λ), also setting lookup tables
Cmsg[i, c] := m for the underlying message m and Clev[i, c] := 0 for the ciphertext level.
• A forwards calls to OReKeyGen to the same oracle in PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ).
• A simulates OReEnc(i, j, c) for non-challenge ciphertexts by retrieving m← Cmsg[i, c]
and ` ← Clev[i, c] and returning c′
$← Enc(pkj ,m, ` + 1). A sets Cmsg[j, c′] := m,
Clev[j, c′] := `+ 1.
For challenge ciphertexts, if B has set ∆i,j = ⊥ thenA generates ∆i,j
($)← OReKeyGen(i, j)
and returns c′ $← ReEnc(∆i,j , c).
• To simulate ChalPCReEnc(i∗, j∗, [∆i∗,j∗ ], c∗0, c∗1), A first retrieves m0 ← Cmsg[i∗, c∗0], `0 ←
Clev[(i∗, c∗0)],m1 ← Cmsg[i∗, c∗1], `1 ← Clev[i∗, c∗1]. ThenA queries ChalCPAEnc (j,m0,m1)
$→
c′(b). Because PRE has transparency, c′(b) will be indistinguishable from any re-
encrypted ciphertext c′
($)→ ReEnc(∆i,j , c∗b) at level `b + 1.
The resulting simulation is identical to PostCompSHPREA (1λ). Therefore, if there
exists an adversary B that wins PRE-IND-CPAPREB (1λ) with advantage ε′1, then A can win
PostCompSHPREA (1
λ) with the same advantage. We conclude that ε′1 ≤ ε1, as required.
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By Lemmas V.8 and V.9 and the triangle inequality, we see that
ε ≤ κ(κ− 1)(QE +QHRE + 1)(QHRE + 1) · ε2 + ε1.
This concludes the proof of Theorem V.3.
Remarks. We note that a multi-key, multi-challenge variant of source-hiding will result in
a simpler reduction, as the simulator will no longer need to guess in advance which keys
and ciphertexts will be used to replace the re-encrypted ciphertext with a fresh encryption.
We conjecture that proving that a PRE scheme meets a multi-key, multi-challenge variant
of source-hiding should not incur a significant loss, as proving source-hiding requires a
statistical argument that ciphertexts are identically distributed. This reasoning should
apply to multiple keys and ciphertexts as long as they are honestly generated. Indeed, it is
possible that the overall loss from using a multi-key, multi-challenge notion of source-hiding
will mean the overall loss of security is less severe than it is in the current approach.
Secondly, we conjecture that there exists a tighter reduction based on the IND-CPA
security of the underlying encryption scheme, as in [FKKP18, Theorem 6]. Doing this
requires swapping the re-encryption challenge in the post-compromise game with the
encryption challenge from the PKE IND-CPA game, which is only defined for one key and
therefore results in a loss of security of at least 1/κ, as a simulator must guess which key
the challenge will be called under. Notions of key privacy may help with this. For example,
source key privacy for update tokens would allow simulator to simulate update tokens from
unknown source keys. Key privacy of ciphertexts may mean it does not matter which key
the challenge is called under, as in [LT18].
Finally, we conjecture that there is the potential for a tighter relation between IND-
HRA-security and PCS, as at a high level the only re-encryption that needs replacing here
is the one performed by ChalPCReEnc. Because the single-challenge definition of source-hiding
has limited application in that it only means that re-encryptions c′
($)← ReEnc(∆i,j , c) of
fresh ciphertexts c $← Enc(pki,m, [`]) can be replaced by fresh encryptions, whereas we need
this property to hold even when c is itself a re-encrypted ciphertext. It should be possible
that such a replacement can be made without needing to replace all previous re-encryptions.
Informally, this follows trivially from an iterative argument, or from the statistical argument
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outlined above.
We will revisit these remarks in Chapter VI.
V: 3.5 Existing PRE schemes that satisfy PCS
In [FKKP19, Construction 2.b], Fuchsbauer et al. present a PRE scheme which is both
PRE-IND-CPA-secure and source-hiding. This construction is based on the hardness of the
decision learning with errors problem with sub-exponential noise-to-modulus ratio. Using
the result of Theorem V.3, we see that their scheme has PCS. We note that, subject to the
remarks given in Section V: 3.4, it is possible that [FKKP18, Construction 2, Construction
4] also have PCS, as, whilst these constructions are not source-hiding, they do re-randomise
ciphertexts upon re-encryption.
We describe a similar scheme to [FKKP19, Construction 2.b] in Section V: 5.2, where
we explain how the parameters required to make the scheme source-hiding carry inherent
inefficiencies which we aim to avoid, motivating our new construction.
V: 4 An Efficient Construction from Lattices
We introduce a natural construction with PCS, based on BV-PRE – the RLWE construction
described in Figure V.5. Whilst Theorem V.3 shows that source-hiding can lead to PCS,
the existing constructions that are provably source-hiding depend on making sub-optimal
parameter choices that significantly impact the schemes’ practicality, as we shall explore
in Section V: 5.2. Our construction has PCS but is not source-hiding, implying that
source-hiding is not necessary for PCS. This means that our construction can utilise much
better parameter choices in terms of efficiency. Furthermore, our construction does not rely
on strong assumptions or heavy techniques such as obfuscation as in [HRsV07,CCV12]. We
also achieve transparency, meaning the cost of decryption does not grow for repeatedly re-
encrypted ciphertexts. Recall from the original motivations of PRE that if extra computation
is needed to decrypt a re-encrypted ciphertext then this may outweigh the benefits of
outsourcing re-encryption.
Our construction makes some adaptations to BV-PRE to fit the workflow of PRE;
making use of the key resampling technique of [BV11] to re-randomise the ciphertext. We
conjecture that any scheme that permits similar re-randomisation can be proven secure
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using similar methods.
V: 4.1 Adapting BV-PRE for PCS
The underlying scheme, BV-PRE is based on the BV-encryption scheme [BV11] (Figure II.2),
which is based on RLWE. This scheme is parameterised by ciphertext modulus q, plaintext
modulus p ≥ 2, ring dimension n, polynomial ring Rq = Zq[n]/〈xn + 1〉 and relinearisation
window r.
Recall that BV-PRE is not fully public-key, relying on an additional ‘public’ key ‘pk’j
for the target key skj to generate update tokens. However, this key together with the
token can be used to derive the old secret key. We get around this problem using the key
resampling technique ReSample which takes a public key pkj and outputs a fresh public
key pk′j with the same underlying secret. The key resampling technique [BV11], can be





ā = av̄ + pē0
b̄ = bv̄ + pē1
return pk = (ā, b̄)
Figure V.7: Similified key resampling technique [BV11].
For the resampled key, observe that b̄ = ās + p(ev̄ + ē1 − ē0s) and is therefore also
suitable for encryption. Furthermore, (ā, b̄) is computationally indistinguishable from a
freshly generated public key for s. Our idea is to replace the ‘public’ key used to create
update tokens in BV-PRE with a resampled public key. We use the same idea to introduce
new randomness in ReEnc.
Resampling leads us to define a new security game for resampled keys in Figure V.9,
where given a public key (a, b), the challenger either returns a resampled key or a uniformly
sampled pair. This is similar to RLWE challenges for fresh keys. Note that we use the
same relinearisation technique as [PRSV17] to reduce error growth, where ciphertexts are
broken down as described in Equation (V.1).
We give our construction, pcBV-PRE, in Figure V.8. It builds on BV-PRE by having
the proxy add further randomness in the ReEnc operation. Recall that this is necessary for
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b = a · s+ pe
sk = s







c0 = b · v + pe0 +m
c1 = a · v + pe1
return c = (c0, c1)
Dec(sk, c)→ m′
s← sk




for ι ∈ {0, 1, . . . , blog2(q)/rc} :
(āι, b̄ι)
$← ReSample(pkj)
γι = b̄ι − ski · (2r)ι
∆ = {(āι, γι)}blog2(q)/rcι=0
























return c′ = (c′0, c
′
1)
Figure V.8: pcBV-PRE. This adapts BV-PRE [PRSV17]
(Figure V.5) to be fully public-key, whilst taking steps to minimise
computation and bandwidth. The key resampling algorithm
ReSample is described in Figure V.7.
a scheme to have PCS, as otherwise an adversary could re-encrypt locally to obtain the
same re-encryption.
V: 5 Analysis of pcBV-PRE
We now analyse pcBV-PRE, giving a correctness bound (Equation (V.5)), and demonstrate
that pcBV-PRE has PCS (Theorem V.4) and is IND-HRA-secure (Theorem V.7). We do not
leverage Theorem V.3 to prove PCS, as pcBV-PRE is not source-hiding. In Section V: 5.2
we use a variant of pcBV-PRE that is source-hiding to explicitly demonstrate how schemes
that are provably source-hiding (at least, using known techniques) rely on parameter choices
that make the scheme far less practical. We instead prove security of pcBV-PRE using
observations of re-sampling RLWE samples as described in Figure V.7. We therefore show
that source-hiding is not a necessary requirement for a PRE scheme to have PCS.
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V: 5.1 Correctness of pcBV-PRE
Much of the analysis used to argue correctness from [PRSV17] holds for our modified
scheme in Figure V.8, as pcBV-PRE is very similar to BV-PRE. Therefore, we keep the
discussion fairly brief and refer to [PRSV17] for full details.
Recall that the decryption algorithm computes c0 − c1s and then performs a reduction
modulo p. In the case that (c0, c1) is a ciphertext produced by the Enc algorithm, we have
that
c0 − c1s = p(ev + e0 + e1s) +m, (V.2)
so decryption is successful when p(ev + e0 + e1s) +m (i.e. the error plus the message) does
not wrap around modulo q. However, the correctness condition of decryption is different
when considering ciphertexts output by the ReEnc algorithm. To see how, let (c′0, c′1)
$←
ReEnc(∆i,j , (c0, c1)). We also note that for ReSample(i, j)
$→ (ā, b̄) = (av̄ + pē0, bv̄ + pē1)
where b = as+ pe, we get
b̄− sā = p(ev̄ + ē1 − ē0s). (V.3)
Using notation consistent with Figure V.7, we have that







b̄ι − si(2r)ι − sj āι
)+ (b̂− âsj)







b̄ι − sj āι
)+ (b̂− âsj)
(V.3)





1 · p(ev̄ι + ē
(ι)
0 sj + ē
(ι)
1 )
+ p(ev̂ + ê0sj + ê1),
where all arithmetic is performed over the integers modulo q. This shows that the error






1 · (ev̄ι + ē
(ι)
0 sj + ē
(ι)
1 )
+ (ev̂ + ê0sj + ê1).
Assume that χe is (B, δ)-bounded for some small δ (we quantify these values later). Then
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we have that the noise grows by at most
p||E||∞ ≤ pn(2r − 1)(blog(q)/rc+ 1)(2B2n+B) + p(2B2n+B) =: G(n, q, r, B) (V.4)
on each re-encryption taking into consideration the multiplication of degree n− 1 polyno-
mials. Therefore, after ` re-encryptions, the noise has grown by an additive term of size
` ·G(n, q, r, B). Therefore, the condition for successful decryption after ` re-encryptions is
p(2Bn +B) + `G(n, q, r, B) + p/2 ≤ q/2, (V.5)
where G is defined in Equation (V.4). Note that if our error distribution has σe > ω(log n),
then we can set B = σe
√
n and δ = 2−n+1 [MR04,LTV12]. In order to choose the parameters
of the system, one needs to ensure that Equation (V.5) is satisfied. Note that this analysis
is a worst-case one. It is shown in [PRSV17] that the central limit theorem can be used to
essentially alter the form of B and change all occurrences of n into occurrences of
√
n in
Equation (V.5) by allowing for a tunable failure probability. We omit this more practical
method of correctness analysis for brevity.
V: 5.2 pcBV-PRE and source-hiding
We first demonstrate that pcBV-PRE is not source-hiding, before describing a variant of
pcBV-PRE that is source-hiding, at the cost of requiring less practical parameter choices.
Lemma V.10. pcBV-PRE is not source-hiding.
Proof. Fresh ciphertexts in pcBV-PRE are distinguishable from re-encrypted ciphertexts,
as re-encrypted ciphertexts have a bigger error than fresh encryptions. As we have not
defined levelling explicitly in pcBV-PRE, all fresh ciphertexts a smaller error bound than
re-encrypted ciphertexts. Since an adversary with the secret key can derive the error, they
will be able to infer whether a ciphertext is fresh or a re-encryption from the size of the
error.
The reason pcBV-PRE is not source-hiding is because fresh encryptions have different
noise magnitudes compared with re-encryptions. One method of overcoming this is using
a noise ‘blurring’ approach [CCL+14]. This involves ‘blurring’ or ‘drowning’ the noise in
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fresh encryptions so that it is distributed in the same way as re-encryptions. To do this, we
modify the ciphertext pairs in the Enc and ReEnc algorithms to add fresh noise to them.
This fresh noise is taken from an error distribution such that it ‘blurs’ out all the old noise
that was introduced from the encryption and re-encryption operations. This is the approach
used in [FKKP19, Construction 2.b].
We now present a formal description of this amendment to our scheme. We define
pcBV-PRE+ in the same way as pcBV-PRE except that we introduce levelling through
blurring widths E` associated to level ` encryption. Specifically, we define Enc(pk,m; `) =
(c0, c1) = (bv + pe0 +m+ pf`, av + pe1) where f`
$← [−E`,E`]n. We also have ReEnc take
a level ` as input, where the input ciphertext has already been re-encrypted `− 1 times,
and have ReEnc add f` to c′0.
Lemma V.11. pcBV-PRE+ is computationally source hiding provided that E`  E`−1
and E0  (σn)2, where x y denotes that x is asymptotically larger than y.
Proof. For correctly sampled aux = (pk0, pk1, sk0, sk1,∆0,1), we will show that the distribu-
tions of (
aux, c := Enc(pk0,m; `), c




aux, c := Enc(pk0,m; `), c
′(0) := ReEnc(∆0,1, pk1, c; `+ 1)
)
(V.7)
are computationally indistinguishable for any valid choice of m and `.
We begin by assessing the error size of fresh encryptions (Equation (V.6)). Let
pk1 = (a1, b1 := a1 · s1 + pe1) where s1, e1 are the secret errors associated with pk1, and let
c = (b1 · ṽ + p(ẽ0 + f`+1) +m, a1 · ṽ + pẽ1) be a fresh ciphertext where ṽ, ẽ0, ẽ1
$← χσ are
the error terms sampled during Enc as described in Figure V.8, and f`+1
$← [−E`+1,E`+1]n.
Using the notation of the source-hiding experiment, equivalently we can write
c′
(1)
= ((a1 · ṽ) · s1 + p(ẽ0 + e1ṽ + f`+1) +m, a1 · ṽ + pẽ1) (V.8)
as the form of a valid level `+ 1 encryption of m under pk1.
We note that as s1 is included in aux, we can calculate c0 − c1s1 = m+ p(ẽ0s1 − ẽ1 +
e1ṽ + f`) and use this to derive the error term ẽ1s1 − ẽ0 − e1ṽ + f`+1. We therefore need
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to demonstrate that this error is indistinguishable from the error of a ciphertext that has
been re-encrypted `+ 1 times.
Let f ′`+1
$← [−E`+1,E`+1]. The distribution of ẽ1s1 − ẽ0 − e1ṽ + f ′`+1 is statistically
indistinguishable from the distribution of f`+1 as long as E`+1  (σn)2, as this is greater
than the largest coefficient of ẽ1s1 − ẽ0 − e1ṽ with all but negligible probability. Therefore,
the distribution of Equation (V.8) is statistically indistinguishable from the distribution of
(




(a1 · ṽ + pẽ1) · s1 + pf ′`+1 +m, a1 · ṽ + pẽ1
)
. (V.9)
In turn, the RLWE assumption implies Equation (V.9) is computationally indistinguishable
from (
u · s1 + pf ′`+1 +m,u
)
,
where u $← Uq. As the arguments hold for any correctly distributed aux, it follows that the
distribution of Equation (V.6) is computationally indistinguishable from
(
aux, c := Enc(pk0,m; `), (u · s1 + pf ′`+1 +m,u)
)
. (V.10)
We move on to assessing the error size of re-encrypted ciphertexts (Equation (V.7)).
To complete the proof, we will show that the distribution of Equation (V.7) is also
computationally indistinguishable from the distribution of Equation (V.10) via a similar
argument. Let pk0 = (a0, b0 := a0 · s0 + pe0) where s1, e1 are the secret errors associated
with pk0. As before, we fix a valid ciphertext (c0, c1) = ((a0 · s0 + pe0)ṽ + p(ẽ0 + f`) +
m, a0 · ṽ + pẽ0) where ṽ, ẽ0, ẽ1
$← χσ, meaning that c0 − c1s0 = m+ p(ẽ0s0 − ẽ1 + e0ṽ + f`).
Writing ∆0,1 = {(āι, b̄ι − s0 · (2r)ι)}blog2(q)/rcι=0 where {(āι, b̄ι)}
blog2(q)/rc
ι=0 are the outputs of
the calls to ReSample(pk1) used in ReKeyGen as described in Figure V.8, we have that
b̄ι = āι · s1 + p(e1v̄ι + ē1(ι) − ē0(ι)s1) where v̄ι, ē0(ι), ē1(ι)
$← χσ are the error terms sampled
in ReSample. In addition, we have the re-randomisation term (â, b̂) generated by calling
ReSample(pk1) in ReEnc as described in Figure V.8, which satisfies b̂ = â·s1+p(e1v̂+ê1−ê0s1)
where v̂, ê0, ê1






+ â, ec = ẽ0s0 − ẽ1 + e0ṽ, et =(∑blog2(q)/rc
ι=0 c
(ι)
1 (e1v̄ι + ē1
(ι) − ē0(ι)s1)
)
and ep = e1v̂+ ê1−pê0s1. Then for a re-encrypted
131
V: 5 Analysis of pcBV-PRE
ciphertext c′(0) = (c′0, c′1):





1 · (b̄ι − si · (2
r)ι)
+ b̂+ pf`+1















āι · s1 + p(e1v̄ι + ē1(ι) − ē0(ι)s1)
)+ â · s1 + pep + pf`+1
= c′1 · s1 + p(ec + et + ep + f` + f`+1) +m,
where f`+1









$← [−E`+1,E`+1]. Then the distribution of f ′`+1 − ec − et − ep − f`
is statistically indistinguishable from the distribution of f`+1 so long as
E`+1  max{E`, (σn)2 · (blog2(q)/rc+ 2)}. Therefore Equation (V.11) is distributed
statistically close to the distribution of
(




c′1 · s1 + pf ′`+1 +m, c′1
)
. (V.12)
Finally, using a RLWE assumption on â, the term c′1 is statistically indistinguishable from
uniform, meaning that the distribution of Equation (V.12) is computationally indistinguish-
able from (u · s1 + pf ′`+1, u), where u
$← Uq. Since these arguments work for any valid aux
and ciphertext (c0, c1), it follows that the distribution of Equation (V.7) is computationally
indistinguishable from the distribution of
(
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The advantage of this approach is that in the resulting scheme, the secret key does not
reveal whether a ciphertext is fresh or a re-encryption. Another advantage is that the keys
the ciphertext was previously encrypted under remain hidden. This is vital since in the
source-hiding security property, the adversary receives all of the available decryption keys
and thus can decrypt any ciphertext they want.
With this in mind, there are a number of reasons why requiring a scheme to be provably
source-hiding is a hindrance. This ‘blurring’ approach is the only one to date that has been
used to prove source-hiding, but it requires at least a sub-exponential noise-to-modulus
ratio which considerably harms performance and security. This is because the RLWE
assumption (and respectively LWE assumption for [FKKP19, Construction 2.b]) that is
used becomes much stronger, since the approximation factors of the related ideal lattice
problems become sub-exponential rather than polynomial in n. In particular, there are
quantum polynomial time algorithms solving ideal lattice problems with approximation
factor exp(Õ(
√
n)) [BS16,CDPR16,CDW17], providing evidence that we cannot simply use
an arbitrary noise-to-modulus ratio while retaining the same security guarantees. Moreover,
the increase in modulus that is required makes standard operations much slower. As a
by-product, both schemes allow only a constant number of re-encryptions. This can be seen
in how the error size for each level must increase dramatically so as to ‘blur out’ the errors
of previous levels. We conclude that incorporating source-hiding (at least, using known
methods) results in a scheme that is impractical, based on much stronger assumptions and
also heavily restricted in the number of re-encryptions that can occur.
The intention with our construction was to give a practical PRE scheme with PCS
with minimal restrictions and from weaker assumptions. Since pcBV-PRE is very close to
BV-PRE, which is comparatively fast (see [PRSV17] for exact figures), and our construction
only adds extra sampling, loss of efficiency is minimal.
V: 5.3 Implications of resampling
Before we prove that pcBV-PRE has PCS, we demonstrate some consequences of using the
resampling technique described in Figure V.7. We will use these in our proof.
Lemma V.12. Let ReSample-ncRLWEA(1λ) be defined as in Figure V.9. Then, for all
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b = a · s+ pe






(ā0, b̄0) = (av + pe0, bv + pe1)
(ā1, b̄1)
$← Uq × Uq
return (ād, b̄d)
Figure V.9: A variant of RLWE for resampling. Note that the
challenge oracle can be queried more than once.







+ (κ+ 2Q) ·AdvRLWEφ,q,χe(D) (1
λ),
where κ is the number of keys generated in ReSample-ncRLWEA(1λ) and Q is the number
of calls that A makes to ChalRRLWE. Because A is PPT, κ and Q must also be polynomial,
meaning the overall advantage of winning ReSample-ncRLWEA(1λ) is negligible, by the
RLWE assumption.
Proof. Let D receive an RLWE challenge, where either the sample is genuine (d = 0)
or it is random (d = 1). We demonstrate via a hybrid argument that D can simulate
ReSample-ncRLWEA(1λ).
Let H0 := ReSample-ncRLWEA(1λ) with challenge bit d = 0, and let Hi be defined in
the same way as Hi−1 except that the first i public keys have been replaced with uniform
random values. Suppose there exists an adversary B that can distinguish between Hi−1 and
Hi with advantage ε. We demonstrate how an RLWE distinguisher D can break RLWE
with the same advantage by simulating Hi and running B as a subroutine. D can simulate
Hi−d by responding to calls B makes to OKeyGen as follows:
• if k < i then D returns (u0, u1)
$← U2q ,
• if k = i D returns an RLWE challenge (a, b),
• if k > i then D returns a genuine RLWE sample.
Then D returns d′ = d′A. The maximal advantage in distinguishing between Hi and Hi−1 is
therefore AdvRLWEφ,q,χe(D) (1
λ).
Now consider a further hybrid argument H̄0 . . . H̄Q where H̄0 is identical to Hκ and H̄i
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is identical to H̄i−1 except that the ith output of OChallenge is replaced with 2 · (ā, b̄)
$← U2q .
Because all public keys are now random elements of Uq, this means that all inputs to
ReSample are uniform random elements, meaning that ā0 = av + pe0 and b̄0 = bv + pe1 are
also RLWE samples. Therefore, using the RLWE assumption twice more for each call to
ChalRRLWE, we see that the maximal advantage in distinguishing between H̄i and H̄i−1 is
2 ·AdvRLWEφ,q,χe(D) (1
λ). Alternatively, this can be seen in the same way as the IND-CPA
security of the underlying encryption scheme [PRSV17, proof of Theorem 5.1], as ReSample
is the same as encrypting 0.
Overall, we get that the number of times we rely on RLWE is κ+ 2Q. This completes
the proof.
To get to selective key corruption models, we need to consider a variant of
ReSample-ncRLWE where A is also given access to a key corruption oracle. We describe














b = a · s+ pe















(ā0, b̄0) = (av + pe0, bv + pe1)
(ā1, b̄1)
$← Uq × Uq
Kchal.add{ski}
return (ād, b̄d)
Figure V.10: A variant of RLWE for resampling with key
corruptions, where d ∈ {0, 1}. As in ReSample-ncRLWE, the
challenge oracle can be queried more than once.
To prove that no PPT adversary can win ReSample-RLWEA(1λ) with non-negligible
advantage, we rely on the following assumption, which we call the challenge independence
assumption. Let {q} denote the set of queries made in a security game Game that are
independent of any challenge queries. Then {q} can give no advantage to an adversary
hoping to win Game. This is relevant for key corruptions as, if the adversary corrupts keys
which are never linked to any challenge keys, the challenge independence assumption means
these keys give the adversary no additional advantage. This principle is similar to the
intuition of how re-encryption simulatability and source-hiding imply a PRE scheme is also
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IND-HRA-secure, as replacing re-encryptions with ciphertexts independent of the challenge
secret key cannot yield an advantage in learning challenge keys. A similar assumption
is made in [FKKP19], where Fuchsbauer et al. mention that it suffices to consider the
challenge graph – the subgraph of the DRG that is reachable from the challenge node.
Lemma V.13. Let ReSample-RLWEA(1λ) be defined as in Figure V.10. Then an adversary
who wins ReSample-ncRLWEA(1λ) with advantage ε can win ReSample-RLWEA(1λ)with
advantage ε by the challenge independence assumption.
Proof. We note that all keys are generated independently and that in ReSample-RLWEA(1λ)
keys either become challenge keys or corrupted keys. Furthermore, ReSample-RLWEA(1λ)
gives no information linking individual samples. This means the challenge independence
assumption, meaning that providing the adversary with the corruption oracle, OCorrupt,
gives no additional advantage in winning.
Combining Lemma V.12 and Lemma V.13 gives the following result.








+ (κ+ 2Q) ·AdvRLWEφ,q,χe(D) (1
λ), (V.13)
where κ is the number of keys generated in ReSample-ncRLWEA(1λ) and Q is the number of
calls that A makes to ChalRRLWE. As in Lemma V.12, this means the advantage of winning
ReSample-ncRLWEA(1λ) is negligible by the RLWE assumption.
V: 5.4 Post-Compromise Security of pcBV-PRE
Recall from Section V: 3.4 that pcBV-PRE is not source-hiding, and we therefore do not
leverage Theorem V.3. Instead we use an alternative method to show that re-encryptions
of non-challenge ciphertexts can be replaced without detection.
Theorem V.4. For all PPT adversaries A, there exists an RLWE distinguisher D such
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where κ is the number of keys generated during PostComppcBV-PREA (1
λ), QRKu→u is the
number of queries A makes to OReKeyGen(i, j) where ski and skj are uncorrupted, QRE⊥u→u
is the number of queries A makes to OReKeyGen(c, i, j,∆i,j) where ski and skj are uncorrupted
and ∆i,j = ⊥, and QCu is the number of non-challenge ciphertexts under corrupted keys
(counting both fresh encryptions and re-encryptions).
Because A is PPT, we note that κ,QRKu→u, QRE⊥u→u and QCu are all polynomial, meaning
that the overall advantage is negligible by the RLWE assumption and thus pcBV-PRE has
PCS.
Proof. We give a brief informal argument before giving a full proof. We first demonstrate
that the scheme is secure for a variant of the game where no re-encryptions from uncorrupted
to corrupted keys are permitted. We call this variant CPA-PostCompPREA (1λ).
This proof follows a hybrid argument using a sequence of game hops beginning with
CPA-PostComppcBV-PREA (1
λ). We replace:
1. outputs of the ReSample used within pcBV-PRE.ReKeyGen where ski and skj are
uncorrupted with uniform random values, and
2. outputs of pcBV-PRE.ReKeyGen where ski and skj are uncorrupted with uniform
random values.
In the final game hop, the challenge ciphertext given to the adversary is a uniformly
sampled value and thus the adversary has no advantage in this game. This implies that
CPA-PostComppcBV-PREA (1
λ) when b = 0 is indistinguishable from when b = 1. This first
part of the proof of Theorem V.4 is formulated in Theorem V.5.
To prove security for the full PostComppcBV-PREA (1
λ) game including honest re-
encryptions, we use a similar idea to re-encryption simulatability to demonstrate how
re-encryptions from uncorrupted to corrupted keys can be simulated without the update
token or knowledge of the old secret key. We demonstrate how this simulated game is
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indistinguishable from PostComppcBV-PREA (1
λ), meaning that pcBV-PRE PCS. This second
part of the proof of Theorem V.4 is formulated in Theorem V.6.
We now proceed to the first stage of the full proof.




re-encryptions from uncorrupted to corrupted keys are permitted whatsoever.













where κ,QRKu→u and QRE⊥u→u are as described in Theorem V.4.
Proof. We prove this theorem using a sequence of game hops as described in Lemmas V.15
to V.17.
Lemma V.15. Let Game0 identical to CPA-PostComppcBV-PRE(1λ). Let Game1 the same
as Game0, except that all update tokens
(





uncorrupted keys are replaced with
(
{(βι, θι)}blog2(q)/rcι=0 , pkj
)
. Then for all PPT adversaries
A:
|Pr[1← Game0(A)]− Pr[1← Game1(A)]|




In other words, the advantage in distinguishing between Game0 and Game1 is the at most
the advantage of distinguishing one of κ+ 2(QRKu→u +QRE⊥u→u)(blog2(q)/rc+ 1) RLWE
samples from uniform.
Proof. Note that if x = r + u ∈ Rq, where r
$← Uq, then x is indistinguishable from
x′
$← Uq, and vice versa. This applies as long as r is unknown, even if x is known.
This means we can replace ∆ = {(āι, b̄ι − ski)
blog2(q)/rc
ι=0 }




ι=0 , with ∆ = {(āι, b̄ι)
blog2(q)/rc
ι=0 }
$← ReKeyGen(ski, pkj) if
and only if we can replace calls to ReSample(pkj) with uniform random values.
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We demonstrate how an adversary B for ReSample-RLWEB(1λ) with challenge bit
d
$← {0, 1} can simulate Gamed:
• B samples b $← {0, 1} to be the bit determining the challenge re-encryption.
• When A calls OGamedKeyGen and O
Gamed
Corrupt, B forwards these queries to the equivalent oracles
in ReSample-RLWE.
• When A calls OGamedReKeyGen(i, j):
– If ski is not corrupted and skj is corrupted, B returns ⊥.
– If ski is corrupted, B returns ∆i,j
$← ReKeyGen(ski, pkj).




ι=0 and sets ∆← {(āι, b̄ι)}
blog2(q)/rc
ι=0 .




the same method as for OGamedReKeyGen if ∆i,j = ⊥.
• When A calls ChalGamedReEnc (i, j,∆i,j , c0, c1), B responds as it would for
OGamedReEnc (i, j,∆i,j , cb).
If d = 0 then resamples are genuine so this perfectly simulates Game0, and if d = 0 then
this perfectly simulates Game1. Therefore, for an adversary A that outputs d′A = d with
advantage δ, B can set d′ = d′A and win ReSample-RLWEB(1λ) with the same advantage.
Overall, B calls ChalRRLWE blog2(q)/rc+1 times for each call A makes to OReKeyGen(i, j)
where ski is uncorrupted, and a further blog2(q)/rc + 1 times whenever A calls
OReEnc(c, i, j,∆i,j = ⊥) where ski is uncorrupted. In total, ChalRRLWE was called at most
(QRKu→u +QRE⊥u→u)(blog2(q)/rc+ 1) times. Lemma V.14 gives us the result.
Lemma V.16. Let Game2 be identical to Game1, except that when the challenge oracle
ChalGame2ReEnc (i, j, [∆i,j , ] c0, c1) is queried, calls to ReSample(pkj) are replaced with uniform
random values. Then for all PPT adversaries A, there exists an RLWE distinguisher D
such that:
∣∣∣∣Pr[1 ($)← Game1(A)]− Pr[1 ($)← Game2(A)]∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2 ·AdvRLWEφ,q,χeD (1λ).
In other words, the advantage in distinguishing between Game1 and Game2 is the same as
distinguishing two RLWE samples from uniform.
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Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that when A queries the challenge oracle
ChalReEnc(c0, c1, i, j,∆i,j), it uses an oracle-generated updated token ∆i,j ∈ Thonest. Let
d
$← {0, 1} be the challenge bit in ReSample-RLWEB(1λ). We demonstrate that if there
exists an adversary A that outputs d′A = d for Gamed+1 with advantage δ, then there exists
an adversary B who can win ReSample-RLWEB(1λ).
As before, we show how B can use ReSample-RLWEB(1λ) to simulate Gamed+1. B first
samples b $← {0, 1} to be the challenge bit in Gamed+1, and responds to all oracles except
the challenge as described in Lemma V.15. When A calls ChalGamedReEnc (i, j,∆i,j , c0, c1), B
performs the appropriate checks, then follows the procedure for pcBV-PRE.ReEnc(∆i,j , cb)
except that it replaces ReSample(pkj) with a call to ChalRRLWE(j).
When d = 0, this simulates Game1 perfectly and when d = 1, this simulates Game2
perfectly. Therefore, B can run A on the simulation and return d′ = d′A to win with the
same advantage. Since ChalRRLWE(j) has only been called once, we rely on the RLWE
assumption two extra times. This gives the result.
Lemma V.17. Let Game3 be identical to Game2, except that ChalGame3ReEnc (i, j,∆i,j , c0, c1)












Proof. In both Game2 and Game3, the adversary submits two ciphertexts c∗0 = (c∗0,0, c∗0,1)
and c∗1 = (c∗1,0, c∗1,1) when it queries the challenge oracle. In Game2, the challenger responds
by setting c0 = c∗0(b) and c1 = c
∗
1(b) for uniformly chosen b
$← {0, 1} and returning the
challenge ciphertext given by















using the relinearisation breakdown described in Equation (V.1). In particular, a∗ and b∗
are the result of calling ReSample(pkj) in Game2 on an honest public key and are therefore
uniform random values that are used once and never revealed to A. Therefore, c′0 and c′1
are also independent uniform random values in Game2, which is the exact case in Game3.
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This argument holds both when the challenge bit b = 0 and when b = 1. This concludes
the proof of this lemma.













This concludes the proof of Theorem V.5.













where ε is the maximal advantage of winning CPA-PostComppcBV-PREA (1
λ), and κ,QCu and
QHu→c are as described in Theorem V.4.
Proof. This is similar to the proof outline of [Coh17, Theorem 5]. We observe that




replacing the outputs from calls to OReEnc(i, j, [∆i,j , ]c), where ski /∈ Kcorrupt, skj ∈ Kcorrupt
and (i, c) ∈ Chonest but (i, c) /∈ Cchal, with a fake re-encryption. If this replacement is not
detectable, then B can call A as a subroutine, output the same guess and win with the
same advantage.
Without loss of generality, for simplicity we give the proof for the variant of our
construction described in Figure V.11, where blog2(q)/rc = 0 (r ≥ log2(q)).
Note that for bi = aisi + pei,
bi − aisi = pei. (V.14)
Let (pki, ski) = ((ai, bi = aisi + pei), si), (pkj , skj) = ((aj , bj = ajsj + pej), sj), let
ā = aj v̄ + pē1, b̄ = bj v̄ + pē0, â = aj v̂ + pê1, b̂ = bj v̂ + pê0 and let c,∆i,j , c′ be as described
in Figure V.11. We first note that by Equation (V.2), a genuine re-encryption will result in
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c0 = biṽ + pẽ0 +m
c1 = aiṽ + pẽ1
m′ ← Dec(ski = si, c)
(c0, c1)← c




γ = b̄− si
∆i,j = (ā, γ)
c′
$← ReEnc(∆i,j , c)
(ā, γ)← ∆i,j
(â, b̂)← ReSample(pkj)
c′0 = c0 + c1γ + b̂
c′1 = c1ā+ â
Figure V.11: A simplified version of pcBV-PRE (Figure V.8).
a ciphertext c′ = (c′0, c′1), where
c′0 = c0 + c1γ + b̂
= c0 + c1(b̄− si) + b̂
= c0 − sic1 + c1b̄+ b̂
(V.2)
= p(ẽ0si − ẽ1 + eiṽ) +m+ c1(bj v̄ + pē0) + bj v̂ + pê0
= bj(c1v̄ + v̂) + p(c1ē0 + ê0 + ẽ0si − ẽ1 + eiṽ) +m,
c′1 = c1ā+ â
= c1(aj v̄ + pē1) + aj v̂ + pê1
= aj(c1v̄ + v̂) + p(c1ē1 + ê1).
If we let
v = c1v̄ + v̂, e0 = c1ē0 + ê0 + ẽ0si − ẽ1 + eiṽ, e1 = c1ē1 + ê1, (V.15)
we get
c′0 = bjv + pe0 +m,
c′1 = ajv + pe1.
(V.16)
Therefore, if the secret key si (and therefore ei), message m and random values ṽ, ẽ0, ẽ1
were known, an alternative way to compute a genuine re-encryption would be to sample
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v̄, ē0, ē1, v̂, ê0, ê1
$← χe and compute c′ as described in Equations (V.15) and (V.16).
We note that, as v̄, ē0, ē1, v̂, ê0, ê1 are freshly sampled for one-time use, B can easily
sample its own values from χe and use these to calculate v, e1. However, since the simulator
does not know si, ei, they cannot compute e0. Instead B can sample its own si′, ei′
$← χe
and use these to create
e′0 = c1ē0 + ê0 + ẽ0si
′ − ẽ1 + ei′ṽ,
and create a fake re-encryption:
c′∗ = (bjv + pe
′
0 +m, ajv + pe1). (V.17)
We need to demonstrate that this replacement will not be detected.
We note that, since pki is uncorrupted, the distinguisher does not know ski = si, and
therefore cannot use the input ciphertext c to learn the ciphertext error Ec = ẽ0si− ẽ1 +eiṽ,
as otherwise they could derive m from c without knowing the secret key, thereby breaking
RLWE. However, as they do know skj = sj , they can compute the error of a re-encrypted
ciphertext. Since
c′0 − c′1sj = (c0 + c1γ + b̂)− (ciā+ â)sj
= c1(γ − āsj) + c0 + b̂− âsj
= c1(b̄− si − āsj) + c0 + b̂− âsj
= c0 + c1(b̄− āsj − si) + (bj v̂ + pê0)− (aj v̂ + pê1)sj
= c0 − c1si + c1(b̄− āsj) + (bj − ajsj)v̂ + p(ê0 − ê1sj)
(V.14)
= m+ pEc + c1p(ej v̄ + ē0 − ē1sj) + pej v̂ + p(ê0 − ê1sj)
= m+ p(Ec + ê0 − ê1sj + ej v̂ + c1(ej v̄ + ē0 − ē1sj)),
the error on a genuine re-encryption c′ is
Ec′ = ẽ0si − ẽ1 + eiṽ + ê0 − ê1sj + ej v̂ + c1(ej v̄ + ē0 − ē1sj),
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and for a fake re-encryption c′∗ is
Ec′∗ = ẽ0si
′ − ẽ1 + ei′ṽ + ê0 − ê1sj + ej v̂ + c1(ej v̄ + ē0 − ē1sj),
where underlined values are known to the adversary.
As c1 = aiṽ + pẽ1, and ai is public, (ai, c1) is an RLWE sample with secret ṽ and error
pẽ1. Because ṽ and ẽ1 are chosen independently of si and ei, it follows that even if si and
ei were later corrupted, ṽ and ẽ1 should remain unknown. As Ec is the only other value
derived using ṽ, ẽ1 and it is also unknown to the adversary, we can therefore argue that c1
is indistinguishable from a value chosen uniformly at random, by the RLWE assumption.
Rearranging, we need to demonstrate that
Ec′ = c1ē0 + ê0 − ê1sj + ej v̂ + c1(ej v̄ − ē1sj) + Ec (V.18)
and
Ec′∗ = c1ē0 + ê0 − ê1sj + ej v̂ + c1(ej v̄ − ē1sj) + E∗c , (V.19)
where E∗c = ẽ0si′ − ẽ1 + ei′ṽ, appear to have the same distribution to any entity that only
knows m, c, sj and c′(∗).
We now observe that because c is an encryption under an uncorrupted key, we can apply
the RLWE assumption to suggest that both c0 and c1 are indistinguishable from uniform
random elements of Rq. We can demonstrate this explicitly via ReSample-RLWEA(1λ), but
omit this full explanation for brevity. In doing this, we invoke the RLWE assumption at
least κ+ 2QCu times (Lemma V.14).
Because c1 appears to be a uniform element of Rq, c1ē0 + ê0 is also distributed like
an RLWE sample with secret ē0 and error ê0. This invokes the RLWE assumption once
more per re-encryption replacement (an additional QHu→c times). The distributions of
Equations (V.18) and (V.19) are therefore indistinguishable, under the RLWE assumption,
from the distributions of a modified version of Equations (V.18) and (V.19) where c1ē0 + ê0
is replaced with u $← Uq4.
4This is a simplification, as we need u to be such that the resulting Ec′Ec′∗ are the appropriate size for
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Finally, we note that if w is an element of Rq and u
$← Uq, then u+w is also distributed
as a uniform element of Rq. Therefore, because c1ē0 + ê0 can be replaced with random
elements of the appropriate distribution, we can replace the entirety of both E′c and E′∗c with
random elements from the appropriate distribution for the number of times the ciphertext
has been re-encrypted. We conclude that e0 and e′0 are indistinguishable.























Thus, B can use fake re-encryptions to simulate PostComppcBV-PREA (1λ) and
run A to win CPA-PostComppcBV-PREB (1λ) with overall advantage of at most(





, by Lemma V.14 and the triangle inequal-
ity. This completes the proof.
The proof of Theorem V.4 follows from Theorem V.5 and Theorem V.6, together with
the triangle inequality.
Remarks. We conjecture that it is possible to generalise the replacement technique used
for pcBV-PRE in place of source-hiding in order to demonstrate HRA-security for a larger
number of schemes. As also note that, as we replace all uncorrupted keys at once as opposed
to needing to replace one key at a time our proof is not restricted to acyclic re-encryption
graphs. In contrast, other proofs such as those given in [PRSV17,FKKP18] replace one key
at a time, in an order that depends on the re-encryption graph. For example, [PRSV17]
replaces keys and update tokens in a topological order from sinks to sources defined by
the acyclic re-encryption graph. As uncorrupted secret keys are only used for update
tokens and re-encryptions leading away from a vertex, this ordering is important in showing
indistinguishability between game hops. We revisit these ideas in Chapter VI.




V: 5.5 IND-HRA security of pcBV-PRE
Recall from Lemma V.7 that PCS does not imply IND-HRA security. We therefore now
demonstrate that pcBV-PRE is IND-HRA-secure.
Theorem V.7. pcBV-PRE is IND-HRA-secure. More specifically, for all PPT adversaries













where κ,QRKu→u, QRE⊥u→u, QCu and QHu→c are as described in Theorem V.4.
Because A is PPT, we note that the above terms are also all polynomial, meaning that the
overall advantage is negligible by the RLWE assumption.
This can be demonstrated using a similar argument to that of Theorem V.4, except
that the challenge that is replaced with a uniform value is a fresh encryption as opposed to
a re-encrypted ciphertext.
V: 6 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented the strongest notion of Post-Compromise Security for
PRE to date. By strongest, we mean that security holds even when the old secret key ski and
update token ∆i,j used to perform the challenge re-encryption are known to the adversary.
We have also shown that existing Post-Compromise Security notions are implied by our
notion of security, and we have presented separating examples showing that the opposite
implication does not hold. We have also shown that PCS can be achieved via a number
of existing PRE security notions which immediately shows that at least one existing PRE
scheme satisfies PCS [FKKP19], and that PCS and transparency imply IND-HRA-security.
We presented pcBV-PRE, an efficient construction of a PRE scheme with PCS based on
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In this Chapter
In this chapter, we study security with respect to adaptive key corruptions. Unlike the
selective security definitions we have studied so far, in the adaptive model the adversary can
corrupt keys at any point, as long as they do not corrupt any key that can be used to directly
decrypt the challenge ciphertext (or any re-encryption of the challenge ciphertext). A simple
way of relating selective and adaptive security is by noting that a selective adversary can
simulate the adaptive game successfully if it correctly guesses in the first stage which keys
the adaptive adversary will corrupt, an approach known as complexity leveraging. However,
this leads to a security loss that is exponential in the number of keys. Therefore, useful work
on proving adaptive security should demonstrate how to prove adaptive security at a smaller
VI: 1 Introduction
loss. We relate selective and adaptive security without using complexity leveraging, by
extending observations already made in the literature and identifying notions of key privacy
for update tokens to prove adaptive security for both CPA and Honest Re-encryption
Attacks (HRA)-style definitions.
The contributions of this chapter are joint work with Benjamin Dowling. My personal
contribution includes the the extension of the challenge graph observation (Section VI: 4),
the definitions of re-encryption replaceability (Definitions VI.11 and VI.14) and all
reduction-based proofs. Benjamin Dowling assisted in defining the appropriate definitions of
key privacy (Definitions VI.6 to VI.8) and provided the statistical proof linking fixed and
selective IND-CPA security (Lemma VI.5).
The contents of this chapter are currently unpublished.
VI: 1 Introduction
Recall that one of the motivations in modelling security for PRE is to consider an untrusted
proxy. One natural extension to existing work is to model more powerful adversaries. Most
security in PRE, including the definitions we have seen so far, is defined in the selective key
corruption model, where a two-stage adversary Asel = (A0,A1) first gets to corrupt keys,
and then learn challenges, update tokens, and re-encryptions. A stronger model formalised
in [FKKP19] is that of adaptive security, where a single-stage adversary Aad can corrupt
keys at any stage in the game, as long as they do no corrupt any keys that allow them to
trivially decrypt the challenge ciphertext. This means that the adversary can corrupt keys
in response to information gained from challenge ciphertexts, subject to the trivial win
condition. A trivial approach to proving adaptive security given selective security is to have
an adversary Asel in the selective game attempt to simulate the adaptive game by guessing
which keys the adaptive adversary Aad will corrupt. If Asel guesses correctly, then it can
use Aad as a subroutine to win the selective game with the same advantage. However, as
this simulation only works if Asel correctly guesses the corrupted keys, this technique has a
loss exponential in the number of keys generated, κ.
Recent work [FKKP19] has demonstrated how adaptive security can be proven at a
quasi-polynomial loss, namely at least κO(log(κ)) for certain types of re-encryption graph
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(namely trees and chains, see Figures III.3 and III.4), assuming that the re-encryption graph
is known in advance. Recall that the re-encryption graph can reflect applications, so this
result is useful for some common applications including key rotation. However, for general
re-encryption graphs (and therefore general applications of PRE), the results of [FKKP19]
still lead to an exponential loss.
Similarly, [LT18,KLR19a] prove adaptive security for updatable encryption schemes
using a key-insulation technique, which limits the necessary amount of guessing by indicating
groups of keys that will not be corrupted. This method works because in updatable
encryption the resulting re-encryption graph is a chain, meaning any need to guess specific
regions of keys in the re-encryption graph is limited compared with general re-encryption
graphs.
VI: 1.1 Contributions
In this chapter, we seek to further reduce the loss when proving adaptive security, using
methods that apply to all re-encryption graphs. More specifically, we take the concepts
introduced in [FKKP19,LT18,KLR19a], extend existing observations and use notions of
key privacy in PRE to prove security with adaptive key corruptions at a smaller loss.
One of our contributions is to draw attention to a discrepancy in the literature in terms
of how selective security is defined – some work defines this in the same way we did in
Section III: 3 where A0 can access a key generation oracle OKeyGen and key corruption
oracle OCorrupt whereas other work instead gives the first-stage adversary an honest key
generation oracle OHonKeyGen and a corrupted key generation oracle OCorKeyGen. We explain
why this discrepancy might pose a problem, before presenting arguments as to why the two
variants can be considered equivalent.
In practice, proofs of security in PRE usually involve describing how update tokens
from uncorrupted keys can be simulated without detection. We formalise this property by
defining token source privacy, which, when present, indicates that update tokens do not
reveal their underlying source key. We describe a number of variants of token source privacy,
and use these to relate existing security properties of PRE schemes. One of our main
contributions is to demonstrate that PRE-IND-CPA-secure (with selective key corruptions)
PRE schemes with token source privacy are also adaptively PRE-IND-CPA-secure.
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We use an observation made in [FKKP19] to demonstrate how a weaker property
than source-hiding is sufficient for our needs, and define re-encryption replaceability as
an alternative which can demonstrate how adaptively PRE-IND-CPA-secure PRE schemes
with this property are also adaptively IND-HRA-secure. We make a number of observations
which indicate that re-encryption replaceability is easier to demonstrate than source-hiding,
suggesting that a number of existing re-encryption schemes (both public-key and symmetric)
have this property.
Our results offer a number of improvements over those presented in [FKKP19]:
• Our methodology can be applied to the traditional approach where re-encryption
graphs are not known in advance, but adaptively defined by the adversary via queries
to OReKeyGen and OReEnc.
• Some of the properties we define are already met by a number of re-encryption
schemes, meaning that some of our results apply more widely.
• We avoid the need to rely on complexity leveraging by using multi-key, multi-challenge
security definitions that prevent the need to guess where replacements will be made.
A summary of our contributions can be seen in Figure VI.1. Our main result is as
follows:
Theorem VI.1 (informal Theorems VI.4, VI.7 and VI.13). If a PRE scheme has token-
source privacy, is re-encryption replaceable, and its underlying encryption scheme is
IND-CPA-secure, then it is also Indistinguishable against Honest Re-Encryption Attacks
with adaptive key corruptions (adaptively IND-HRA-secure).
Finally, we demonstrate similar results for adaptive Post-Compromise Security. We use
these results to demonstrate that pcBV-PRE (Figure V.8) is secure with respect to adaptive
key corruptions for PRE-IND-CPA security, IND-HRA security and PCS.
Chapter structure. We begin by discussing related work in Section VI: 2, before presenting
variants of the indistinguishability notions introduced in Section III: 3 with respect to
different forms of key corruption in Section VI: 3. In Section VI: 4 we discuss the challenge
graph observation, an observation made in [FKKP19] which we expand on to demonstrate
security at a smaller loss. In Section VI: 5 we define several notions of key privacy in PRE.
We then use these to give a general result for proving adaptive security for IND-CPA-secure
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+ ReEncRep Theorem VI.13+ ReEncSim [Coh19, Theorem 5]
Figure VI.1: A summary of the individual relations proven in this
chapter. wTSP is weak Token Source Privacy (Definition VI.6),
TSP is Token Source Privacy (Definition VI.7). ReEncRep is
re-encryption replaceability (Definition VI.14).
definitions in Section VI: 6 and extend this to IND-HRA definitions in Section VI: 7
and PCS in Section VI: 7.4, demonstrating how pcBV-PRE is also secure with respect to
adaptive key corruptions.
VI: 2 Related work
Jafargholi et al. [JKK+17] relate selective and adaptive security for a number of cryp-
tographic primitives, including generalized selective decryption, constrained PRFs, Yao
garbled circuits and secret sharing over access structures defined via monotone circuits.
They demonstrate how it is not always necessary for a selective adversary to guess all queries
the adaptive adversary will make, and that instead only some subset of information needs
to be known. More specifically, Jafargholi et al. demonstrate how, when using a hybrid
argument,1 proving that two neighbouring hybrids are indistinguishable often requires only
some partial information about the queries the adaptive adversary will make. They use
directed graphs to demonstrate how queries are connected, and introduce graph pebbling
games to describe what needs to be simulated in an indistinguishability proof between two
neighbouring hybrids – if a vertex has a pebble on it, then all edges from that vertex are
simulated, otherwise they are as expected. They demonstrate how this approach can lead
to proving adaptive security at a sub-exponential loss.
1A hybrid argument demonstrates indistinguishability between two games by defining a sequence of
interim games leading from one game to the other by replacing specified values, then showing indistin-
guishability between the interim games. This approach is also known as using game-hops.
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Fuchsbauer et al. [FKKP19] apply this framework specifically to PRE for both PRE-
IND-CPA and IND-HRA security. They define a number of pebbling games based on
the re-encryption graph to prove adaptive security at a smaller loss for certain types of
re-encryption graph. Specifically, they demonstrate a quasi-polynomial loss κO(log κ) for
trees and chains. However, for general re-encryption graphs, the security loss is exponential
in their depth. They also introduce a new definition of key privacy for update tokens,
which they use to prove adaptive IND-CPA security, and they introduce source-hiding as
a means of proving adaptive IND-HRA security, as discussed in Section V: 5.2. However,
recall that one of the downsides of this technique is that known schemes that are provably
source-hiding use a blurring technique [CCL+14] that severely limits the number of times a
ciphertext can be re-encrypted and still decrypt correctly. Furthermore, the way in which
source-hiding is defined results in the need for some complexity leveraging. We define an
alternative property, re-encryption replaceability, which is weaker than source-hiding but
sufficient to demonstrate adaptive IND-HRA security.
The main other related work that proves adaptive security for re-encryption schemes is
in the related primitive of updatable encryption [LT18,KLR19a]. In particular, in [KLR19a]
Klooß et al. use a key-insulation approach to prove adaptive security without relying entirely
on complexity leveraging. This entails showing how certain parts of the re-encryption
graph are independent of areas where keys are corrupted, meaning that these parts can be
indistinguishably simulated without knowledge of the secret keys. This is similar to the
idea of partial commitments expressed in [JKK+17,FKKP19]. Klooß et al. also introduce
the concept of randomness-preserving and use this as a means of simulating re-encryptions
under uncorrupted keys that are indistinguishable from genuine re-encryptions. They
conjecture that their work can be extended to prove adaptive security in unidirectional
PRE by using notions of key privacy in PRE to enable key-insulation.
Key privacy (also known as key anonymity) was first defined in [BBDP01] in the context
of PKE schemes. Key privacy captures the notion that an adversary cannot distinguish
between ciphertexts encrypted under one public key from another public key. This notion
was later extended to PRE schemes, first defined in [ABH09] for unidirectional, single-hop
PRE schemes. In the [ABH09] definition, the adversary must instead distinguish whether a
given update token allows the adversary to re-encrypt ciphertexts between two specified
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and uncorrupted keys, or is instead a random element of the update token space. They
demonstrate that in a PRE scheme that meets this definition, ciphertexts also have key-
privacy in the traditional sense. In [FKKP19], a weaker notion of key privacy is defined,
which implies that only the source key (pki for token ∆i,j) is hidden. Neither definition of
key-privacy in PRE considers corrupted keys.
VI: 3 Preliminaries
In this section we define existing models of key corruption in detail. We begin by defining a
multi-key variant of traditional IND-CPA security for PKE schemes. We will demonstrate
how security in PRE with adaptive key corruptions can be proven from this comparatively
simple definition together with some additional properties.
Definition VI.1. Consider the following security game:
PKE-IND-CPAPKEA (1λ)
































where κ is the maximum number of keys generated in PKE-IND-CPAPKEA (1λ). If ε is negligible
and κ is polynomial as determined by the security parameter λ then we say PRE is PKE
Indistinguishable against Chosen Plaintext Attacks (PKE-IND-CPA-secure).
We believe this definition is met by most, if not all IND-CPA PRE schemes in the




VI: 3.1 Fixed vs selective key corruptions
One of our contributions is to highlight a discrepancy in how selective security is defined. At a
high level it is always defined in the same way – the first stage adversary A0 determines which
keys are corrupted, before the second stage adversary A1 gets access to ChalEnc,OReKeyGen,
or OReEnc. However the discrepancy comes in whether keys are generated as corrupted
keys, or whether keys are generated and then later corrupted. The former is the model we
have discussed in this thesis so far. In the latter, instead of A0 having access to OKeyGen
and OCorrupt, they gain access to an honest key generation oracle, and a corrupted key


















We refer to this as the fixed key model. We refer to the fixed key corruption variants of the
CPA experiment (Definition III.7) and HRA experiment (Definition III.8) defined by this




Definition VI.2. We say that a PRE scheme, PRE, is (ε, κ)-Indistinguishable against









where κ is the maximum number of keys generated in f-PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ). If ε is negli-
gible and κ is polynomial as determined by λ, then we say PRE is Indistinguishable against
Chosen Plaintext Attacks with fixed key corruptions (fixed-key PRE-IND-CPA-secure).
We say that a PRE scheme, PRE, is (ε, κ)-Indistinguishable against Honest Re-









where κ is the maximum number of keys generated in f-IND-HRAPREA (1λ). If ε is negligible
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and κ is polynomial as determined by λ, then we say PRE is Indistinguishable against
Honest Re-Encryption Attacks with fixed key corruptions (fixed-key IND-HRA-secure).
In the chapter, we also parametrise the selective variants of the definitions described in
Section III: 3:
Definition VI.3. If a PRE scheme, PRE, is ε-PRE-IND-CPA-secure subject to a max-
imum of κ key pairs, then we say PRE is selectively (ε, κ)-PRE-IND-CPA-secure. If
ε is negligible and κ is polynomial as determined by λ, then we say PRE is selectively
Indistinguishable against Chosen Plaintext Attacks (PRE-IND-CPA-secure).
Similarly, if PRE is ε-IND-HRA-secure subject to a maximum of κ key pairs, then
we say PRE is selectively (ε, κ)-IND-HRA-secure. If ε is negligible and κ is polynomial
as as determined by λ, then we say PRE is selectively Indistinguishable against Honest
Re-Encryption Attacks (IND-HRA-secure).
If PRE is ε-PCS subject to a maximum of κ key pairs, then we say PRE has selective
(ε, κ)-PCS. If ε is negligible and κ is polynomial as as determined by λ, then we say PRE
has selective Post-Compromise Security (PCS).
The crucial difference between fixed-key and selective security is that in the selective
we model the adversary can choose whether to learn the secret key based on the public
key. This difference affects how things can be proven in the different models. For example,
in [PRSV17] security is defined in the fixed-key model, and therefore proofs are also in
this model. As security depends on RLWE, the proof replaces all public keys generated
by OHonKeyGen(1λ) with uniform random elements. However, in the selective model this
approach does not work, as it is unknown whether keys will be corrupted when they are
generated. As the secret key does not exist when the public key is actually a uniform random
value, the challenger will be unable to return it if the adversary chooses to corrupt that key.
It is this reason that led to us defining the resample-RLWE experiment in Section V: 5.3,
and using reductions to this as opposed to standard RLWE challenges. In the fixed-key
variant, standard RLWE would have been sufficient.
We remark that, in the symmetric setting, as there is no public key, OHonKeyGen(1λ)
generates a key but returns nothing to the adversary, meaning that fixed and selective key
corruptions are equivalent, as A0 receives no information when keys are generated with
which to decide whether to corrupt those keys.
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The existing work [FKKP19] that relates selective and adaptive key corruption in PRE
defines selective security using a corruption oracle. This is reasonable in the sense that as
the selective variant is closer to the adaptive model, making the two easier to compare.
However, the constructions presented in [FKKP18] (which is the full version of [FKKP19])
are variants of constructions presented in existing work, where they are proven secure in the
fixed-key model. In [FKKP18], proofs that the constructions are adaptively secure leverage
these results, referring to them as selectively secure despite the discrepancy. Therefore, it
appears that Fuchsbauer et al. assume that the fixed and selective variants are equivalent.
We therefore investigate in Section VI: 6.1 whether fixed key and selective security can
indeed be considered equivalent.
VI: 3.2 Definitions for adaptive security
Recall that in selective security (Definitions III.7 and III.8), the trivial win condition was
enforced in the oracles, by ChalEnc returning ⊥ if given a corrupted key as input, and by
OReKeyGen and OReEnc also returning ⊥ for forbidden queries. This type of enforcement is
possible because these oracles are only given to the second-stage adversary A1, at a point
when the sets of corrupted and uncorrupted keys are known. However in the adaptive key
corruption model, it is more complex to use conditions in OReKeyGen, OReEnc and ChalEnc
to prevent trivial wins, as whether or not a key will later be corrupted is unknown at the
time these oracles are queried. For example, the adversary could call ChalEnc(i,m0,m1)
whilst ski is uncorrupted and later corrupt ski, resulting in a trivial win if we were to not
change how the trivial win condition is enforced. For this reason, the trivial win condition
in adaptive games is instead enforced using the Directed Re-encryption Graph (DRG)
(Section III: 3.1). When the adversary queries OReKeyGen or OReEnc, the challenger updates
a DRG. Then after the adversary outputs its guess, the challenger uses the DRG to update
the set of challenge keys Kchal, as described in Figure VI.2. Then, if any challenge keys
have been corrupted, the challenger returns ⊥, and otherwise returns (b′ = b) as usual.





for ski ∈ Kchal, : for j ∈ {1, . . . , κ} :
if ∃ a path between vi and vj in DRG :
Kchal.add{skj}
return Kchal
Figure VI.2: Updating the set of challenge keys in an adaptive
security game.
Definition VI.4. Consider the following security game:
a-PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ)
Kchal,Kcorrupt, Thonest,DRG = ∅










if Kchal ∩ Kcorrupt 6= ∅ :
return ⊥
else :



















OCPAReEnc(i, j, [∆i,j ], c)
($)→ c′


















where boxed conditions apply only to bidirectional PRE schemes.
A PRE scheme, PRE, is said to be adaptively (ε, κ)-Indistinguishable against Chosen
Plaintext Attacks with adaptive key corruptions ((ε, κ)-adaptively PRE-IND-CPA-secure)
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where κ is the maximum number of keys generated in a-PRE-IND-CPAPKEA (1λ).
If ε is negligible and κ is polynomial as determined by the security parameter λ then
we say PRE is Indistinguishable against Chosen Plaintext Attacks with adaptive key
corruptions (adaptively PRE-IND-CPA-secure).
Definition VI.5. Consider the following security game (where shaded parts highlight the
differences from a-PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ)):
a-IND-HRAPREA (1λ)
Kchal,Kcorrupt, Thonest,DRG = ∅










if Kchal ∩ Kcorrupt 6= ∅ :
return ⊥
else :


























VI: 4 The Challenge Graph Observation
OHRAReEnc(i, j, [∆i,j ], c)
($)→ c′
if (i, c) /∈ Chonest : return ⊥









($)← ReEnc(∆i,j , c)
Chonest.add{j, c′}













Chonest.add{(i, c)}, Cchal.add{(i, c)}
called← true
return c∗b
where boxed conditions apply only to bidirectional PRE schemes.
Similarly, PRE is said to be adaptively (ε, κ)-Indistinguishable against Honest Re-
Encryption Attacks with adaptive key corruptions ((ε, κ)-adaptively IND-HRA-secure) if









where κ is the maximum number of keys generated in a-IND-HRAPKEA (1λ).
If ε is negligible and κ is polynomial as determined by the security parameter λ then
we say PRE is Indistinguishable against Honest Re-Encryption Attacks with adaptive key
corruptions (adaptively IND-HRA-secure).
VI: 4 The Challenge Graph Observation
We now discuss a crucial observation made by Fuchsbauer et al. in their work on adaptively
secure PRE [FKKP19]. They point out that to prove security, strictly speaking, it is
sufficient to only consider the ‘challenge graph’ – the subgraph that is reachable from the
challenge vertex. Therefore, in their proofs of security, their game-hops only replace outputs
of oracle queries in the challenge graph. We believe this is reasonable, as any subgraph that
is not reachable from the challenge subgraph represents keys that the challenge ciphertext
has never been encrypted under, and that were generated independently of the challenge
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key. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that any information the adversary learns about
these keys cannot give any advantage in winning the game.
Recall that a major difference between [FKKP19] and other work defining security
in PRE is that the re-encryption graph is fixed at the start of the game. This change is
necessary in [FKKP19] as the security proofs utilise a hybrid argument that replaces the
outputs of oracle queries in an order determined by the graph. Because the [FKKP19] setting
assumes that the re-encryption graph is known at the start of the game, the challenge graph
is also apparent from the beginning (see Figure VI.3), making it simple for any simulator










Figure VI.3: The challenge graph is the subgraph reachable from
the challenge node. In this example, this means the challenge










where the re-encryption graph is determined during the course of the experiment, the
challenge graph is also not known in advance, making it difficult to know which queries
need to be simulated and which do not.
However, we can extend their observation to the adaptive graph setting by observing that
even when the challenge graph is not known in advance, we know that certain oracle queries
will lead to a subgraph that is not reachable from the challenge graph, as a consequence
of the trivial win condition. For example, if A learns a token ∆i,j and corrupts skj , then
neither pki nor pkj can be in the challenge graph. If we use the same logic as Fuchsbauer
et al., we conclude that it suffices to only consider adversaries that never make OCorrupt,
OReKeyGen or OReEnc queries that result in vertices being unreachable from the challenge
graph. For example, we do not need to consider adversaries that call OCorrupt(i), OCorrupt(j)
and OReKeyGen(i, j). We note this is similar to the challenge independence assumption
discussed in Section V: 5.3. We further note this also implies that learning update tokens
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between corrupted keys can give no advantage in winning the game, meaning that it suffices
to only consider adversaries that corrupt ski, skj and learn some ∆i,j (in any order). We
refer to this as the challenge graph observation.
We shall explore this in detail in Section VI: 7.1, and in Section VI: 7.2 will demonstrate
that this observation implies that a property weaker than source-hiding is sufficient for
demonstrating adaptive IND-HRA security.
We remark that similar assumptions can be made for other primitives. Informally, any
queries made in a security game Game on keys that are independent of any challenge keys
cannot give any advantage to an adversary hoping to win Game. We do not formalise this
here as the challenge independence assumption is difficult to generalise correctly, so we
restrict ourselves to defining the challenge independence assumption for PRE schemes only.
VI: 5 Key Privacy Notions
In contrast to prior work on key privacy in PRE, we give more specific terms so as to be
clear both in terms of whether we are referring to ciphertexts or update tokens, and in
the case of update tokens, which keys are hidden. In what follows, we specifically examine
token source privacy. We will discuss a number of variants of this, but overall the following
definitions capture the notion that, given an update token, the adversary cannot tell whether
it re-encrypts from the expected source secret key, or an unknown source key. We give
different variants as we find that weaker variants are sufficient to relate fixed and selective
PRE security from PKE-IND-CPA-security, but stronger variants are required to prove
adaptive security. Defining these variants, allows us to be more precise in the properties
required for our results.
As in the security games discussed so far, in all our key privacy notions the adversary
is not allowed to corrupt any challenge keys. We note that when challenges are update
tokens ∆∗i,j , the challenge key is the target key skj . This is because if the adversary
learns skj
($)← ChalReKeyGen(i0, i1, j) then they will be able to trivially win by computing
c
$← Enc(pki0 ,m), followed by c
′ ($)→ ReEnc(∆∗, c) and verifying whether m ?= Dec(skj , c′).
Our first definition of token source privacy in Definition VI.6 is similar to FKKP-weak
key privacy [FKKP19, Definition 8]. Whereas Fuchsbauer et al. call their definition ‘weak’ in
the sense that only the source key is hidden in an update token, we use ‘weak’ to mean the
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adversary does not get to corrupt any secret keys related to challenges i.e. ChalReKeyGen(i, j)
returns ⊥ if either ski or skj are corrupted. We also give a stronger variant in Definition VI.7
– called token source privacy – where the adversary is allowed to learn the source private
keys of challenge tokens. This is clearly stronger than the weak variant, as the adversary
has access to more information. Note that in both of these variants, only A0 has access to
OCorrupt, and only A1 has access to ChalReKeyGen. Finally, we introduce an adaptive version
of token source privacy in Definition VI.8, where the adversary can corrupt keys and learn
challenges in any order.




(pk1, sk1), . . . , (pkκ, skκ)
$← KeyGen(1λ)





($)← AOCorrupt0 (pk1, . . . , pkκ)
b′
($)← AChalReKeyGen1 (1λ, state)

















A PRE scheme, PRE, is said to have (ε, κ)-weak Token Source Privacy ((ε, κ)-weak TSP)









If ε is negligible and κ is polynomial as determined by the security parameter λ then we
say PRE has weak Token Source Privacy (weak TSP).
We note that weak TSP is a strictly weaker notion than the definition of key privacy
given in [ABH09], as their definition masks both the source and target keys. Therefore, the
schemes which are proven to have ABH-key-privacy have weak TSP.
Recall that in Section V: 5.3 we used the challenge independence assumption to
demonstrate that if there is a strict separation between challenge keys and corrupted keys,
and the experiment gives no information linking the two, then the existence of corrupted
keys can provide no advantage in winning the experiment.
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Lemma VI.1. Consider the variant of the weak TSP experiment with no key corruption.
This is equivalent to the weak TSP experiment, by the challenge independence assumption.
This means that to demonstrate that a scheme has weak TSP it is sufficient to demon-
strate that the scheme meets the variant of weak TSP with no OCorrupt (which is equivalent
to a multi-key variant of FKKP-weak key privacy).
We now present a stronger notion of token source privacy, where the adversary is
allowed to corrupt the source keys of challenge tokens.




(pk1, sk1), . . . , (pkκ, skκ)
$← KeyGen(1λ)





($)← AOCorrupt0 (pk1, . . . , pkκ)
b′
($)← AChalReKeyGen1 (1λ)













A PRE scheme, PRE, is said to have (ε, κ)-Token Source Privacy ((ε, κ)-TSP) if for all









If ε is negligible and κ is polynomial as determined by the security parameter λ then we
say PRE has Token Source Privacy (TSP).
Recall that typically, proofs that a PRE scheme is PRE-IND-CPA-secure or
IND-HRA-secure use a hybrid argument where keys together with tokens and re-encryptions
from those keys are replaced. We avoid the need to restrict ourselves to acyclic graphs by
instead replacing all update tokens with uncorrupted source keys in one step, utilising our
multi-key, multi-challenge notions of token source privacy. This is in contrast to existing
work, where often proofs replace values in a particular order which often depends on the
re-encryption graph. For example, in [FKKP19], the pebbling games used in security proofs
can only be defined assuming a single source vertex, meaning that graphs must be acyclic.
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Similarly, in the proofs of [PRSV17, Theorem 4.3, Theorem 5.1], uncorrupted public keys
are replaced with uniform random values in an order which depends on the unique ordering
presented by a directed acyclic graph.
Remark. For a public-key PRE scheme to be secure, it is necessary that, given
∆i,j
($)← ReKeyGen(ski, pkj), it should not be possible to derive ski from pkj . Recall that
BV-PRE [PRSV17] uses an alternative ‘public’ key to create update tokens, and the exposure
of this key leads to the source key being learned from the update token, and hence this key
cannot be public in practice. One means of ensuring the source secret key remains secret is
by using some random input to ‘mask’ the keys being used, as in pcBV-PRE. We therefore
conjecture that for public-key PRE schemes with a probabilistic ReKeyGen, token-source
privacy is likely to be a side-effect of the existing security of the system, meaning that our
main results which utilise token source privacy can be applied.
Definition VI.8. Consider the following security game:
a-TSPPREA,κ (1λ)
Kcorrupt = ∅
(pk1, sk1), . . . , (pkκ, skκ)
$← KeyGen(1λ)





($)← AOCorrupt,ChalReKeyGen(pk1, . . . , pkκ)
return (b′ = b)
OCorrupt(i)→ ski













A PRE scheme, PRE, is said to have (ε, κ)-adaptive Token Source Privacy ((ε, κ)-









If ε is negligible and κ is polynomial as determined by the security parameter λ then we
say PRE has adaptive Token Source Privacy (adaptive TSP).
In a-TSPPREA,κ (1λ), the trivial win condition is enforced by ChalReKeyGen(i, j) returning
⊥ if skj is corrupted, and by OCorrupt(i) returning ⊥ if ski is a challenge key. The main
difference between TSP and adaptive TSP is that the adversary can corrupt keys in response
to challenge tokens, as long as they do not corrupt any keys that a challenge token re-encrypts
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to.
VI: 5.1 Key privacy observations
We now make some basic observations about these notions of source key privacy.
Lemma VI.2. If a PRE scheme PRE has (ε, κ)-adaptive TSP, then it also has (ε, κ)-TSP,
and if PRE has (ε, κ)-TSP, then it also has (ε, κ)-weak TSP.
In other words, (ε, κ)-adaptive TSP =⇒ (ε, κ)-TSP =⇒ (ε, κ)-weak TSP.
Proof. Each security game gives the adversary strictly more information or ability. This




adversaries in TSPPREA,κ (1λ) can perfectly simulate wTSP
PRE
A,κ (1
λ), and therefore gain the
same advantage as any successful adversary for the weaker games.
Lemma VI.3. If a PRE scheme, PRE , has TSP, then PRE .ReKeyGen must be probabilis-
tic.
Proof. In TSPPREA,κ (1λ), A can call ChalReKeyGen(i, j)
($)→ ∆∗ and then OCorrupt(i)→ ski. This
means A can compute their own token ∆i,j
$← ReKeyGen(ski, pkj).
If ReKeyGen is deterministic then ReKeyGen(ski, pkj) only has one output. Therefore,
A can output b = 0 if ∆∗ = ∆i0,j and b′ = 1 otherwise to always win the game. We
conclude that PRE schemes with token source privacy must be probabilistic.
We note that a similar result to Lemma VI.3 is shown in [ABH09, Lemma 1] for (what
we refer to as) weak TSP, but we chose to provide an explicit proof for easier comparison
in our multi-key approach.
Lemma VI.4. If a PRE scheme has TSP, it must be unidirectional.
Proof. We show that if PRE is bidirectional, then it cannot have TSP. Bidirectionality
implies that, given a token ∆i,j
($)← ReKeyGen(ski, pkj) it is possible to derive a token ∆j,i
that successfully re-encrypts from pkj to pkj . Therefore, if A0 corrupts ski and A1 calls
ChalReKeyGen(i, j)
($)→ ∆∗, they can compute some ∆j,i. If A1 sets some c
$← Enc(pkj ,m),
then they can compute m′ ← Dec(∆j,i,ReEnc(∆∗, c)). Therefore, A1 can output b = 0 if
m′ = m and b′ = 1 otherwise to always win the game. We conclude that PRE schemes
with token source privacy must be unidirectional.
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We note that Lemma VI.2 does not apply to weak TSP. Furthermore, by Lemma VI.2,
schemes with adaptive TSP also must be unidirectional and have a probabilistic ReKeyGen
(Lemmas VI.3 and VI.4).
A crucial and initially surprising result which we use going forward, is to demonstrate
that adaptive token source privacy is already implied by token source privacy.
Theorem VI.2. If a PRE scheme PRE is (ε, κ)-TSP, it is (ε, κ)-adaptive TSP.
Proof. We first demonstrate that the adaptive adversary cannot corrupt any keys that could




the set of challenge keys is created by adding {skj} whenever ChalReKeyGen(i, j) is queried.
We note that because of the trivial win condition, the only keys that the adaptive adversary
can corrupt are those which are a source in the re-encryption graph, in other words, keys
that are not reachable from any other vertex. This is true for all re-encryption graphs.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that by the end of the game, both the selective
and adaptive adversaries have ensured that every key is either a challenge key or a corrupted
key. It follows that for every re-encryption graph, the adaptive adversary does not corrupt
any keys that are not corrupted by the selective adversary.
It may be the case that the challenge graph that gives the highest advantage varies
depending on the specific set of keys, and so the adaptive adversary has an advantage in
determining this graph. The crucial difference between the selective and adaptive adversaries
is that after receiving a challenge token ∆∗i,j the adaptive adversary can decide whether ski
should become a corrupted key or a challenge key, whereas the selective adversary can only
choose for ski to be a challenge key. More specifically, assuming a challenge ∆∗i,j has been
learned, the adaptive adversary can choose whether to extend the re-encryption graph by
querying ChalReKeyGen(h, i) for some key index h (adding ski to the set of challenge keys),
or whether to corrupt ski. We note that the adaptive adversary cannot decide to corrupt
skj , as this breaks the trivial win condition. It remains to show that this ability cannot
give the adaptive adversary any advantage in determining b that the selective adversary
does not have.
We note that a challenge token in the TSP experiment only depends on the two input
keys. This differs from confidentiality notions of PRE schemes, as in these the challenge
ciphertext can be re-encrypted through a number of keys and therefore be a product of all
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prior keys. This means that for any individual challenge token, any possible advantage in
distinguishing the source key must come from values created using the same source keys,
specifically other challenge tokens from the same source key.
Suppose that ski is uncorrupted, and that the adversary has learned a set of challenge
tokens with the same source key ({∆∗i,j
$← ChalReKeyGen(i, j) : j ∈ {1, . . . , κ}}). Now
suppose this reveals some information about the source key which helps the adversary
to determine whether ski should become a corrupted key or a challenge key, and that
leads to an additional advantage in the adaptive game but not the selective game. If this
information could have been inferred from the public keys without any challenge tokens,
then the selective adversary would also be able to determine whether ski should be corrupted.
For the adaptive adversary to have a greater advantage, it would have to learn something
that depended on the set of challenge tokens. However, if ∆∗i,j reveals whether the specific
underlying secret key ski of these tokens {∆∗i,j} should be corrupted or challenged, then
this implies it is possible to infer the source key, meaning the selective adversary could use
the information to determine b from ∆∗i,j , and gain the same advantage. We conclude that
TSP implies that being able to adaptively corrupt source keys after receiving challenge
tokens gives no advantage to the adversary in the adaptive TSP experiment.
VI: 6 Adaptive CPA security
In this section, we demonstrate how a PRE scheme with TSP may also be
adaptively PRE-IND-CPA-secure. We begin by examining key corruptions in PRE-IND-
CPA security. We first discuss the relationship between fixed and selective security and
whether these can be considered equivalent, before demonstrating how to prove adaptive
PRE-IND-CPA security at a sub-exponential loss when re-encryption graphs are determined
adaptively.
VI: 6.1 Fixed and Selective PRE-IND-CPA security
Here, we argue that it is reasonable to consider fixed-key PRE-IND-CPA security (Defi-
nition VI.2) and selective PRE-IND-CPA security (Definition III.7) to be equivalent. We
demonstrate this through two different approaches. In the first approach, we demonstrate
that if a PRE scheme is PKE-IND-CPA-secure and has weak token source privacy, then
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it is both fixed-key PRE-IND-CPA-secure and selectively PRE-IND-CPA-secure. In the
second approach, we use a statistical argument to show that if the number of corrupted
keys in f-PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ) and PRE-IND-CPA
PRE
A (1
λ) is the same, then the difference
in advantage between the two experiments is negligible.
Approach 1
We begin by proving that a PRE scheme which has PKE-IND-CPA security and
weak token source privacy is both fixed-key PRE-IND-CPA-secure and selectively
PRE-IND-CPA-secure.
Theorem VI.3. Let PRE be a PRE scheme that is (ε1, κ)-PKE-IND-CPA-secure and has
(ε2, κ)-weak TSP. Then PRE is (ε1 + ε2, κ)-fixed-key PRE-IND-CPA-secure.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary B that wins f-PRE-IND-CPAPREB (1λ) with advan-
tage ε. If an adversary A in PKE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ) can simulate f-PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ),
then they can call B as a subroutine and output the same guess to gain the same advantage.
We demonstrate how A can simulate f-PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ). Let Game0 =




date tokens between uncorrupted keys, ∆i,j
($)← ReKeyGen(ski, pkj), are replaced by tokens
from independent source keys, ∆i,j
($)← ReKeyGen(ski, pkj), where (ski, pki)
$← KeyGen(1λ)
is independent of (pki, ski). A can simulate Game1 by generating its own key pairs (pki, ski)
for each uncorrupted key pair, and use these as the source keys for token generation and
re-encryption queries between uncorrupted keys.
We now show that no PPT distinguisher D can distinguish between Game0 and Game1
with advantage greater than ε2. Let B be an adversary in the wTSP experiment with
challenge bit d ∈ {0, 1}. B can perfectly simulate Gamed as follows:
• B first samples b $← {0, 1} to be the challenge bit in Gamed.
• When D calls OHonKeyGen, B returns one of the public keys it received in the wTSP
experiment that it has not returned in a call to OCorKeyGen.
• When D calls OCorKeyGen, B takes one of the public keys it received in the wTSP
experiment that it has not returned in a call to OHonKeyGen, corrupts the corresponding
secret key then returns (pk, sk) to D.
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• When D calls OReKeyGen(i, j):
– If ski is a corrupted key, then B generates ∆i,j
($)← ReKeyGen(ski, pkj) and returns
∆i,j to D.
– If ski is uncorrupted and skj is corrupted, B returns ⊥, as specified in both
Game0 and Game1.
– If both ski and skj are uncorrupted, then B calls the wTSP challenge oracle
ChalReKeyGen(i, j)
($)→ ∆∗i,j and returns ∆∗i,j to D.
• When D calls OReEnc(i, j,∆i,j , c), B first performs the checks described in
f-PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ). If (i, j,∆i,j) ∈ Thonest, then B calculates ∆i,j as described
for calls to OReKeyGen. B then computes c′
($)← ReEnc(∆i,j , c) and returns c′ to D.
• When D calls ChalEnc(i,m0,m1), B performs the appropriate checks, and if the checks
pass computes c0
$← Enc(pki,m0), c1
$← Enc(pki,m1) and returns cb to D.
We see that if d = 0, tokens have the correct source keys and thus this simulates Game0
perfectly, and if d = 1, tokens have the independent source keys and thus simulates
Game1 perfectly. As PRE is (ε2, κ)-weak TSP, we conclude that advantage that D has in
distinguishing between the two is bounded by ε2. We conclude that the advantage ε of any
PPT adversary winning f-PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ) is bounded by ε ≤ ε1 + ε2, as required.
Theorem VI.4. If a PRE scheme PRE is (ε1, κ)-PKE-IND-CPA-secure and (ε2, κ)-
weak TSP, then it is also selectively (ε1 + ε2, κ)-PRE-IND-CPA-secure.
Proof. Similarly to proof of Theorem VI.3, let Game0 = PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ), and let
Game1 be a variant of PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ) where update tokens between uncorrupted
keys ∆i,j
($)← ReKeyGen(ski, pkj) are replaced by tokens from independent source keys,
∆i,j
($)← ReKeyGen(ski, pkj), where (ski, pki)
$← KeyGen(1λ) is independent of (pki, ski). An
adversary in PKE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ) can simulate Game1 in the same way as described in
proof of Theorem VI.3.
The rest of the proof is identical to proof of Theorem VI.3, except that when D
queries OKeyGen, B returns the next public key given in the wTSP experiment, and when D
queries OCorrupt, B forwards this to the challenger in the wTSP experiment and returns the
corresponding secret key.
The results of Theorems VI.3 and VI.4 are intuitive, as if the message mb underlying
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the challenge ciphertext is revealed during re-encryption, then it follows that re-encryption
must involve the correct source key, as otherwise it would be possible to distinguish the
message without the secret key and so the underlying encryption scheme would not be
PKE-IND-CPA-secure.
Remark. As we have discussed, most security in PRE is (or can be) proven by simulating
re-encryption tokens from uncorrupted source keys, and showing that this simulation is
indistinguishable. This property is precisely what we have formalised in token source
privacy. We therefore remark that, if this is the case for all PRE schemes (and we believe
it is likely for the majority of schemes), then Theorems VI.3 and VI.4 can be applied. This
indicates the possibility that fixed-key and selective PRE-IND-CPA-security are equivalent.
Approach 2
We now demonstrate further reasoning to consider fixed and selective key corruptions
equivalent in our second approach, which uses a statistical argument.
Lemma VI.5. Consider the two security games f-PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ) and
PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ). If the number of non-trivial OCorrupt queries (queries that do not
return ⊥) made by Asel0 (the first-stage adversary in the selective PRE-IND-CPA experi-
ment), and the number of OCorKeyGen queries made by Afix0 (the first-stage adversary in the












Proof. If we fix the number of corrupted keys learned by Afix0 and Asel0 to N , then by
the end of the first stage the distribution of information received by both adversaries is
identical. In the first stage the adversary can learn the security parameter, a set of public
keys, and a subset of secret keys associated with the set of public keys. Since all of these
keys are independent in the first stage, if N is fixed, then the distribution of information
is identical. Since the oracles and restrictions on oracle queries in both experiments in
the second stage is identical (i.e. we can simulate a second-stage selective challenger with
access to a second-stage fixed challenger), then it is clear that the distributions of both
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second-stage adversaries is identical as well. This gives us our result.
In the first approach, we argued that in practice, proofs of selective PRE-IND-CPA
security rely on weak TSP, which we have demonstrated can prove both the fixed and
selective variants. Together with the statistical argument given in the second approach,
we conclude that it is reasonable to believe the fixed and selective approaches to defining
selective PRE-IND-CPA security are equivalent.
VI: 6.2 Adaptive PRE-IND-CPA security
We now move on to demonstrating how TSP can imply adaptive security for PRE-IND-CPA.
Theorem VI.5. If a PRE scheme is (ε1, κ)-PKE-IND-CPA-secure and has (ε2, κ)-
adaptive TSP, then it is also (ε1 + ε2, κ)-adaptively PRE-IND-CPA-secure by the challenge
independence assumption.
Proof. We start by noting that, by the challenge graph observation, it is sufficient to only
consider adversaries who do not query OCorrupt(j) if they have queried either OReKeyGen(i, j)
or OReEnc(i, j,∆i,j , c), as this will result in a subgraph that is not in the challenge graph.
Suppose there exists an adversary B that wins a-PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ) with advantage
ε. If an adversary A in PKE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ) can simulate f-PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ), then
they can call B as a subroutine and output the same guess to gain the same advantage.
Let Game0 = a-PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ), and let Game1 be a variant of
a-PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ) where all update tokens, ∆i,j
($)← ReKeyGen(ski, pkj), are re-
placed by tokens from independent source keys, ∆i,j
($)← ReKeyGen(ski, pkj), where
(ski, pki)
$← KeyGen(1λ) is independent of (pki, ski). Recall from Section VI: 4 that the
challenge independence assumption implies that a variant of PKE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ) where
the adversary can corrupt non-challenge keys (at any point) as long as they do not corrupt
any challenge keys is equivalent to the original experiment with no corruption oracle. We
note that an adversary A in this variant can simulate the Game1 by forwarding calls to
OKeyGen,OCorrupt and ChalEnc to the challenger in the PKE-IND-CPA variant. A also gener-
ates its own key pair (pki, ski)
$← KeyGen(1λ) for every call to OKeyGen. Then every time a
token is generated between keys ski and pkj , A instead generates ∆i,j
($)← ReKeyGen(ski, pkj).
We now show that no PPT distinguisher D can distinguish between Game0 and Game1
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with advantage greater than ε2. Let B be an adversary in the a-TSP experiment with
challenge bit d ∈ {0, 1}. B can perfectly simulate Gamed as follows:
• B first samples b $← {0, 1} to be the challenge bit in Gamed.
• When D calls OKeyGen, B returns one of the public keys it received in the a-TSP
experiment.
• When D calls OCorrupt, B takes forwards this to the a-TSP challenger.
• When D calls OReKeyGen(i, j), B calls the a-TSP challenge oracle ChalReKeyGen(i, j)
($)→
∆i,j and returns ∆i,j to D.
• When D calls OReEnc(i, j,∆i,j , c), A first performs the checks described in
f-PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ). If (i, j,∆i,j) 6∈ Thonest, then B calculates ∆i,j as described
for calls to OReKeyGen. If the checks pass then B then computes c′
($)← ReEnc(∆i,j , c)
and returns c′ to D.
• When D calls ChalEnc(i,m0,m1), B performs the appropriate checks, and if the checks
pass returns c∗ $← Enc(pki,mb).
Recall that the challenge graph observation implies that we only need to consider cases where
D does not query both OCorrupt(j) and either of OReKeyGen(i, j) or OReEnc(i, j,∆i,j , c) for
some (i, j,∆i,j , c). This means that the trivial win condition in the a-TSP experiment does
not restrict the calls that D makes to OCorrupt. We see that if d = 0, tokens have the correct
source keys and thus this simulates Game0 perfectly, and if d = 1, tokens have independent
source keys and thus simulates Game1 perfectly. As PRE has (ε2, κ)-adaptive TSP, we
conclude that the advantage that D has in distinguishing between the two is bounded by ε2.
Overall, we see that the advantage ε of any PPT adversary winning a-PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ)
is bounded by ε ≤ ε1 + ε2, as required.
Combining Theorem VI.2 and Theorem VI.5 gives the following result:
Theorem VI.6. If a PRE scheme is (ε1, κ)-PKE-IND-CPA-secure and (ε2, κ)-TSP, then
it is also (ε1 + ε2, κ)-adaptively PRE-IND-CPA-secure.
As many PRE schemes are already proven for the selective PRE-IND-CPA setting, the
following theorem may be more useful in demonstrating that these schemes are also secure
in the adaptive model.
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Theorem VI.7. If a PRE scheme PRE is (ε1, κ)-PRE-IND-CPA-secure and (ε2, κ)-TSP,
then PRE is also (ε1 + ε2, κ)-adaptively PRE-IND-CPA-secure.
Proof. Note if PRE is (ε1, κ)-PRE-IND-CPA-secure then it is also (ε1, κ)-
PKE-IND-CPA-secure, as PRE-IND-CPA security is a strictly stronger security
property than PKE-IND-CPA security. Leveraging Theorem VI.6 gives the result.
In summary, we have demonstrated that PKE-IND-CPA security and token source
privacy implies adaptive IND-CPA security. As discussed in Section VI: 5, it appears
that token source privacy is already a property of existing public-key PRE schemes where
ReKeyGen is probabilistic, and therefore these schemes are adaptively PRE-IND-CPA-secure.
In particular, in Section VI: 8 we will demonstrate that pcBV-PRE is adaptively
PRE-IND-CPA-secure.
VI: 7 Extension to HRA security and PCS
We now move on to exploring under what conditions an adaptively PRE-IND-CPA-secure
PRE scheme is also adaptively IND-HRA-secure. Whilst most of the oracle queries in
HRA games can be forwarded to the equivalent CPA game, the distinction comes in how
re-encryptions of non-challenge ciphertexts are handled. These cannot be forwarded to the
re-encryption oracle in the CPA game, as this will result in an edge being added to the
DRG in the CPA game which is not added in the HRA game, which in turn may lead to the
trivial win condition being triggered by the CPA challenger but not the HRA challenger.
To prove security against Honest Re-Encryption Attacks, one approach is to replace the
outputs of OReEnc(i, j,∆i,j , c) where c is a non-challenge ciphertext with a value that has
been computed without the source secret key ski. This means that this new ability to
re-encrypt from the challenge key to corrupted keys does not give any information about ski
(which could be a challenge key), meaning these re-encryptions give no advantage in winning
the game. Note that this can be considered an existing use of the challenge independence
assumption.
Existing work defines properties that imply such replacements will be undetected.
As discussed in Section V: 2.2, one such property is re-encryption simulatability [Coh19,
Definition 7] (see Definition V.3) which informally states that there exists an algorithm
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ReEncSim which, given (pki, pkj , skj , c,m), can simulate a re-encryption of a ciphertext
without knowing the old secret key, ski. In [Coh19, Theorem 5] Cohen2 proposes a
theorem stating that PRE schemes that are selectively PRE-IND-CPA-secure are also
adaptively PRE-IND-CPA-secure. In [Coh17,Coh19] Cohen provides a proof sketch that
indicates how re-encryptions from uncorrupted keys to corrupted keys can be simulated
using ReEncSim – because the ciphertext is honestly generated, the selective adversary can
keep a lookup table and retrieve the underlying message, m, for ciphertext, c $← OEnc(i,m),
and therefore knows the information necessary to simulate the re-encryption using ReEncSim.
As skj is corrupted, the selective adversary knows all the necessary information to compute
the simulated re-encryption c′
($)← ReEncSim(pki, pkj , skj , c,m).
Re-Encryption simulatability cannot be used in the same way to prove that adaptive
CPA security implies adaptive HRA security. This is because the adaptive adversary can
request the re-encryption of a non-challenge ciphertext before any keys are corrupted. As
re-encryption simulatability assumes skj is known to the adversary, ReEncSim cannot neces-
sarily be used to make this replacement. This problem does not exist for selective security
as in this setting re-encryption happens in the second phase, when the set of corrupted keys
is known. Furthermore, the adaptive adversary might later query OReKeyGen(i, j), meaning
that the simulated ciphertext would need to remain indistinguishable even if the adaptive
adversary later learns some ∆i,j , which is not guaranteed by re-encryption simulatability.
This observation was also made by Fuchsbauer et al., who introduced source-
hiding [FKKP19, Definition 9] (see Definition V.4) as an alternative property which indicates
that re-encryption of honest ciphertexts can be simulated in the adaptive setting. Source-
hiding was introduced for a variant of PRE where encryption takes an additional input `
to indicate the level for the ciphertext (the number of times the ciphertext appears to have
been re-encrypted). In other words, Enc(pk, `,m) produces an encryption of m under pk
that appears to have been re-encrypted ` times. Recall from Section V: 2.2 that informally,
source-hiding implies that re-encrypted ciphertexts have the same distribution as fresh
ciphertexts at the appropriate level, even when the adversary knows both key pairs and the
update token.
In [FKKP18, Section 4.2.1] Fuchsbauer et al. demonstrate how a PRE scheme that
2Cohen’s definition of selective security uses the fixed key corruption approach.
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is adaptively PRE-IND-CPA-secure and source-hiding is also adaptively IND-HRA-secure.
In their proof, the use of source-hiding incurs an exponential security loss whose factor
is based on the number of keys, the number of encryption queries and the number of
re-encryption queries, as we demonstrated in the proof of Theorem V.3. This is because of
how source-hiding is defined. Firstly, source-hiding only has two key pairs, meaning that
in order to embed a source-hiding challenge into a reduction, the simulator must guess in
advance which keys the adaptive adversary will request the re-encryption for. Secondly, as
the source-hiding challenge gives both the re-encrypted ciphertext and the input ciphertext,
the simulator must guess which ciphertext will become the input for the re-encryption, and
return this at the appropriate place.
As we aim for a smaller security loss, we opt for a different approach. Additional
reasons why source-hiding is a less ideal solution include:
1. Most existing PRE schemes do not have explicit levelling, and so it is harder to apply
source-hiding to these schemes. Hypothetically, one could define variants of existing
PRE schemes to create levelled encryption, but this requires adapting the existing
scheme and therefore makes comparisons less clear.
2. All known public-key PRE schemes that are source-hiding such as [FKKP19, Construc-
tion 2.b] use a ‘blurring ’ approach [CCL+14]. Here extra randomness is added on each
re-encryption to mask traces of the original ciphertext, and the amount of randomness
needed increases dramatically for each level. This means the constructions rely on
heavier parameter choices compared to other lattice-based PRE schemes, meaning
they are less efficient compared to other constructions. The blurring approach also
limits the number of times a ciphertext can be re-encrypted and still decrypt correctly.
As we noted in Section V: 3.4, in practice, security proofs are usually based on the keys
as opposed to the update tokens, we believe that a multi-key, multi-challenge notion would
lead to a smaller overall loss in proving adaptive HRA security.
VI: 7.1 The Challenge Graph Observation for HRA
In addition to the outlined problems with relying on source-hiding, we conjecture that source-
hiding is actually stronger than what is required to make the appropriate replacement, by
the challenge graph observation. In source-hiding, the distinguisher receives the maximum
175
VI: 7 Extension to HRA security and PCS
amount of information – the message m, old key pair (pki, ski), new key pair (pkj , skj)
original ciphertext c and update token ∆i,j . This means that both ski and skj are corrupted.
However, we see by the challenge graph observation that if both keys are corrupted, then
their respective nodes cannot be in the challenge subgraph and therefore we do not need
to consider adversaries that make this combination of queries. We can therefore define a
weaker notion which can hopefully be met by a larger number of PRE schemes, opening
the possibility of proving adaptive HRA security for more efficient constructions.
We now investigate what kinds of auxiliary information the simulated re-encryption
must remain indistinguishable for, according to the challenge graph observation. Suppose
that an adversary A first queries OEnc(i,m)
($)→ c followed by OReEnc(i, j, c) (see Figure VI.4).
To demonstrate possible relations to the challenge, now suppose that A learns a challenge
under a different key pki∗ , followed by an update token from pki∗ to some independent pkj∗
(see Figure VI.5). Note that the challenge graph currently contains vi∗ and vj∗ , as vj∗ is




Figure VI.4: OReEnc(2, 3, c) where




Figure VI.5: Figure VI.4 followed by
ChalEnc(1,m0,m1) and
OReKeyGen(1, 4).
Figure VI.6: In these re-encryption graphs, dashed, grey lines
represent re-encryptions of non-challenge ciphertexts, whilst solid
edges are added for calls to OReKeyGen and calls to OReEnc for
challenge ciphertexts.
We now observe that A has three main options for corruption regarding ski, skj and
∆i,j .
1. A later corrupts both ski and skj.
If this happens, then no challenges can be learned under either of these keys, by the
trivial win condition. Therefore, vi and vj will be unreachable from the challenge
vertex and therefore not in the challenge subgraph, as shown in Figure VI.7. We
therefore do not need to consider adversaries who query OReEnc(i, j,⊥, c) for a non-
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challenge ciphertext c, followed by OCorrupt(i), and OCorrupt(j) (in any order).
2. A later corrupts skj and learns some ∆i,j.
Because there is now a path from vi to vj , again we have that no challenge can
be learned under either of these keys, so again, vi and vj are not in the challenge
subgraph, as shown in Figure VI.8. We therefore do not need to consider adversaries
who query OReEnc(i, j,⊥, c) for a non-challenge ciphertext c, followed by OCorrupt(j),
and OReKeyGen(i, j) (in any order).
3. A later corrupts ski and learns some ∆i,j.
Similarly to the first point, we do not need to consider A also corrupting skj . This




cannot be in challenge subgraph
Figure VI.7: Figure VI.5
followed by OCorrupt(3)





cannot be in challenge subgraph
Figure VI.8: Figure VI.5
followed by OCorrupt(3)







Figure VI.9: Figure VI.5
followed by OCorrupt(2)
and OReKeyGen(2, 3) (in
any order). v3 could
still become part of the
challenge graph.
Overall, the challenge graph observation implies that to replace outputs of OReEnc(i, j, c)
for a non-challenge c, it is sufficient to consider the case where the replacement is indistin-
guishable given either skj or (ski,∆i,j).
VI: 7.2 Our approach: Re-encryption Replaceability
As we have seen, the current method for proving HRA security is to demonstrate that a
selective adversary can simulate the HRA game by replacing the re-encryptions of non-
challenge ciphertexts with an alternative calculated using information available to the
selective adversary. In particular, simulations must be possible when ski has not been
corrupted, meaning the simulated re-encryption is independent of ski. Motivated by existing
definitions and the challenge graph observation, in this section we present our new definition,
re-encryption replaceability.
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Similar to re-encryption simulatability, instead of needing a specific function, we just
need to demonstrate that there exists a function that can make the appropriate replacement.
We need the inputs to the function to be those available to the adaptive CPA adversary
ACPA when no corruptions have been made and no update tokens have been learned, but
have the replacement be indistinguishable from a genuine re-encryption even given values
the HRA adversary AHRA may learn later. Recall that when simulating the HRA game ACPA
simulates the encryption oracle OEnc(i,m) by computing c
$← Enc(pki,m) and updating
the appropriate lists. We note that, because ACPA performs this encryption locally, it
will know any random values used to create the ciphertext, and therefore can use these
when simulating re-encryptions. This becomes useful in our proofs as this information
may enable the challenger to replace re-encryptions without them needing to know the
corresponding secret key, unlike re-encryption simulatability. This idea is similar to those
of randomness-recovery and perfect re-encryption in [KLR19b]. To make discussion simpler,
we define the following.
Definition VI.9. For an algorithm F : X → Y, let F : X → Y × R be the variant of F
which also returns any values randomly sampled to produce the output. If F is deterministic,
then we say F(x)→ (y, ∅).
For example, for ElGamal encryption (Figure II.1) where Enc(pk = gx,m) returns
c = (gy, gyx ·m), Enc(pk,m) returns (c, y).
Definition VI.10. For an algorithm F : X → Y, let det-F : X×R → Y be the deterministic
variant of F where the random values are explicitly given as input. In other words, det-F is
such that for F(x) $→ (y, r), det-F(x; r) = y.
Finally, we observe that we should not need to know whether the adaptive adversary
will later learn skj or (ski,∆i,j) in advance of making the replacement, as long as the same
function can be used to replace the re-encryption in both cases.
This inspires our new definition, re-encryption replaceability. Informally, if a PRE
scheme is re-encryption replaceable, then re-encrypted ciphertexts appear to be independent
of any secret keys the ciphertext was previously encrypted under. We define two types – one
where indistinguishability still holds if the new secret key is learned, and the other where
indistinguishability still holds if the old secret key and an update token are learned. Both
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will be used in our relation between CPA and HRA security. We note that re-encryption
replaceability is optimal in the sense that inputs to ReEncRep are minimal in terms of what
may be known to a selective adversary hoping to simulate the adaptive game, but maximal as
it also considers the randomness the selective adversary uses to encrypt ciphertexts, thereby
modelling all the information known to the selective adversary. We present two variants, a
statistical definition in Definition VI.11 and a game-based definition in Definition VI.14.
We acknowledge that statistical security notions are generally considered to be weaker
than computational (game-based) ones. However, in practice, proofs are often statistical.
In particular, if either ReKeyGen or ReEnc are probabilistic, then there is more than one
possible re-encrypted ciphertext c′
($)← ReEnc(ReKeyGen(ski, pkj), c) for each input ciphertext,
c. Therefore, proofs do not demonstrate that the output is a specific value, but rather that
it appears to come from the correct distribution. This appears to be why source-hiding
is defined as a statistical notion in [FKKP19]. In other words, we find that in practice, a
statistical notion is not necessarily more difficult to prove than a computational notion,
and this is why we define the statistical notion of re-encryption replaceability as well as the
computational variant.
Definition VI.11. Consider a PRE scheme, PRE. Let (pk1, sk1), . . . , (pkκ, skκ)
$←
KeyGen(1λ). We say that PRE is type-N statistically κ-re-encryption replaceable for
N ∈ {1, 2} if there exists an algorithm ReEncRep such that with overwhelming probability
over auxN , for all m ∈ M, all (pki, ski), (pkj , skj) ∈ {(pkι, skι)}κι=1 and all ciphertexts c
where (c, rc)
$← Enc(pki,m):
(ReEncRep(pki, pkj ,m, c, rc), auxN ) ≈s (ReEnc(∆i,j , c), auxN )





aux1 = (pki, pkj , c,m, skj)
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If PRE is type-N statistically κ-re-encryption replaceable for all N ∈ {1, 2}, and the same
function ReEncRep is used for both types, then we say it is statistically κ-re-encryption
replaceable. If κ is polynomial as determined by the security parameter, then we say PRE
is statistically re-encryption replaceable.
In the special case that
ReEncRep(pki, pkj ,m, c, rc) = ReEnc(∆i,j , c),
we say that PRE is perfectly re-encryption replaceable.
We note that if ReKeyGen is deterministic then ∆i,j = ∆′i,j , in which case the adversary
learns the token used to perform the re-encryption.
VI: 7.2.1 Observations on statistical re-encryption replaceability
We begin with some simple observations on statistical re-encryption replaceability, including
how it relates to re-encryption simulatability and source-hiding.
Remark. For a PRE scheme to be type-1 statistically re-encryption replaceable, ReEncRep
needs to output ciphertexts that successfully decrypt to m using skj . This means that
type-1 re-encryption replaceability cannot easily be proven using reductions such as DDH
or RLWE, as the output of ReEncRep cannot be replaced with a uniform random value.
Lemma VI.6. If a PRE scheme PRE is source-hiding, then it is statistically (ε, 2)-re-
encryption replaceable where ε is negligible.
Proof. Source-hiding implies that replacing re-encrypted ciphertexts with fresh encryptions
at the appropriate level is indistinguishable even given (ski, skj ,∆i,j), defined over two key
pairs. Clearly, indistinguishability holds given only a subset of these values, as is the case
for type-1 and type-2 statistical (ε, 2)-re-encryption replaceability where ε is negligible.
Lemma VI.7. Type-1 re-encryption replaceability does not imply re-encryption simulata-
bility, and re-encryption simulatability does not imply type-1 re-encryption replaceability.
Proof. This is because the inputs to ReEncRep and ReEncSim are different. ReEncRep
assumes that rc is known whereas ReEncSim does not, and similarly ReEncSim assumes that
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skj is known whereas ReEncRep does not. If the only provable function for re-encryption
simulatability depends on skj being known, then this function cannot be used to demonstrate
re-encryption replaceability, and similarly for rc and re-encryption replaceability.
Despite Lemma VI.7, we note that, like re-encryption simulatability, re-encryption
replaceability can also be used to demonstrate that a PRE-IND-CPA-secure scheme with
this property is also IND-HRA-secure. We do not prove this explicitly here as it will follow
trivially from Theorem VI.13.
We now make some observations on what kind of schemes are trivially re-encryption
replaceable, focusing on transparency. Transparency is a well-known concept but not
formally defined in the literature. Recall from Definition III.6 that, informally, a PRE
scheme has transparency if fresh ciphertexts have the same form as re-encrypted ciphertexts,
and can be decrypted in the same way, and is called such because the existence of the proxy
is essentially hidden. Definition VI.12 is our formalisation of how transparency is currently
considered.
Definition VI.12. Let PRE be a PRE scheme with correctness bound L. Let c(0) $←
PRE .Enc(pk,m), and let c(`) be a ciphertext under pk with underlying message m that
has been re-encrypted ` times. Then PRE has (weak) transparency if for all messages
m, all key pairs (pk, sk) $← PRE .KeyGen(1λ), all fresh ciphertexts c(0) $← PRE .Enc(pk,m)
and all re-encrypted ciphertexts c(`) under pk with underlying message m that have been
re-encrypted ` times:
(c(0),m, pk) ≈s (c(1),m, pk) ≈s · · · ≈s (c(L),m, pk),
and for all i ∈ {0, . . . , L}
m = PRE .Dec(sk, c(i)).
Definition VI.12 meets the intuition of transparency in the sense that decryption is the
same for ciphertexts of all levels and that all ciphertexts c where Dec(sk, c)→ m look the
same to an adversary who does not know sk. This is in contrast to PRE schemes where
re-encryption adds some additional components to the ciphertext, which then need to be
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processed upon decryption, or when decryption is defined differently for ciphertexts at
different levels.
We note that an implication of weak transparency is that for all c such that Dec(ski, c)→
m, there exists an x such that c = det-Enc(pki,m;x). We note that x is a function
of the inputs used to create the ciphertext i.e. if c′ is a re-encrypted ciphertext c′ ←
det-ReEnc(∆i,j , c; rre) where c← det-Enc(pki,m; rc), and ∆i,j ← det-ReKeyGen(ski, pkj ; rt),
then x is derived from (m, pki, rc, ski, pkj , rt, rre), or some subset of these values.
However, weak transparency does not imply that a party who knows the secret key
cannot infer how many times the ciphertext has been re-encrypted. This is the case in
lattice-based PRE schemes, where re-encryption adds further error to the ciphertext, and a
party with the secret key can learn the size of the error and may therefore infer how many
times the ciphertext was re-encrypted. Recall that in Section V: 5.2, we gave this as the
reason why pcBV-PRE is not source-hiding.
We therefore also define strong transparency, where fresh ciphertexts (at level ` = 0)
under pkj are identically distributed to re-encrypted ciphertexts under pkj , even given skj
and ∆i,j .
Definition VI.13. Let PRE be a PRE scheme with correctness bound L. Let c(0) $←
PRE .Enc(pk,m), and let c(`) be a ciphertext under pk with underlying message m that
has been re-encrypted ` times. Then PRE has strong transparency if for all messages
m, all key pairs (pk, sk) $← PRE .KeyGen(1λ), all fresh ciphertexts c(0) $← PRE .Enc(pk,m)
and all re-encrypted ciphertexts c(`) under pk with underlying message m that have been
re-encrypted ` times:
(c(0),m, pk, sk) ≈s (c(1),m, pk, sk) ≈s · · · ≈s (c(L),m, pk, sk),
and for all i ∈ {0, . . . , L}
m = PRE .Dec(sk, c(i)).
We now make a similar observation as we did for for weak transparency. Let Rc be
the distribution from which Enc samples randomness, Rt be the distribution from which
ReKeyGen samples randomness, and Rre be the distribution from which ReEnc samples
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randomness. Then if the PRE scheme has strong transparency, this implies that for all
(c, rc)
$← Enc(pki,m), (∆i,j , rt)
($)← ReKeyGen(pki, skj), and (c′, rre)
($)← ReEnc(∆i,j , c), there
exists a deterministic function f : Rc ×Rt ×Rre → Rc such that
c′ = det-Enc(pkj ,m; f(rc, rt, rre)).
We can assume that Rc, Rt and Rre are publicly known, as they are included in the
descriptions of the algorithms. We can further assume that f is publicly known, as it can
be determined from re-encrypting using known key pairs.
For example, the original PRE scheme, BBS [BBS98] (Figure III.8), has strong trans-
parency. Fresh ciphertexts have the form (m · grc , garc) for (pki, ski) = (ga, a) where rc
is the randomness sampled by Enc. The update tokens have the form ∆ = b/a, and
re-encrypted ciphertexts are computed as c′ = (c0, c∆1 ) = (m · grc , gbrc). We see that
c′ = det-Enc(pkj ,m; rc), meaning that f(rc, rt, rre) = f(rc, ∅, ∅) = rc.
Similarly, the updatable encryption scheme, RISE [LT18] (see Appendix C: 1),
also has strong transparency. Fresh ciphertexts have the form (gxrc , grc · m) for
(pki, ski) = (g
x, x) where rc is the randomness sampled by Enc. The update to-
kens have the form ∆ = (x′/x, gx′), and re-encrypted ciphertexts are computed as
c′ = (c∆00 ·∆
rre
1 , c1 ·grre) = (gx
′(rc+rre), grc+rre ·m). We see that c′ = det-Enc(gx′ ,m; rc+rre),
meaning that f(rc, rt, rre) = f(rc, ∅, rre) := rc + rre. Since addition is carried out modulo q,
f(rc, rt, rre) from the same distribution as rc.
Clearly, strong transparency implies weak transparency. The main difference between
weak and strong transparency is that for schemes with weak transparency, re-encrypted
ciphertexts could still contain the secret key, whereas for schemes with strong transparency,
re-encrypted ciphertexts are independent of any previous secret keys. Another difference is
that with strong transparency, the randomness f(rc, rt, rre) in a re-encrypted ciphertext
comes from the same distribution Rc as a fresh ciphertext (at level ` = 0). This is not the
case for PRE schemes that have weak transparency but not strong transparency, particularly
lattice-based constructions such as BV-PRE [PRSV17] and pcBV-PRE (Figure V.8) due to
error growth.
Remark. At present it seems that error growth and therefore weak transparency is an
inevitability of lattice-based PRE schemes. The problem of reducing error growth also exists
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for Fully-Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). As recent public-key unidirectional, multi-hop
PRE schemes are based on lattices, we make the distinction between strong and weak
transparency so as to clarify which is needed when proving certain properties. This contrasts
some existing work such as [ABH09], which appears to assume strong transparency.
Lemma VI.8. Let PRE be a PRE scheme with strong transparency where both ReKeyGen
and ReEnc are deterministic. Then PRE is perfectly re-encryption replaceable.
Proof. Let ReEncRep be as defined as:






c′∗ ← det-Enc(pkj ,m; f(rc, r′t, r′re))
return c′∗
Because ReKeyGen and ReEnc are deterministic, we have that rt = rre = r′t = r′re = ∅.
Therefore,





= det-Enc(pkj ,m; f(rc, rt, rre))
= det-Enc(pkj ,m; f(rc, ∅, ∅))
= ReEnc(∆i,j , c),
as required.
The following theorem is a generalisation of the proof technique used in proof of
Theorem V.6.
Theorem VI.8. PRE schemes with strong transparency where the underlying encryption
scheme is PKE-IND-CPA secure are statistically re-encryption replaceable.
Proof. Let rt denote the random values sampled from distribution Rt by ReKeyGen and let
rre denote the random values sampled from distribution Rre by ReEnc. Recall that strong
transparency implies that there exists a publicly known function f such that re-encrypted
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ciphertexts can be computed using det-Enc and f and computing
c′ = det-Enc(pkj ,m; f(rc, rt, rre)).
Then ReEncRep can be defined as in the proof of Lemma VI.8.
We now prove statistical re-encryption replaceability for ReEncRep. For type-1 statistical
indistinguishability, we need to show that for all m ∈M, and all (c, rc)
$← Enc(pki,m):




re)), pki, pkj , c,m, skj)
≈s (det-Enc(pkj ,m; f(rc, rt, rre)), pki, pkj , c,m, skj)
Firstly, we note that both rt and rre are generated afresh when ReKeyGen and ReEnc
are called and therefore only used in the specific creation of a genuine re-encryption. We
further note that we can consider ReEnc(i, j, c) as a black box that generates ∆i,j and
re-encrypts c, returning c′ without revealing any interim values. In other words, neither
∆i,j , rt nor rre are directly given to the distinguisher. The same applies for ReEncRep,
meaning that r′t and r′re are also unknown.
Because the underlying encryption scheme is PKE-IND-CPA secure, encryption does
not reveal rc – otherwise, an adversary could use rc to compute c = det-Enc(pk,m0; rc)
and compare this with the challenge ciphertext to break PKE-IND-CPA security. We
therefore conclude that no distinguisher can learn rc from c. However, as skj is known,
there exists some function g for which the distinguisher learns g(f(rc, rt, rre)) from c′ ←
det-Enc(pkj ,m; f(rc, rt, rre))
(
or g(f(rc, r′t, r′re)) from c′ ← det-Enc(pkj ,m; f(rc, r′t, r′re))
)
.
In other words, the secret key could allow the adversary to learn something about the
randomness used for encryption. For example, in both BBS and RISE, the adversary learns
grc for c = det-Enc(pk,m, rc) but not rc itself.
Clearly, as rt and r′t are from the same distribution, rre and r′re are also from the
same distribution, and as rt, r′t, rre, r′re are unknown then f(rc, rt, rre) and f(rc, r′t, r′re), and
therefore g(f(rc, rt, rre)) and g(f(rc, r′t, r′re)), are indistinguishable. We therefore conclude
that replaced re-encryptions will be indistinguishable from genuine ones, even given the
current secret key.
185
VI: 7 Extension to HRA security and PCS
Similarly, to show type-2 statistical re-encryption replaceability we need to show that




re)), pki, pkj , c,m, ski,∆
′
i,j)
≈s (det-Enc(pkj ,m; f(rc, rt, rre)), pki, pkj , c,m, ski,∆′i,j)
We note that because skj , is unknown, then f(rc, rt, rre)
(




VI: 7.2.2 Computational Re-Encryption Replaceability
We now define a computational notion of re-encryption replaceability, as this can be
used more intuitively for our main results. The intuition is the same, but we shift to
a game-based, multi-key, multi-challenge model. In ReplacePREA (1λ) (Figure VI.10), the
adversary must determine whether it is receiving genuine re-encryptions, or outputs of
ReEncRep. For each challenge query replacing a re-encryption from pki to pkj , we allow
the adversary to either learn some ski and/or ∆i,j , or only learn skj . This is enforced by
recording the queries to ChalReEncRep, OReKeyGen and OCorrupt inRChallenge, Tlearned andKcorrupt
respectively, and using abort conditions in these oracles. We also impose the condition in
ChalReEncRep(i, j, c) that the adversary cannot have learned some ∆i,j ((i, j) 6∈ Tlearned), as
in this case a CPA adversary ACPA simulating the in the HRA experiment can compute
a genuine re-encryption and does not need to make any replacements. The challenger
also maintains a lookup table of underlying messages in Message[], and a lookup table
of the random inputs used to create a re-encrypted ciphertext in RandomInputs[], which
it uses to retrieve the appropriate inputs for ReEncRep when b = 1. In ReplacePREA (1λ),
the boxed constraint in ChalReEncRep enforces the challenge graph observation depicted in
Figure VI.7, the boxed constraint in OReKeyGen enforce the challenge graph observation
depicted in Figure VI.8, and the boxed constraint in OCorrupt enforces the challenge graph
observation depicted in Figure VI.9.










where ReplacePREA (1λ) is given in Figure VI.10, and κ is the maximum number of keys
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Message[i, c] := m













if ((i, c) /∈ Chonest) ∨ ((i, j) ∈ Tlearned) :
return ⊥





($)← ReEnc(∆i,j , c)
r0 := (rt, rre)
m← Message[i, c]
rc ← RandomInputs[i, c]
(c∗1, r1)
($)← ReEncRep(pki, pkj ,m, c, rc)
Message[j, c∗b ] := m




Figure VI.10: The Re-Encryption Replaceability game. The
boxed conditions enforce the challenge graph observation, which
in this case means that for each challenge c∗b
$← ChalReEncRep(i, j, c)
for some c, we only need to consider adversaries that know either
skj or at most (ski,∆i,j).
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generated in ReplacePREA (1λ). If ε is negligible and κ is polynomial as characterised by λ,
then we say PRE is re-encryption replaceable.
VI: 7.2.3 Observations on Re-Encryption Replaceability
Here we prove a number of theorems that demonstrate properties that imply re-encryption
replaceability.
Theorem VI.9. If a PRE scheme PRE is perfectly re-encryption replaceable, then it is
re-encryption replaceable (for all κ).
The proof of this is trivial, as perfect re-encryption replaceability implies there exists
ReEncRep such that ReEncRep(pki, pkj ,m, c, rc) = ReEnc(∆i,j , c).
We now demonstrate that in a number of cases, it is sufficient to prove that the PRE
scheme is secure as defined by the following variant of re-encryption replaceability.
Definition VI.15. Consider a variant of ReplacePREA (1λ) where ChalReEncRep only takes
fresh ciphertexts (at level 0) as input. For a given PRE scheme PRE, if there is no PPT
adversary that wins this variant with advantage greater than ε when a maximum of κ key
pairs are generated, then we say that PRE is level-0 (ε, κ)-re-encryption replaceable.
Theorem VI.10. If a PRE scheme, PRE, is statistically κ-re-encryption replaceable
(Definition VI.11), then PRE is also level-0 κ-re-encryption replaceable.
Proof. Firstly, we note that because statistical re-encryption replaceability is defined over
all κ keys, there is no advantage in choosing which keys a challenge is called on. Secondly,
because statistical re-encryption replaceability is defined for all fresh ciphertexts, we should
be able to replace all challenges in ReplacePREA (1λ).
We now look at game-based re-encryption replaceability. For all (i, j) ∈ RChallenge, by
the challenge graph observation, at the end of the game, either
• skj ∈ Kcorrupt, and ski 6∈ Kcorrupt and (i, j) 6∈ Tlearned; or
• ski ∈ Kcorrupt and/or (i, j) ∈ Tlearned, and skj 6∈ Kcorrupt; or
• ski, skj 6∈ Kcorrupt, and (i, j) 6∈ Tlearned.
This means that in the first case, the adversary’s information is limited to aux1. Since
statistical indistinguishability is stronger than computational indistinguishability, statistical
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type-1 re-encryption replaceability implies no adversary can distinguish a challenge where
skj is later corrupted. Similarly, in the second case the adversary’s information is limited to
at most aux2, meaning that by statistical type-2 re-encryption replaceability no adversary
can distinguish a challenge when it later learns (ski,∆i,j). We note that technically the
adversary could either corrupt only ski or ∆i,j , but this trivially follows from statistical
type-2 re-encryption replaceability as the adversary has less information with which to
distinguish the challenge.
The remaining difference of note is that in Definition VI.14, the adversary can adap-
tively decide which set of auxiliary information it receives after receiving the challenge.
However, as statistical re-encryption replaceability implies that challenges are statistically
indistinguishable in either case, there is no advantage in the adversary being able to decide
which auxiliary information it receives.
We now demonstrate how PRE schemes with weak transparency that are level-0
re-encryption replaceable are re-encryption replaceable (for all levels).
Theorem VI.11. Let PRE be a PRE scheme with weak transparency. Then if PRE is
level-0 (ε, κ)-re-encryption replaceable, it is also (ε, κ)-re-encryption replaceable.
Proof. Let ` be the maximum level for a ciphertext c for which OReEncRep accepts c as input.
We proceed by induction on `. We show via an iterative argument that if there exists a
function ReEncRep that can indistinguishably replace re-encryptions of fresh ciphertexts,
then it can also be used to replace re-encryptions of re-encrypted ciphertexts.
` = 0: This is the case where all ciphertext inputs to ChalReEncRep are outputs of
OEnc and therefore at level 0. This clearly follows from PRE being level-0 re-encryption
replaceable.
For (c, rc)
$← Enc(pki,m), (∆i,j , rt)
($)← ReKeyGen(ski, pkj), let (c′0, rre)
($)← ReEnc(∆i,j , c)
and c′1
($)← ReEncRep(pki, pkj ,m, c, rc). Because c′0 and c′1 are computationally indistinguish-
able even when skj is known, we have that Dec(skj , c′0) = Dec(skj , c′1) = m. Because PRE
has weak transparency, it follows that for b ∈ {0, 1}, there exists xb such that
c′b = det-Enc(pkj ,m;xb),
where x0 is derived from (some subset of) (pki,m, rc, ski, pkj , rt, rre) and x1 is derived from
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(some subset of) (pki,m, rc, pkj).
Let g be the function such that an adversary decrypting c where c $← det-Enc(pk,m;x)
learns g(x). In other words, g describes what a party with the decryption key can learn of the
randomness used in the encryption. We have that g(x0) and g(x1) must be computationally
indistinguishable.
Therefore, the existence of ReEncRep implies that there exists a function f such that
f(pki, pkj ,m, c, rc)
($)→ x1 where g(x1) is computationally indistinguishable from g(x0). We
conclude that an acceptable choice for ReEncRep is
ReEncRep(pki, pkj ,m, c, rc)
($)→ ∆i,j
x1
($)← f(pki, pkj ,m, c, rc)
c′1 ← det-Enc(pkj ,m;x1)
return c′1
We will use this going forward.
` = n: We assume this is true.
` = n+ 1: Because the theorem holds for ` ≤ n, we have that for all input ciphertexts c
that have been re-encrypted at most n times, there exists rc such that c = det-Enc(pki,m; rc).
We further note that as c has been created by oracles, we can use r ← RandomInputs[i, c]
to derive rc.
Recall that weak transparency implies that for (c′0, rre)
($)← ReEnc(∆i,j , c) where
(∆i,j , rt)
($)← ReKeyGen(ski, pkj), there exists an x0 such that c′0 = det-Enc(pkj ,m;x0),
and that x0 is derived from (some subset of) (pki,m, r, ski, pkj , rt, rre). As for the case
where ` = 0, the same function f can be used to derive f(pki, pkj ,m, c, rc)
($)→ x1 such that
g(x1) and g(x0) are computationally indistinguishable. We conclude that ReEncRep yields
the result.
Combining Theorems VI.10 and VI.11 we get the following:
Theorem VI.12. If PRE is a PRE scheme with weak transparency and PRE is statistically
κ-re-encryption replaceable, then PRE is also κ-re-encryption replaceable.
In summary, to prove that a PRE scheme PRE has re-encryption replaceability, it
suffices to demonstrate that one of the following is true:
• PRE has perfect re-encryption replaceability (Theorem VI.9).
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• PRE has both weak transparency and statistical re-encryption replaceability (Theo-
rem VI.12).
Furthermore, as the existing schemes that are source-hiding (see Section V: 5.2) also have
weak transparency, Lemma VI.6 gives us reason to believe that these schemes are also
re-encryption replaceable.
VI: 7.3 Proving adaptive HRA using Re-Encryption Replaceability
We now demonstrate our main result – that if a PRE scheme, PRE , is
adaptively PRE-IND-CPA-secure and re-encryption replaceable, then it is also
adaptively IND-HRA-secure.
Theorem VI.13. If PRE is (ε1, κ)-adaptively PRE-IND-CPA-secure and (ε2, κ)-re-
encryption replaceable, then it is (ε1 + ε2, κ)-adaptively IND-HRA-secure.
The following proof follows the same idea as Cohen’s proof outline, except that instead
of using ReEncSim to replace re-encryptions of non-challenge ciphertexts, we use ReEncRep.
Proof. This proof follows the same structure as the proofs of Theorems VI.3 to VI.5.
Suppose there exists an adversary AHRA that wins a-IND-HRAPREκ (1λ) with advantage ε.
If an adversary A in a-PRE-IND-CPAPREA (1λ) can simulate a-IND-HRAPREκ (1λ), then they
can call AHRA as a subroutine and output the same guess to gain the same advantage.




where re-encryptions of non-challenge ciphertexts when no update token has been learned
and the source key is not corrupted are replaced by outputs of ReEncRep. We note that A
can simulate Game1 by forwarding calls to OKeyGen, OCorrupt or OReKeyGen(i, j) to the CPA
challenger, and can simulate calls to OEnc by encrypting locally and updating Chonest. Recall
that A cannot forward calls to OReEnc(i, j,∆i,j , c) when c is a non-challenge ciphertext.
Instead, for each honestly-generated ciphertext and key tuple (i, c), A maintains a list
of the random inputs used in the creation of c and the underlying message, as described
in ReplacePREA (1λ), and uses these as inputs to ReEncRep to simulate re-encryptions of
non-challenge ciphertexts.
We now show that no PPT distinguisher D can distinguish between Game0 and Game1
with advantage greater than ε2. Let B be an adversary in ReplacePREA (1λ) with challenge
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bit d ∈ {0, 1}. B can perfectly simulate Gamed as follows:
• B first samples b $← {0, 1} to be the challenge bit in Gamed.
• When D calls OKeyGen, OCorrupt, OEnc or OReKeyGen(i, j), B forwards these to the
challenger in ReplacePREA (1λ).
• When D calls OReEnc(i, j,∆i,j , c), B first performs the checks described in
IND-HRAPREA (1λ) and if they pass, proceeds as follows:
– If (i, c) ∈ Cchal and (i, j,∆i,j) ∈ Thonest, then B returns c′
($)← ReEnc(∆i,j , c) after
updating the appropriate lists.
– If (i, c) ∈ Cchal and (i, j,∆i,j) 6∈ Thonest, then B obtains ∆i,j
($)← OReKeyGen(i, j)
then returns c′
($)← ReEnc(∆i,j , c) after updating the appropriate lists.
– If (i, c) /∈ Cchal and ski ∈ Kcorrupt, B computes ∆i,j
($)← ReKeyGen(ski, pkj) and
returns c′
($)← ReEnc(∆i,j , c) after updating the appropriate lists.
– If (i, c) /∈ Cchal and ski 6∈ Kcorrupt then B calls the challenge oracle in
ChalReEncRep(i, j, c)
($)→ c∗d, updates the appropriate lists and returns c′.
• When D calls ChalEnc(m0,m1), B performs the appropriate checks, and if the checks
pass computes c0
$← Enc(pki,m0) and c1
$← Enc(pki,m1) and returns cb, updating
the lists as appropriate.
We note that the challenge graph observation implies that for each pair of keys pki, pkj ,
we only need to consider the case when D does not query both OCorrupt(j) and either
OReKeyGen(i, j) or OReEnc(i, j,∆i,j , c) for some (i, j,∆i,j , c), meaning that the conditions in
ReplacePREA (1
λ) do not restrict the calls that D makes to OCorrupt. We see that if d = 0,
non-challenge ciphertexts are genuine re-encryptions and thus this simulates Game0 perfectly,
and if d = 1, non-challenge re-encryptions are replaced and thus simulates Game1 perfectly.
As PRE is (ε2, κ)-re-encryption replaceable, the advantage that D has in distinguishing
between the two is bounded by ε2. We conclude that the advantage ε of any PPT adversary
winning a-IND-HRAPREκ (1λ) is bounded by ε ≤ ε1 + ε2, as required.
VI: 7.4 Proving adaptive PCS using Re-Encryption Replaceability
We can prove that a PRE scheme has adaptive Post-Compromise Security (adaptive PCS)
using the same techniques as in Sections VI: 6 and VI: 7. We do not define adaptive PCS
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explicitly here as it is reasonably intuitive, but provide a full description in Appendix E.









where CPA-PostCompPREA (1λ) = 1 is the variant of the selective PCS game that forbids any
re-encryptions from uncorrupted to corrupted keys, which generates a maximum of κ keys.
Then if PRE is also (ε2, κ)-TSP and (ε3, κ)-re-encryption simulatability, then PRE has
(ε1 + ε2 + ε3, κ)-adaptive PCS.
Proof. Similarly to proof of Theorem VI.13, we Theorem VI.14 by using a CPA-variant of
PCS.
Lemma VI.9. Let PRE be a PRE scheme where for all PPT adversaries A,
Pr
[
CPA-PostCompPREA (1λ) = 1
]
≤ 12 + ε1, where CPA-PostComp
PRE
A (1
λ) = 1 is the variant
of the selective PCS game that forbids any re-encryptions from uncorrupted to corrupted








+ (ε1 + ε2),




also generates a maximum of κ keys.
Proof of Lemma VI.9 is analogous to proof of Theorem VI.7, leveraging the fact that
adaptive TSP is implied by TSP (Theorem VI.2).
We can expand into the full adaptive PCS game using re-encryption replaceability.
Lemma VI.10. Let PRE be a PRE scheme where for all PPT adversaries A
Pr
[
a-CPA-PostCompPREA (1λ) = 1
]
≤ 12 + ε1, where at most κ key pairs are generated








+ ε1 + ε2,
if at most κ key pairs are generated in a-PostCompPREA (1λ). In other words, PRE has
(ε1 + ε2, κ)-adaptive PCS.
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Proof of Lemma VI.10 is analogous to proof of Theorem VI.13.
VI: 8 Adaptive security of pcBV-PRE
We now use the results demonstrated in this chapter to prove that pcBV-PRE is both
adaptively IND-HRA-secure and adaptively Post-Compromise secure.
VI: 8.1 Adaptive PRE-IND-CPA security














where κ is the number of key pairs, QRK is the number of calls to OReKeyGen and QRE⊥ is
the number of calls to OReEnc where ∆i,j = ⊥.
Because A is PPT, κ,QRK and QRE⊥ must also be polynomial, meaning the overall advantage
of winning a-PRE-IND-CPApcBV-PREA (1
λ) is negligible, by the RLWE assumption. Therefore,
pcBV-PRE is adaptively PRE-IND-CPA-secure.
Proof. This follows from Theorem VI.6, as we can demonstrate adaptive PRE-IND-CPA
security via PKE-IND-CPA-security and TSP.
Lemma VI.11. pcBV-PRE is ((κ+ 2) · εRLWE, κ)-PKE-IND-CPA-secure, where εRLWE is
the maximal advantage of any distinguisher in RLWEφ,q,χe.






return c = (c0, c1)
Therefore, we can use ReSample-RLWEA(1λ), calling ChalRRLWE once when simulating
ChalCPAEnc to demonstrate that the challenge ciphertext is indistinguishable from random,
meaning that mb is hidden. Using Lemma V.14 gives the result.
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Lemma VI.12. pcBV-PRE has ((κ+ 2QRK(blog2(q)/rc+ 1)) · εRLWE, κ)-TSP, where QRK
is the number of queries to ChalTSPReKeyGen.
Proof. Again, this can be shown using ReSample-RLWEA(1λ), by calling ChalRRLWE in place
of ReSample for each simulation of ChalTSPReKeyGen(i, j) (where skj is uncorrupted). This means
we call ChalRRLWE at most (QRK +QRE⊥)(blog2(q)/rc+ 1) times.
Recall from Theorem VI.6 that we can now simulate a-PRE-IND-CPAA(1λ) by simu-
lating update tokens to uncorrupted keys both for OReKeyGen and for OCPAReEnc. This uses
at most QRK + QRE⊥ simulated update tokens in total. Therefore, by Theorem VI.6,
conclude that pcBV-PRE is (2(κ+ (QRK +QRE⊥)(blog2(q)/rc+ 1) + 1) · εRLWE, κ)-
adaptively PRE-IND-CPA-secure, as required.
VI: 8.2 Adaptive IND-HRA security
We begin by demonstrating that pcBV-PRE is re-encryption replaceable. We derive the
following result from proof of Theorem V.6.













where κ is the number of keys, and QH is the number of ciphertexts created during
ReplacepcBV-PREA (1
λ).
Because A is PPT, κ and QH must also be polynomial, meaning the overall advantage of
winning ReplacepcBV-PREA (1
λ) is negligible, by the RLWE assumption. Therefore, pcBV-PRE
has re-encryption replaceability.
Proof sketch. We use the function used to replace honest re-encryptions in the proof of
Theorem V.6. Specifically:
195
VI: 8 Adaptive security of pcBV-PRE
pcBV-PRE.ReEncRep(pki, pkj ,m, c, (ṽ, ẽ0, ẽ1))





pk′i = (ai, ai · si′ + pei′)




$← pcBV-PRE.ReEnc(∆i′,j , c̄)
return c′∗
For a challenge c′b
($)→ ChalReEncRep(i, j, c), the adversary can either later corrupt skj , or it
can learn ski and/or some ∆i,j . In the former case, indistinguishability is demonstrated as
described in proof of Theorem V.6, which relies on applying on the indistinguishability of
the resampled pki used in the creation of the input ciphertext, c. As c could either be a
fresh encryption or a re-encryption (or replacement), this would call the ChalRRLWE at most
QH times. In the latter case, as the target public key pkj will not be corrupted, we can use
the indistinguishability of the resample used in pcBV-PRE.ReEnc (or pcBV-PRE.ReEncRep).
Since this is an honest re-encryption in the game, it is already counted in QH , so this incurs
no further security loss. Using Lemma V.14 gives the result.
















where κ is the number of keys, QRK is the number of calls A makes to OReKeyGen, QchalRE⊥
is the number of calls to OReEnc for a challenge ciphertext when ∆i,j = ⊥, and QH is the
number of non-challenge ciphertexts created during IND-HRApcBV-PREA (1
λ).
Because A is PPT, we note that κ,QRK, QchalRE⊥ and QH are also all polynomial, meaning
that the overall advantage is negligible, by the RLWE assumption. Therefore, pcBV-PRE is
adaptively IND-HRA-secure.
Proof. This follows from Theorems VI.13, VI.15 and VI.16. We note we only need to use
ReEncRep to replace the re-encryptions of non-challenge ciphertexts when c is an honest,
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non-challenge ciphertext and ski is unknown. We therefore only need to use Chal
Replace
ReEnc less
than QH times. Using Theorem VI.16 gives the result.
VI: 8.3 Adaptive PCS
















where κ is the number of calls A makes to OReKeyGen, QchalRE⊥ is the number of calls to
OReEnc for a challenge ciphertext when ∆i,j = ⊥, and QH is the number of non-challenge
ciphertexts created during IND-HRApcBV-PREA (1
λ).
Because A is PPT, we note that κ,QRK and QH are also all polynomial, meaning that
the overall advantage is negligible, by the RLWE assumption. Therefore, pcBV-PRE is
adaptive PCS.
Theorem VI.18 can be proven analogously to Theorem VI.17. More specifically, we can
use Theorem VI.14 together with Theorems V.5 and VI.16 and lemma VI.11 to demonstrate
that pcBV-PRE is adaptive PCS.
VI: 9 Summary
In this chapter, we related the fixed, selective, and adaptive models of key corruption in
PRE. We discussed a discrepancy in the literature in terms of how selective security is
defined, and presented arguments as to why the two variants can be considered equivalent.
We then showed how adaptive security can be proven for PRE schemes by generalising
many of the techniques used in Chapter V, identifying security properties which imply
that a PRE scheme with these properties that is secure in the selective model is also
secure in the adaptive model. In doing so, we demonstrated that pcBV-PRE is both
adaptively IND-HRA-secure and has adaptive PCS. Our results achieve a significantly
smaller security loss than existing work, and apply to all re-encryption graphs, and to the
traditional security model where the adversary adaptively determines the re-encryption
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graph through its queries to OReKeyGen and OReEnc. We also introduced re-encryption
replaceability an alternative to source-hiding, which can prove HRA security from CPA
security. This is preferable to source-hiding at is does not depend on inefficient methods




We summarise our contributions and present ideas for future work.
In this thesis, we have examined applications of PRE and presented security definitions
that reflect those applications. In doing so, we have explored recent trends in re-encryption
primitives and explored the new possibilities presented by lattice-based constructions.
In Chapter IV we scrutinised the client’s ability to control re-encryptions. We extended
ciphertext dependence to token robustness, which implies that a ciphertext cannot be
re-encrypted to new keys without knowledge of the appropriate secret key. We defined
unidirectionality in this context and discussed reversal attacks, where an adversary can
retain some information about a previous ciphertext, and use this to try to reverse the
re-encryption of a ciphertext. We also introduced Ciphertext Origin Authentication – a
mechanism where it is possible to identify the party responsible for the ciphertext being
under its current key. Interesting future work in this area would be to create a PRE
scheme based on lattices that has COA, and to investigate the possible advantages that
such schemes offer over the ElGamal-based scheme presented in Chapter IV.
In Chapter V we motivated the need to define Post-Compromise Security to identify
whether a PRE scheme is suitable for enforcing access revocation and key rotation, as
well as to extend the PCS of messages in transit [CCG16] to backups of messaging history
stored in the cloud. We then formally defined PCS for PRE. Our definition is strong in the
sense that only the current secret key must be kept secret to ensure that it is not possible
to tell which ciphertext has been re-encrypted. We note that this is stronger than the
reversal attacks considered in Chapter IV. We then discussed how PCS can be proven using
a number of existing security properties, before giving an explicit PRE scheme, pcBV-PRE,
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that meets this definition, based on BV-PRE– a practical PRE scheme originally presented
in [PRSV17]. A particular advantage of our scheme is that it does not rely on sub-optimal
parameter choices to prove PCS. A useful extension to this work would be to construct
alternative PRE schemes with PCS that permit an arbitrary number of re-encryptions.
In Chapter VI we explored stronger adversaries that can adaptively corrupt keys. We
presented proofs for the most adaptive model to date, where the adversary can both corrupt
keys and build the re-encryption graph adaptively. We identified a number of properties
that imply that a PRE scheme secure in the selective model is also secure in the adaptive
model. Our proofs demonstrate a sub-exponential security loss and do not rely on inefficient
methods. In doing so, we proved that pcBV-PRE is adaptively secure. Helpful follow-up
work could investigate whether it is possible to emulate our results using an alternative
method that does not rely on token-source privacy. As most existing PRE schemes are
not token-source private, such an extension may be applicable to a larger number of
existing schemes, making adaptive security more easily achievable. Another extension is to
investigate whether the techniques presented in Chapter VI for proving adaptive security
can be applied to symmetric and/or bidirectional PRE schemes. Results in this area may
also be applicable to updatable encryption schemes. For adaptive security, one possible
avenue for achieving this might be to apply recent techniques in proving IND-CCA security
for updatable encryption by Klooß, Lehmann and Rupp [KLR19a].
We finish by suggesting some general extensions to our work. One possible continuation
is to extend all our contributions to the CCA model. Another future avenue could explore
whether the challenge graph observation can be deployed to areas outside PRE. This
may enable other cryptographic primitives to be proven secure with respect to adaptive
key corruptions. Finally, we note that it would also be useful to explore methods for
re-encrypting longer messages without sacrificing security, as this would make the scheme
more useful in practice. One of the main challenges here is for the resulting construction to
have PCS, as this is not the case for the key encapsulation method. It would be especially
desirable for such a scheme to have the majority of the computation performed by the
proxy as opposed to the client, as this better aligns with many reasons for outsourcing
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Updatable encryption is a similar primitive to PRE in that it also re-encrypts ciphertexts
from one key to another key. The main difference is that, as updatable encryption was
created as a means of enforcing key rotation, keys are associated with epochs, and re-
encryptions are performed sequentially from one epoch to the next. This means the
resulting re-encryption graph is a chain (or collection of chains). The following definition is
taken from [LT18], although we note that an alternative definition that is more similar to
PRE is given in [KLR19a]. We give the original definition as it better fits the descriptions
of updatable encryption schemes and security models discussed in this thesis.
Definition A.1. An updatable encryption scheme consists of the following algorithms:
• Setup(1λ) $→ (params, k0): A probabilistic algorithm that outputs a set of parameters
and an initial symmetric key k0.
As usual params is input to every subsequent algorithm, but we leave it out for
compactness of notation.
• Next(ke)
$→ (ke+1,∆e,e+1): A probabilistic algorithm that takes a symmetric key ke
for epoch e, it outputs a new key ke+1 for epoch e + 1 and an update token ∆e,e+1
from epoch e to epoch e+ 1.
• Enc(ke,m)
$→ ce: A probabilistic algorithm that takes a message m and epoch key ke
and produces a ciphertext ce.
• Dec(ke, ce)→ {m′,⊥}: A deterministic algorithm that takes a ciphertext ce and epoch
key ke and produces either an element of the message space m′ or an error symbol ⊥.
• Upd(∆e−1,e, ce)
($)→ ce+1: An algorithm that is either probabilistic or deterministic that
takes an update token ∆e−1,e and ciphertext ce and outputs an updated ciphertext
213
ce+1.
An updatable encryption scheme is correct if the underlying encryption scheme given
by SE = {KeyGen,Enc,Dec} is correct, and if for all messages m ∈ M, initial keys
k0
$← Setup(1λ), subsequent keys and update tokens {(ke,∆e−1,e)
$← Next(ke−1)}e=1, all
fresh ciphertexts c0
$← Enc(k0,m), and all re-encrypted ciphertexts cj
($)← Upd(∆j−1,j , cj−1)
for 1 ≤ j ≤ e:
Dec(kj , cj)→ m.
We note that it is named as an explicit goal of updatable encryption that re-encrypted
ciphertexts should be as secure as fresh ones, meaning that all components of a ciphertext
should be updated upon re-encryption. To our knowledge, the only other re-encryption
schemes are key rotation schemes [EPRS17], which are essentially the same as updatable
encryption schemes, and so we do not give an explicit definition here. Interestingly, security




Confidentiality of symmetric PRE
Here we give definitions for the symmetric setting for easier comparison with other re-
encryption schemes defined with symmetric keys. We leave out some security games where








return b′ = b
ChalEnc(i,m0,m1)
($)→ c∗b







Figure B.1: symIND-CPA, the symmetric variant of the IND-CPA
game. Again, we give a multi-key, multi-challenge variant.
We present oracles commonly used in games for symmetric PRE schemes in Figure B.2.
OKeyGen(1
λ)




















Figure B.2: Common oracles used in security games for symmetric
PRE. OReEnc is described in the specific security games, as its




Definition C.1. An encryption scheme SE is ε-Indistinguishable against Chosen Plaintext
Attacks (ε-SE-IND-CPA-secure) if for all PPT adversaries A:
∣∣∣Pr[symIND-CPASEA (1λ) = 1]− Pr[symIND-CPASEA (1λ) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ ε,
where symIND-CPAbSEA (1λ) is defined in Figure B.1. If ε is negligible as parameterised by the
security parameter λ, then we say the scheme isIndistinguishable against Chosen Plaintext
Attacks (sym-CPA-secure).
A symmetric PRE scheme sPRE is (ε-sym-CPA-secure) if the encryption scheme given by


















if `∗ > L− 1 : return ⊥
c← Enc(k0,m∗, `∗)
c′
(0) ($)← ReEnc(∆0,1, c)
c′




Figure C.1: Experiments for the symmetric source-hiding property.
L is the number of times a ciphertext can be re-encrypted without
breaking the correctness conditions.












where SH is defined in Figure C.1. If ε is negligible as parameterised by the security





Kchal,Kcorrupt, Chonest, Cchal, Thonest,DRG = ∅




($)← AOEnc,OReKeyGen,OReEnc,ChalReEnc1 (1λ, state)
Kchal ← UpdateChallengeKeys(Kchal,DRG)
if Kchal ∩ Kcorrupt 6= ∅ : return ⊥
return b′ = b
OReEnc(c, i, j, [∆i,j ])
($)→ c′
if ∆i,j given :
if (i, j,∆i,j) /∈ Thonest : return ⊥
else : ∆i,j
($)← ReKeyGen(ki, kj)
if (i, c) 6∈ Chonest : return ⊥
c′
$← ReEnc(∆i,j , c)
Chonest.add{(j, c′)}
if (i, c) ∈ Cchal :
Cchal.add{(j, c′)},Kchal.add{kj}
return c′
ChalReEnc(i, j, [∆i,j , ]c0, c1)
($)→ c′b
if |c0| 6= |c1| OR called = true : return ⊥
if (i, c0), (i, c1) 6∈ Chonest OR (i, j,∆i,j) 6∈ Thonest : return ⊥
c′0
$← ReEnc(∆i,j , c0)
c′1
$← ReEnc(∆i,j , c1)
Chonest.add{(j, c′b)}, Cchal.add{(j, c′b)},Kchal.add{kj}
called← true
return c′b
Figure C.2: The symmetric variant of selective PCS game.
Definition C.3. A symmetric PRE scheme sPRE is said to be ε-post-compromise secure









where symPostCompsPREA (1λ) is defined in Figure C.2.
If ε is negligible as parameterised by the security parameter, then we say the scheme is
Post-Compromise Security (PCS).
C: 1 RISE





Select a λ-bit prime q
Select a generator g of the group Zq
params = (Zq, g, q)
x
$← Z∗q


































c′0 ← c∆0 · y′r
′
c′1 ← c1 · gr
′





Figure C.3: RISE, an updatable encryption scheme with PCS as
defined in [LT18].
Re-encrypted ciphertexts have the form
c′ = ((yr)x





In other words, it effectively creates a fresh encryption using randomness r̄ = r + r′.
We give the equivalent lemma to Lemma V.6 for symmetric PRE, using RISE as an
example in our proof.
Lemma C.1. sIND-UPD 6=⇒ symmetric PCS.
Proof. For this proof, we use RISE as a counterexample. We note that RISE [LT18] is proven
to be sIND-UPD. Because RISE is not unidirectional, it does not have PCS by Lemma V.2.
To see this, we consider the trivial adaptation of RISE for general proxy re-encryption1 as
this fits more with our notation, but we observe that the original construction defined as
an updatable encryption scheme is also sufficient for the proof.
• RISE′.KeyGen(1λ) : x $← Z∗q , (pk, sk) =, (x, gx)
1We allow for re-encryptions between arbitrary keys as opposed to sequentially from ki to ki+1.
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C: 1 RISE
• RISE′.Enc(pk,m) : r $← Z∗q , c← (pkr, gr ·m)
• RISE′.Dec(sk,m) : m′ ← c1 · c−1/sk0
• RISE′.ReKeyGen(ski, skj) : ∆i,j = (skj/ski, pkj) = (xj/xi, gxj )
• RISE′.ReEnc(∆i,j , c) : (∆, y′) = ∆i,j , (c0, c1)← c, r′
$← Z∗q , c′ ← (c∆0 · y′
r′ , c1 · gr
′
)





IND-UPD [LT18, definition 3] is a post-compromise security notion for updatable encryption
schemes, which are a variant of symmetric PCS schemes. The main difference in updatable
encryption is that key updates happen sequentially from ki to ki+1, meaning the re-
encryption graph is always a chain. Another notable difference between updatable encryption
schemes and PRE schemes is that they contain an algorithm Next, which generates a new
key and an update token from the old key to the new one as opposed to defining these
functions separately.
Here we adapt the selective definition that we presented in Definition D.1 for the
public-key setting.
Definition D.1. A PRE scheme PRE is said to be ε-pksIND-UPD-secure (selectively









where pksIND-UPDPREA (1λ) is defined in Figure D.1.






e := 0, e∗ := ⊥,DRG := {v0}











(e, c1) 6∈ Chonest
)
∨ (|c0| 6= |c1|) :
return ⊥





($)← AOEnc,ONext,OReEnc,OLearnTok,OReEnc1 (1λ, state)
Kchal ← UpdateChallengeKeys(Kchal,DRG)
if Kchal ∩ Kcorrupt 6= ∅ : return ⊥













∆e−1,e ← ReKeyGen( ske−1, pke )
if e∗ 6= ⊥ :





if (e− 1, ce−1) 6∈ Chonest :
return ⊥
if (ReEnc is deterministic) ∧ (e = e∗) :










if (i > e) ∨ (i = e∗) : return ⊥
if PRE is unidirectional :
DRG.add{→e i−1,i} // directed edge
else (PRE is bidirectional) :






Figure D.1: The pksIND-UPD game, a public-key adaptation of
sIND-UPD (Figure V.3). Differences from the original IND-UPD




Definition E.1. A PRE scheme PRE is said to have (ε, κ)-adaptive Post-Compromise









where a-PostCompPREA (1λ) is defined in Figure E.1 and κ is the maximum number of keys
generated in a-PostCompPREA (1λ).
If ε is negligible and κ is polynomial as determined by the security parameter, then we





Kcorrupt, Thonest, Chonest, Cchal = ∅








if Kchal ∩ Kcorrupt 6= ∅ :
return ⊥
else :
























OPCReEnc(i, j, [∆i,j ], c)
if (i, c) /∈ Chonest : return ⊥




($)← ReEnc(∆i,j , c)
Chonest.add{j, c′}




ChalPCReEnc(i, j, [∆i,j , ] c0, c1)








(i, c1) 6∈ Chonest
)
return ⊥




$← ReEnc(∆i,j , c0)
c′1
$← ReEnc(∆i,j , c1)
Kchal.add{ski}
Chonest.add{(i, c)}, Cchal.add{(i, c)}
called← true
return c′b
Figure E.1: The adaptive PCS game, the adaptive version of
PostCompPREA (1
λ) (Figure V.6).
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